

FROM THE EDITOR

The first issue of the International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food appears almost a decade after the formal establishment of the Research Committee on Sociology of Agriculture of the International Sociological Association, of which the journal is the official publication. It follows by almost two decades the establishment of an international network of sociologists who research issues pertaining to the sociology of agriculture and food. The delay between these two latter events and the publication of the journal reflects the growth of this substantive area as well as the existence of a critical mass of scholars interested in the topic. More importantly, the publication of the journal testifies to the increasing social importance that the issues debated within these pages have assumed in the international and national contexts.

After several years of informal work both within the domestic context and at the international level, the "Sociology of Agriculture" group was officially constituted as a permanent organization of the International Sociological Association at the X World Congress of Sociology held in Mexico City in 1982. On that occasion the basic research areas and theoretical emphasis of the group were reaffirmed. In particular, attention was paid to the definition of a common research agenda and to differences between the sociology of agriculture and the parent discipline of rural sociology.

Since then, the central themes of research of the "Sociology of Agriculture" group have

gravitated around the contradictory development of agriculture and the effects of its outcomes on various segments of the world population. More significantly, the investigation has emphasized the global dimension of agriculture. The transnational character of agricultural production and its regional, domestic and international consequences at both the empirical and theoretical levels have been recent foci of sociologist members of the Research Committee. Furthermore, the recognition of the systemic character of contemporary agriculture and the limiting nature of the agrarian question have forcefully proposed the introduction into the research agenda of the "food question." As a result, at the XII World Congress of Sociology it was decided to change the original name of the Research Committee from "Sociology of Agriculture" to "Sociology of Agriculture and Food." This change is reflected in the title of the journal.

This brief account of the investigative agenda of the Sociology of Agriculture and Food group makes apparent the significant scientific departure from the parent discipline of rural sociology. Differences exist at both the substantive and epistemological levels. Rural sociology has been traditionally concerned with rurality and has been understood as a discipline which studies phenomena as they occur in rural settings. Sociology of Agriculture and Food is not directly interested in the study of rurality. Though rural events may take center stage in some of its

studies, its emphasis is on the totality of the processes of production and distribution of food and their relationship to society. Nevertheless, it should not be considered a discipline separate from sociology. Rather, Sociology of Agriculture and Food aims to be a substantive area within sociology whose boundaries are set by the specific characteristics of the issues investigated.

At the epistemological level, Sociology of Agriculture and Food departs from the almost exclusive functionalist - positivist posture typical of rural sociological studies. Its roots lie in a large and diverse background which includes among others Neo-Marxism, Neo-Weberianism, Dialectical and Critical Theory and Phenomenology. In essence, studies within the Sociology of Agriculture and Food should continue the critical tradition of scientific investigation which has been a constant and important component of the entire enterprise of sociology. This critical posture would like to be reflected in the type of contributions published in the journal.

The International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food though mirrors the activity of the international network of scholars affiliated with the Research Committee of Sociology of Agriculture and Food, it does not wish to be an "exclusive" publication. On the contrary, its aim is to provide new opportunities for scholars who share the same substantive interests, wish to contribute to the debate and wish to be part of an international socially concerned community. The absence of a specific journal which addresses issues in this general area with a critical and international view point has been one of the major motivations inspiring the undertaking of this initiative.

The general format of the journal is characterized by a principal section containing refereed articles. This section is titled "Articles"

and is accompanied by two other sections. The first of these, "The Forum" contains papers which specifically address current topics from a scientific view point. In this issue the theme of "Globalization and the State" is treated in three papers. The second section is called "Proposed Research" and contains research ideas and proposals. It is the objective of this section to inform readers of current research activities in order to develop information on new research directions and to stimulate scholarly cooperation.

It is important, at this point, to point out the bilingual character of the journal. The lack of a dialogue between an English speaking "North" and a Spanish speaking "South" has been a source of concern for many intellectuals interested in this scientific area. It is hoped that the establishment of a bilingual international journal will constitute a small yet important step toward the enhancement of a North-South dialogue which represents one of the fundamental objectives that the Research Committee on Sociology of Agriculture and Food would like to foster. While it is not the aim of the journal to publish the same articles in both English and Spanish, articles written in English and those written in Spanish will be published in their original languages along with translations of their summaries. In this inaugural volume, the articles contained in the "Forum" and in the "Proposed Research" sections are published in both languages.

Finally, at the outset of this new initiative and on behalf of the members of the Research Committee, I would like to thank Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (CENDES) of the Central University of Venezuela and the College of Agriculture at the University of Missouri-Columbia for their institutional support. Their contributions are pivotal for the realization of the tasks at hand. ■

EDITORIAL

La primera edición de la Revista Internacional de Sociología sobre Agricultura y Alimentos se publica casi una década después del establecimiento formal del "Comité de Investigaciones sobre Sociología de la Agricultura", adscrito a la Asociación Internacional de Sociología. La revista viene a constituirse en su publicación oficial. Del mismo modo, la edición de esta Revista tiene lugar casi dos décadas después del establecimiento de una red internacional de sociólogos que se dedican a la investigación de los temas relativos a la sociología sobre agricultura y alimentos. La demora entre estos acontecimientos y la publicación de la Revista, refleja el crecimiento de este importante campo de investigación, así como, la existencia de una masa crítica de especialistas interesados en el tema. Y lo que quizás es más significativo, la publicación de esta Revista evidencia la creciente importancia social que han cobrado los temas discutidos en estas páginas, en contextos nacionales e internacionales.

Lucgo de varios años de trabajo informal, tanto en niveles nacionales como internacionales, el "Grupo de Trabajo sobre Sociología de la Agricultura" se constituyó oficialmente como una organización permanente de la Asociación Internacional de Sociología en el X Congreso Mundial de Sociología, celebrado en la ciudad de México en 1982. En esa ocasión se reafirmaron las áreas básicas de investigación, así como, el énfasis teórico del grupo. En particular, se prestó atención a la definición de una agenda de investigación común y a las diferencias entre la sociología de la agricultura y su disciplina origen, la sociología rural. Desde entonces, los temas centrales de investigación del Grupo de Trabajo

sobre "Sociología de la Agricultura" han girado en torno al desarrollo contradictorio de la agricultura y a los efectos de sus consecuencias sobre varios segmentos de la población mundial. Lo que es más significativo, la investigación ha enfatizado la dimensión global de la agricultura. El carácter transnacional de la producción agrícola y sus consecuencias regionales, nacionales e internacionales, tanto en los niveles empírico como teórico, han sido el objeto de interés reciente de los sociólogos miembros del Comité de Investigaciones. Además, el reconocimiento del carácter sistemático de la agricultura contemporánea y la naturaleza limitante de la cuestión agraria han incorporado con cierta fuerza la "cuestión alimentaria" en la agenda de investigación del Grupo. Como resultado de ello, en el XII Congreso Mundial de Sociología, se decidió cambiar el nombre original del Comité de Investigaciones sobre "Sociología de la Agricultura" por el de "Sociología sobre Agricultura y Alimentos". Este cambio está reflejado en el nombre de la Revista.

Esta breve descripción de los intereses de investigación del Grupo de Sociología sobre Agricultura y Alimentos, hace evidente su significativa desviación científica de su disciplina origen, la sociología rural. Entre ambas existen diferencias en el nivel substantivo así como en el nivel epistemológico.

Tradicionalmente, la sociología rural se ha interesado en la problemática rural, y ha sido comprendida como una disciplina que estudia los fenómenos tal como ocurren en el marco rural. La sociología sobre agricultura y alimentos no está directamente interesada en el estudio de los fenómenos rurales. Aunque los acontecimientos rurales pueden ocupar un lugar central en algunos

de sus estudios, esta nueva disciplina enfatiza la totalidad de los procesos de producción y distribución de los alimentos y su relación con la sociedad. Sin embargo, no por ello debe considerarse una disciplina independiente de la sociología. Por el contrario, la sociología sobre agricultura y alimentos se propone ser un campo significativo dentro de la sociología, cuyos límites son establecidos por las características específicas de los temas investigados.

En el nivel epistemológico, la sociología sobre agricultura y alimentos se desvía de la tradicional posición funcionalista-positivista de los estudios sociológicos rurales. Sus raíces se encuentran en un amplio y diversos campo que incluye, entre otras teorías, el Neo-Marxismo, el Neo-Weberianismo, la Teoría Dialéctica y Crítica, y la Fenomenología. Esencialmente, los estudios dentro de la sociología sobre agricultura y alimentos deben continuar la tradición crítica de la investigación científica que ha constituido un componente constante e importante de todo el desarrollo de la sociología. Esta posición crítica quiere ser reflejada en el tipo de contribuciones publicadas en la Revista.

La Revista Internacional de Sociología sobre Agricultura y Alimentos, si bien refleja la actividad de la red internacional de especialistas asociados con el "Comité de Investigaciones de Sociología sobre Agricultura y Alimentos", no desea ser una publicación "exclusiva". Al contrario, su meta es brindar nuevas oportunidades a los especialistas que comparten los mismos intereses esenciales, que desean contribuir al debate, así como también, ser parte de la comunidad científico-social internacional interesada. La ausencia de una Revista específica que se dedique a los temas de esta área general con un punto de vista crítico e internacional ha sido una de las mayores motivaciones que han inspirado esta iniciativa.

El formato general de la Revista se caracteriza por una sección principal que contiene un conjunto de artículos arbitrados. Esta sección se titula "Artículos" y está acompañada de otras dos secciones. La primera de ellas, "El Foro", contiene

artículos que, específicamente, tratan temas actuales desde un punto de vista científico. En esta edición se trata el tema de "La Globalización y El Estado", en tres artículos. La segunda sección se titula "Propuestas de Investigación". Su objetivo es informar a los lectores acerca de las actividades de investigación actuales para intercambiar información hacia nuevas direcciones de investigación y estimular la cooperación entre especialistas.

Del mismo modo, es importante puntualizar el carácter bilingüe de la Revista. La falta de un diálogo entre un "Norte" de habla inglesa y un "Sur" de habla hispana ha sido fuente de preocupación para muchos intelectuales interesados en esta área científica. Esperamos que el establecimiento de una Revista bilingüe internacional constituirá un paso pequeño, aunque importante, hacia el aumento de un diálogo Norte-Sur, el cual representa uno de los objetivos fundamentales que el "Comité de Investigaciones de Sociología sobre Agricultura y Alimentos" quisiera promover. No es el propósito de la Revista publicar los mismos artículos tanto en inglés como en español, los artículos escritos en inglés y aquellos escritos en español serán publicados en sus idiomas originales junto con las traducciones de sus resúmenes. Sin embargo, en este volumen inaugural, los artículos contenidos en las secciones "El Foro" y "Propuestas de Investigación" son publicados en ambos idiomas.

Finalmente, en el comienzo de esta nueva iniciativa, y en nombre de los miembros del Comité de Investigaciones, quisiera agradecer al Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (CENDES) de la Universidad Central de Venezuela y a la Facultad de Agricultura de la Universidad de Missouri-Columbia, por su apoyo institucional. Sus contribuciones son fundamentales para la realización de las tareas propuestas.

The Globalization and Theories of the State of the Agricultural and Food Sector

Alessandro Bonanno

The paper investigates the theoretical dislocation between the domestic oriented character of theories of the State and the transnational character of theories of socio-economic development. Employing the case of the food and agricultural sector, it is argued that the literature in this area has emphasized the transnational dimension of capital accumulation and the process of by-passing State authority at the national level. This situation mandates a re-evaluation of State theories in regard to the international dimension of current processes of capital accumulation. Furthermore, the present analysis suggests patterns of "contradictory convergence" in which expansion at the transnational level of State action is demanded by transnational corporations and subordinate classes alike. This demand, however, is contradictory, as it finds its limits in the transnational bourgeoisie's desire to avoid State action. Politically, as a result of this situation the locus of emancipatory social action should be increasingly transferred to the international arena.

Alessandro Bonanno is Assistant Professor of Rural Sociology at the University of Missouri-Columbia, USA. He has researched among other topics, the structure of agriculture, regional and international development, aging and the State. He is the author of numerous journal articles and books, among them *Small Farms* (1987) *Sociology of Agriculture* (1989) *Agrarian Policies and Agricultural Systems* (1990). He received his Ph. D. in Sociology from the University of Kentucky, USA.

Introduction

Recent transformations in the agricultural and food sector have influenced a number of rural sociologists to argue the emergence of a transnational system of agricultural and food production (Bonanno et al., 1990, Campbell, 1990; Friedland, 1988; Friedland et al. 1991; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989; McMichael and Myhre, 1991). In these analyses center stage is occupied by the role of the State vis-a-vis new trends in the economic and political spheres. Epistemologically and with some exceptions (e.g. Campbell, 1990), the theoretical underpinnings of these works rest upon Marxian interpretations of societal development and the relationship between the economy and superstructural⁽¹⁾ elements in society. The centrality of the Marxian theoretical construction in regard to these issues is made evident by the long standing attention paid by Marxian scholars to the role of the State in society and by the number of Marxian studies analyzing the phenomena of multinationalization and transnationalization⁽²⁾ of the food and agricultural system. Indeed, the problematics of multinationalization of food and agricultural production and its later transnationalization have been developed predominantly within the Marxian debate in the sociology of agriculture⁽³⁾.

(*) I would like to extend my appreciation to Gary Green, Bill Friedland, Phil McMichael and Doug Constance for their comments on earlier versions of this manuscript.

The present study would like to contribute to the Marxian scholarship in the sociology of agriculture and sociology of the State by analyzing the theoretical implications that the transnationalization of the agricultural and food sector has in regard to the role of the State. The paper opens with a brief review of the major theories of the State: the "instrumentalist," "relative autonomy" and the "mixed approach." In the following section the domestic dimension of the relationship between the polity and the economy in Marxian analyses is illustrated. Particular attention is paid to the domestic dimension of the original work of Marx. In this respect, it is argued that the stage of capitalist development achieved in the middle of the last century, the effort to illustrate the laws of capitalist development and the emphasis placed on the British case did not allow Marx to transcend the domestic dimension of capitalist development. Furthermore, it is maintained that though Marxian theories of colonialism and imperialism were developed in the decades following Marx's death, they reflected the multinational development of capital in a manner which emphasized the struggle of national capitalist States and national capitals to control the international arena. In this context the domestic oriented dimension of the capitalist State was maintained. Finally, a discussion on the national cultural dimension that the reproduction of capitalist rule mandates is also undertaken.

In the third section the transnationalization of the economic sphere is briefly illustrated, while the fourth section of the paper reviews some of the recent literature on transnationalization and its relationship to State action. Focusing on the literature on the State and on that of transnationalization, the next section provides a discussion of the dislocation between the global dimension of capital accumulation and the domestic dimension of State action. It is argued that the theoretical underpinnings of current theories of the State are becoming increasingly

inadequate. Furthermore, it is maintained that the mediation of the various fractions of capital carried on by the State at the domestic level is unresolved in the international arena. Finally, it is pointed out that subordinate classes find their power in society reduced due to the dislocation between State power and economic activities. The concluding portion of the paper illustrates patterns of "contradictory convergence" in which expansion of the transnational level of State action is demanded by transnational corporations and subordinate classes alike. This demand is contradictory, as it finds its limits in the transnational bourgeoisie's desire to avoid State action. Politically, as a result of this situation the locus of emancipatory social action should be increasingly transferred to the international arena.

Theories of the State in the Sociological Literature

The role of the State in society has been a central theme of sociological debate in recent years (Block, 1980; Domhoff, 1979; Hooks, 1990; Offe, 1985; Poulantzas, 1978; Prechel, 1990; Quadagno, 1990). Originally formulated in the context of political sociology, Marxist sociology and the sociology of complex organizations, theories of the State have been increasingly employed to address issues in the area of sociology of agriculture (Bonanno, 1987a, 1987b; Friedland, 1988; 1983; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989; Mc Michael and Myhre, 1991; Green, 1987; Gilbert and Howe, 1988). In this debate the State has been identified as a) an institution instrumentally controlled by the ruling class; b) an entity endowed with relative autonomy; and c) an institution in which the instrumental dimension and the autonomous dimension are both contained in the State's historical role.

The instrumentalist account (Domhoff, 1978) views the State in capitalism as either "an instrument for promoting the common interests of the ruling (capitalist) class" (Offe and Ronge,

1979:346) or "a committee of the ruling class directly manipulated by the members of this class" (Carnoy, 1984:214).

Two types of instrumental theories have emerged. The first calls for an identity between the ruling class and the State officialdom (Miliband, 1969; 1970; Domhoff, 1979; 1967). In this case, State bureaucrats tend to belong to the same class or classes that dominate society and are bound to it by common educational backgrounds, friends, and family relations. Though it is possible for members of other classes to enter the upper class, it is the latter which controls the political apparatus. The second theory, which has also been labeled "State Monopoly Capital Theory", indicates that the monopolistic-corporate fractions of the bourgeoisie exercise direct control over the State (O'Connor, 1973; 1974). Essentially, it is maintained that the control that monopolistic-corporate class fractions exercise over the economy entails, almost automatically, control over the State.

The theoretical and empirical bases of the instrumentalist approach have been criticized by studies which have emphasized the complex character of the relationship between the economy and the polity. Moreover, empirically observed discrepancies between the action of the State and that of the ruling class have cast doubts on the ability of the latter to control directly the former. Drawing from portions of the work of Marx (1964:5-69) and more recent formulations (Gramsci, 1975, 1971; Habermas, 1975; Horkheimer, 1974; Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972; Lukács 1971; Marcuse, 1964) which emphasize the role that ideology, the polity and the superstructure in general play in the process of development of capitalism, the relative autonomy approach underscores the partial independence of superstructural elements from the economic structure. Accordingly, it calls for the relative autonomy of the State (an element of the superstructure) from the economy (the

structure) (Block, 1980; 1977; Poulantzas, 1978, Offe and Ronge, 1979).

In essence it is argued that the State reproduces class relations not because one class or fraction of class directly controls it, but because the State is interested in reproducing "the rules and social relationships that are presupposed by the class rule of the capitalist class" (Offe and Ronge, 1979:346). The "instrumentalist" and "relative autonomy" theories have generally been employed in exclusive terms (for the debate in sociology of agriculture see Bonanno, 1987a; 1987b; Green, 1987, 1989). In other words, it has been maintained that the two camps are based on different assumptions. Indeed, in the illustration of the instrumentalist and relative autonomy theories attention has been paid to the relatively diverse theoretical origins of the two positions. Offer and Ronge (1979:345-347), for instance, while recognizing the Marxian roots of both positions, point out that the "instrumentalist" position is rooted in some passages of the *Manifesto*, while the "relative autonomy" approach finds its origins in the analysis contained in *The German Ideology*. However, it is also acknowledged that this distinction is more "heuristic" than real (Green, "221) and that there are more similarities than differences between the two (Bonanno, 1988:133).

An analysis which explicitly rejects the separation between the instrumentalist and relative autonomy positions is provided by William H. Friedland (1988; 1983). Friedland's work assumes more relevance for the present discussion as it has been developed within the debate in the sociology of agriculture and represents one of the innovative attempts to adapt debates in general sociology to issues relevant to rural sociology. In essence, for Friedland the role of the State in society is not given, but rather depends upon specific historical circumstances. Indeed, these circumstances are the sources of an instrumentalist or autonomous posture of the State in society. Employing the cases of various

agricultural commodities, he demonstrates that the State is simultaneously called upon to organize various interests of the ruling class and to mediate between the ruling class interests and opposing interests emerging from other classes (relative autonomy theory). However, he further demonstrates that in specific instances the State also operates as an instrument of the ruling class, as the latter directly and effectively controls the action of the former (instrumentalist theory). Empirically, he concludes, neither theory is sufficient to describe the complex patterns of State involvement in society. Paradoxically, each theory becomes correct under differing circumstances.

Similar conclusions have been reached by scholars working within both the Marxian and the State Center paradigms and examining a variety of historical cases (e.g. Campbell and Lindberg, 1990; Hooks, 1990; Jenkins and Brents, 1989; Prechel, 1990).

As underscored by many students (Carnoy, 1984; Bonanno, 1987b; Green, 1987; O'Connor, 1973; 1974), the various theories of the State contain a number of important similarities. Among these are the overall tenets that accumulation of capital is not possible without the aid of the State and that the State cannot exist without the continuous existence of an accumulation process. In more specific terms this signifies, first, that accumulation of capital and the rule of the bourgeois class in society depend upon the ability of the State to maintain the conditions necessary for the reproduction of capital. Second, accumulation of capital must be legitimized and the State provides legitimization through the mediation of the various interests in society. This phenomenon refers to both mediation among members of the bourgeois class and among the bourgeois class and other classes. Third, the State obtains its financial resources from the taxation of revenue generated through the accumulation process. Accordingly and historically, the continuous existence of the accumulation process

is paramount for the existence of the State. In essence, for all the above mentioned schools there is an intrinsic relationship between the process of capitalist development and the existence of the State apparatus.

Global Development and Theories of the State

The domestic dimension of the relationship between polity and the economy.

Central to the objectives of this paper is the common characteristic of the various theories of the State which views the relationship between the polity and the economy as framed in domestic terms. More specifically, in Marxist analyses the State has been conceptualized as a predominantly domestic entity which regulates the process of reproduction of capital.

This posture finds its roots in the historical phases of capitalist development in the analytical importance that the historical context assumes in Marxism. In a nutshell, the development of Marxian theories of the State reflected the evolution of capitalism and its interpretations provided by scientific and political circles. Three general items are of importance here.

a) The original work of Marx is based on the analysis of the development of national capitalism. More specifically, it is an illustration of the establishment and development of the capitalist mode of production in Great Britain (e.g. *Capital*).

b) Theories of colonialism and imperialism first, and later theories analyzing the development of multinational capital considered colonialism and imperialism as phenomena which reflect the extension of national interests in the international arena.

c) The work of early twentieth century Marxists concerned with the relationship of polity and the economy emphasized the national cultural dimension necessary for the maintenance of capitalism (e.g. Gramsci, 1975; 1971).

Let us briefly review each of these points.

The original work of Marx.

The original Marxist analysis of capitalist development (e.g. *Capital*; see Sweezy, 1942) and particularly the discussions on "Primitive Accumulation" (Marx, 1977:873-940) and on the "General Laws of Capitalist Accumulation" (Marx, 1977:762-853) are based on the analysis of a single national case (the British case). In Marx's work references are made to other "national" cases, such as the Prussian and the French, to indicate historical differences from the British example originally discussed. These examples are introduced to demonstrate the generality of the laws of capitalist development which, nevertheless, produced particular outcomes at individual national levels. In this respect, these examples re-captured the stages of capitalist development which historically occurred and which characterized the formation and consolidation of national capitalisms (Brewer, 1980:18; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989:98-99). From its establishment in a few initial geographical enclaves, capitalism, according to Marx, expanded to other regions, becoming the "world" dominant mode of production (Marx, 1977:940; Marx and Engels, 1963:25-29). Historically, Marx's analysis could hardly have been different, as he examined a period characterized by the emergence of national capitalism in which its international expansion was, heuristically and politically speaking, less relevant (Dobb, 1963).

Marx's emphasis on the domestic dimension of capitalist development⁽⁴⁾ has led many modern scholars to stress the limited original contribution that the German philosopher provided to international issues (Brewer, 1980:18-20; Dobb, 1963; Mutti and Poli, 1975:28-29). Despite his focus on the functioning of capitalism in a closed economic system (Mandel, 1977:12; Brewer, 1980:27) and his declared intention to study the international market and uneven capitalist development internationally (e.g. see the 1857 introduction to *A Contribution to the Critique*

of the Political Economy; Marx, 1976), Marx never succeeded in elaborating an organic theory of capitalist accumulation on a world scale, even in relation to the historical period of colonialism. A limited analysis of colonialism is suggested in a non-systematic way only in some parts of *Capital* and in a series of articles dealing with European penetration in China and India that Marx wrote in the 1853-60 period when he was a foreign correspondent for the "New York Daily Tribune." In essence, then, both from the view point of the creation of the capitalist system and from the point of view of the internationalization of capitalism, Marx's work is domestically centered. In this context, the original Marxian formulation of the relationship between the polity and the economy does not represent an exception.

Theories of colonialism and imperialism

It would be misleading, however, to argue that the international dimension of capitalist development is foreign to the work of Marx and Marxist tradition. Despite the incomplete character of the classic work of Marx on this subject, the richness of Marx's theory has led many scholars to undertake the task of analyzing the diffusion of capitalism on a world scale. Furthermore and from a historical view point, only a few years after the death of Marx the rapid expansion of capitalism made the analysis of the international question a scientific and political imperative. It was in this context that the classic works of Lenin, Luxemburg, Bukharin, Hilferding and others on colonialism and imperialism emerged.

Reflecting the stage of capitalist development existing at that time (circa 1910), these classic studies of colonialism and imperialism conceptualized these phenomena in terms of "national capitals" which matured into their monopolistic form and expanded beyond the boundaries of their territories of origin (Bukharin, 1972; Hilferding, 1970; Lenin, 1926; Luxemburg, 1971). Indeed, according to Bukharin (1972) and

Lenin (1926) it was through the establishment of national monopolies that the phase of imperialism developed. In their view, the growth of capitalism in Western nations led to the establishment of domestic monopolies. In turn, monopolies captured the nation state's organizational powers to foster their interests domestically and compete internationally against other national capitals. The competition among various monopolistic nations created the preconditions for the imperialist domination of the world. Following similar considerations, Hilferding (1970) argues that monopolies can develop more easily at the domestic level as barriers to foreign competition can be imposed. Once the monopoly stage is achieved, state protectionism ensures the viability of national capitals in the world market. Finally, Rosa Luxemburg (1972) viewed the capitalist solution to crisis of realization (i.e. the inability of capitalists to spend [realize] all their profits) as the incorporation of non-capitalist geographical areas into the sphere of influence of the domestic capital.

These classic Marxian formulations of the expansion of capitalism from a few centers to the entire world were challenged in the 1960's and 1970's by the emergence of the "Dependency Theory" (Frank, 1967a, 1967b), the "World System Theory" (Wallerstein, 1974, 1979) and the "Unequal Exchange Theory" (Emmanuel, 1972). Remaining within the Marxist framework⁽⁵⁾, these accounts responded to the growth of capitalism and its evolution into the phase of "multinational capital" (Dickens and Bonanno, 1988:173; Hoogvelt, 1982). They maintain that capitalism has been a world system since the beginning (*circa* sixteenth century) and that national economies are hierarchically placed in a system of domination in terms of three unequal statuses: core, semi-periphery and periphery (Wallerstein, 1979). Domination is established through the appropriation by core countries of surplus generated in periphery and semi-periphery countries, and the cyclical nature

of the capitalist system is reflected in the upward and downward mobility of nations (Dickens and Bonanno, 1988:174-175; Howe and Sica, 1980:235-236).

The unique merit of these theories lies in the establishment of a clear connection between development and underdevelopment across national boundaries and continents, while acknowledging the emerging multinational dimension of capitalist development. Despite their reformulation of classic Marxian analyses, however, the dependency theory and world system theories' understanding of the development of capitalism is still centered on the concepts of national capital and on its international ramifications. Core countries are essentially exporters of capital, which penetrates peripheral and semi-peripheral countries to foster the process of exploitation (Brewer, 1980:158). Dependent countries, on the other hand, remain the objects of exploitative mechanisms maintained through the establishment of a "Dependent State" (Camoy, 1984:184-192). In this theoretical construction the dependent State is of key importance for two fundamental reasons. First, from the international point of view the State depends on the process of multinational accumulation of capital and the maintenance of the system's division of labor for its existence. This situation means that the dependent State acts as a vehicle for the extraction of surplus from the peripheral economies to the advantage of the metropole (Amin, 1980: 135-136; Frank, 1979:5). Second, the process of multinational exploitation demands the social control of domestic settings, which is achieved through the action of the State apparatus. Domestically, the dependent State ensures the class rule of the dependent bourgeoisie (bourgeoisie compradora) and the subordination of the working classes to foreign capital (Dickens and Bonanno, 1988:175-178). In the case of the dependent State, ultimately, the multinationality of the development of capital requires the maintenance of a national state.

The Articulation of Modes of Production theory (Arrighi, 1978; Laclau, 1971; Taylor, 1979) provides another modern alternative to classic accounts. Though critical of the Dependentistas and generally considered an attempt to re-introduce some of the orthodoxies of Marxism violated by the World System and Dependency theories (Blomstrom and Hettne, 1984:81-90), it ultimately stresses the national dimension of capitalist accumulation. Proponents of the Articulation of Modes of Production theory base their accounts on the concept of social formation (society), which constitutes their unit of analysis. Within social formations the characteristics of the relations of productions are examined to assess the extent to which capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production exist and/or co-exist (articulation). Accordingly, emphasis is placed on the domestic (social formation) character of the relations of production, which postulates a limiting analytical dimension, i.e. the nation. The fact that wage relations transcend national boundaries and the fact that they are dominant at the world level are given little theoretical space in this approach.

The national cultural dimension of capitalist societies

In the Marxist tradition the development of the capitalist State finds its origins in the dissolution of previous forms of production (the economy) and in the organization of political and ideological apparatus which can sustain capital accumulation (the polity) (Marx and Engels, 1963:28-30). Essential to the growth of capitalism is that the economy, the polity and the ideological spheres be controlled by the bourgeoisie. In the economic sphere, the control of the bourgeoisie is achieved through direct control of the means of production. In the political and ideological spheres, bourgeois control is generated through the establishment of bourgeois apparatus (such as

private property, individual liberties, individualism, etc.) which legitimize accumulation of capital (Gramsci, 1975). However, the conditions for the establishment of legitimizing political and ideological apparatus is essentially domestic since it finds its roots in the cultural and historical traditions of that nation. As illustrated by Gramsci (1971, 1975, e.g. see the discussion on historical materialism), the dominant class' ability to reinterpret the cultural and historical traditions of one country in its favor (i.e. to employ these traditions in its hegemonic project) is one of the fundamental conditions for the establishment and success of its rule in society. Accordingly, the State's attempt to legitimize class power depends on its ability to maintain the ruling class' view of the history and culture of the country.

The New Phase of Capitalist Development: The Transition from Multinationality to Transnationality.

The historical conditions which made possible the domestic centered conceptualization of the State and capital accumulation have been gradually altered in recent decades. More specifically, capitalism has abandoned its "multinational" phase to enter a new "transnational" phase. In the multinational phase of capitalist development it was possible to identify corporations with countries of origin (Bonanno, 1987a; Mingione, 1990; Sassen, 1988) and to argue that the most important segments of the State were controlled by monopoly capital (Poulantzas, 1978). In this context, international operations were treated as extensions of entrepreneurial activities designed and engineered in the home country and supported by the home State apparatus.

In the transnational phase, economic activities, identity and loyalty of conglomerates with a

country are decreasingly visible⁽⁶⁾. The large number of acquisitions of companies by other international conglomerates, the decentralization of production across national borders and the transnationalization of the financial sector are all cases in point (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Bonanno, 1987a; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989; Mingione, 1990; Heffernan, 1990; Sassen, 1988). A report in the specialized media describes this process thusly: "As cross-border trade and investment flows reach new heights, big global companies are effectively making decisions with little regard to national boundaries. Though few companies are totally untethered from their home countries, the trend toward a form of 'stateless' corporation is unmistakable" (Business Week, 1990:98).

To be sure, the extent and characteristics of the process of transnationalization have been the subjects of debate. In the progressive camp Gordon (1988) challenges the assertions that there is an increase of movement of productive capital around the world and that, ultimately, interpretations of recent changes in the global economy have been distorted. In the conservative camp, accounts dispute the very existence of phenomena which are considered to be among the most important reasons for the existence of the process of transnationalization (Medoff and Strassman, 1985). Regardless of the arguments presented the transnationalization of the economy and new the dimension of the role of the State in this process are acknowledged in the debate (Gordon, 1988:63).

The changes at the global level have affected the internal organization of a number of productive sectors, including the agricultural and food sector. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that the emerging limits of the national State have been a subject of debate recently (Friedland, 1988; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989:112; McMichael and Myhre, 1991). The globalization of the food and agricultural sector and the implications that this phenomenon has in regard to the issue of the State are discussed in the remaining sections of the paper.

The Globalization of the Agricultural and Food Sector and its Implications in Regard to the Role of the State

Recent analyses of the agricultural and food sector have underscored the process of globalization characterizing the present historical phase. Friedmann and McMichael (1989; 1988) discuss the development of the "second food regime," its global, transnational character and its implications for the State. According to these authors, the first food regime was characterized by the emergence of national economies which governed the development of national states. In this context, agricultural production was concentrated in colonies which traded agricultural products for manufactured goods, labor and capital from the European metropol and in settler colonies which were distinct forms of economy. The second food regime emerged in concomitance with the transnationalization of the agricultural and food order. Transnationalization indicates "(i) intensification of agricultural specialization (for both enterprises and regions) and integration of specific crops and livestock into agro-food chains dominated at both ends by increasingly large industrial capital and (ii) a shift in agricultural products from final use to industrial inputs for manufactured foods" (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989:105). Accordingly, the restructuring of agricultural and food production greatly diminished, yet did not eliminate, the possibility of the national State directing agricultural production to specific ends such as food security, community development, etc. (Friedmann and McMichael 1989:95).

Similar issues are discussed by William D. Heffernan and his associates (Heffernan, 1990; 1984; Constance and Heffernan 1989, forthcoming). According to these authors, the evolution of the food sector has transcended the

national State arena since there has been a concentration of the food sector orchestrated by a few global conglomerates. The global dimension of the concentration of food production is based on these conglomerates' actions to a) increase economic returns by shifting production from one location to another to reduce economic uncertainties and b) avoid State regulations (such as environmental regulations, health regulation, etc.) which have created additional production costs. It is argued that food producing conglomerates are increasingly controlling food commodity markets at the global level and that this control is maintained through bypassing the national State. Though these authors acknowledge that national agricultural policies and national agriculture related policies are relevant in terms of domestic production, they also stress that the "undesired" effects of these policies can largely be avoided by food conglomerates through operating at the transnational level.

Bonanno et al. (1990) also point out the global dimension of agricultural and food production and the inability of national States to mediate the various contradictions emerging at the productive and legitimative levels. Employing the cases of the US and the European Community in a comparative fashion, these authors argue that the complexity of the pattern of interaction between the State and the food producing sector does not allow for a return to a laissez-faire system. More specifically, it is argued that the proposal to "return to the laws of the market" and an elimination of the intervening role of the State is only a theoretical option since in the present phase of advanced capitalism it is socially, economically and politically nonviable. Indeed, though there would be some advantage in eliminating State intervention, the disadvantages and contradictions that would emerge from a withdrawal of State action would be much greater and unacceptable to progressive and regressive societal forces alike (Bonanno et al., 1990:240-244). A further step forward is taken by William

H. Friedland (1988) who discusses both the relationship between the process of transnationalization and the State and the emergence of a transnational State. Employing the case of transnational conglomerates in the food sector, Friedland contends that the emergence of the transnational corporation implies that the State can control these new economic forms only partially. Transnational corporations, in fact, "can only be partially controlled by nation-states because so much of their productive, manufacturing, distributing and marketing functions are nationally-dispersed." (Friedland, 1988:4). He concludes that, despite a push toward the embryonic tendency for the creation of a transnational State, no legal or political entity at that level has yet emerged.

The Dislocation of State and Economy: a Discussion

The literature on the State and on the globalization of the food and agricultural sector provides us with a body of knowledge from which some general considerations on future trends can be inferred. In fact, if both literatures are correct and the phenomena discussed are accurately described, it is obvious that we face a dislocation between the internationalization of the accumulation process and the national dimension of State action. This dislocation, in turn, can have repercussions both at the theoretical and socio-economic levels. Let us examine some of them.

a) If the literature on globalization is accurate, the theoretical underpinnings of current theories of the State become inadequate. Theories of the globalization of capital accumulation have not been accompanied by a transnationalization of the conceptualization of State actions, which remain domestically centered. Current analyses of the State present a discrepancy between the domestic dimension in which the State is viewed and the not necessarily

domestic dimension in which capitalist development is analyzed. In essence, the assumption of the domestic dimension of State action is empirically challenged by the transnational dimension of the economic process. This situation calls for a reformulation of State theories vis-a-vis the transnational process through empirical analysis. As indicated by Friedmann and McMichael (1989:112), the nation-state is increasingly untenable as an "organizing principle of the world economy."

However, as indicated by Friedland (1988), the emergence of a transnational State is presently embryonic and contingent upon the transnationalization of the economic sphere. Nevertheless, the process of transnationalization of the economic sphere does not necessarily involve the transnationalization of other constitutive components of the State such as the cultural and ideological spheres. It can be argued following an orthodox Marxist posture that the transnationalization of the cultural and ideological apparatus would automatically follow the transformation of the economic sphere. However, and drawing from other Marxian theoretical currents, it is possible to reject this hypothesis to argue that the relative autonomy of superstructural elements does not involve an automatic transformation of the ideological and cultural spheres. On the contrary, the relative autonomy of superstructural elements could prolong the simultaneous existence of an increasingly transnational oriented economic system and a still nationally based system of social consensus and legitimization. In this respect, cultural, ethnic and regional political movements can represent relevant forces against the emergence of a transnational State. Regardless of these and other hypotheses, the relationship among the constitutive components of the State vis-a-vis the process of transnationalization should occupy analytical center stage.

b) If the theories of the State are correct in their description of the historical "functions" of

the State in society, then the process of mediation of the various fractions of capital at the international level is unresolved. It has been pointed out that in order for accumulation to occur, there must be a certain degree of harmony in society. This situation, which Block (1980) called "business confidence," refers to two related issues. The first refers to the creation of harmony between the ruling class as a whole and subordinate classes as a whole. The second refers to the harmonization of competition and conflict among the various fractions of the ruling class. Currently at the international level, competing fractions of the bourgeoisie do not seem to have an organizing entity such as that present at the domestic level (i.e. the national State). Put in a different manner, the transnational bourgeoisie does not have an organizing State which mediates its action vis-a-vis opposing classes. These organizing and mediating actions are necessary as bourgeois fractions compete among themselves in the pursuit of profit enhancement.

Paradoxically, the globalization of capital accumulation developed as a partial response to the increasingly intervening role of the State at the domestic level (Bonanno, 1987a; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989; Sassen, 1988). However, limiting the intervention of the State in the process of accumulation carried on by transnational corporations has hampered the ability of the State to organize economic activities in a situation in which the transnationalization of the economy demands more (State) coordination (Sassen, 1988:135). After all, historically the State played a fundamental role in previous phases of the international expansion of capital (Murray, 1971; Rowthorn, 1971). In essence, then, the bourgeoisie's need for organization finds its limits in the bourgeoisie's desire to avoid State action.

It can be argued at this point that transnational corporations actually attempt to coordinate their actions and, as such, overcome the lack of a coordinating State. In fact, these attempts are not new patterns as indicated by the case of the

Trilateral Commission, which was established over two decades ago. It should be stressed, however, that organizations such as the Trilateral Commission can never obtain all the various powers associated with a State apparatus. Corporations do not have the monopoly of power that the State has and cannot directly legislate and/or execute legislation. They can influence legislation and political action in general but, as illustrated by the literature on the State (Poulantzas, 1978:179-185), they are not the State. While it is undeniable that attempts to organize themselves at the global level are undertaken by transnational corporations, these attempts have not historically replaced the mediating and organizing functions performed by the State.

c) If the State is increasingly unable to extend its action at the international level, subordinate classes find their power in society reduced. Theories of the State underscore that, together with a repressive role, the State can in some circumstances perform a progressive role (i.e. the fact that subordinate classes through political action force the State to protect some of their interests) (Offe, 1985; Poulantzas, 1978). However, the interests of subordinate class are protected only in so much as the State maintains normative control over the production process. Once this control is reduced or eliminated, the protection of the interests of subordinate classes is also reduced or eliminated. Accordingly, legislation passed to establish wages levels, safety and health regulations, and regional and community development has been avoided through economic maneuvers such as the migration of capital and production outfits across national borders and other forms of by-passing State authority (Sassen, 1988).

Conclusion

Contradictory convergence

State action in favor of transnational companies and the simultaneous State protection

of the interests of subordinate classes point to a convergence of interests on the part of these two groups in preserving the intervention of the State in socio-economic affairs. However, this convergence of action is contradictory. The interests of transnational companies and subordinate classes in maintaining State action are motivated by opposing reasons and, more importantly, they tendentially undermine each group's essential objectives.

Transnational capital is interested in State action which fosters accumulation. If this action is opposed, counter actions are taken. In recent years the latter have assumed, primarily, the form of by-passing the coordinating and mediating role of the State¹⁷. This solution, in turn, undermines the State's ability to assist corporations in the process of accumulation.

Subordinate classes are interested in State action which protects their well-being vis-a-vis economic problems (inflation, declining wages) and social problems (limitations in the provision of health care; declining education, etc.). The transnational restructuring of the economy — accomplished primarily through the shifting of production across national borders, reliance on low wage labor, and concentration of capital — has severely limited the national State action to protect the social and economic gains of subordinate classes obtained in previous periods (Bonanno, 1989; 1988).

The International Arena

The national dimension of State action and the globalization of capital accumulation could be overcome by the establishment of an entity which would continue the role of the State at the international level (Friedland, 1988).

Empirically, tendencies toward the emergence of a multinational State are found in the expansion and consolidation of the European Community (EC), the creation of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the US and Canada with the proposed inclusion of Mexico, political attempts

by Japan to organize a multistate organization of countries in the Orient and OECD regulatory patterns in the agricultural and food area, etc. Among these attempts, the EC is indeed the most advanced one with its thirty years of history and a proposed schedule for economic and eventually political unification (Bonanno, 1990:3).

The attempts to create a multinational State represent, however, only a partial solution to the dislocation between the arena of State power and the arena of capital accumulation. In fact, this dislocation might well continue to exist since the EC as well as the other examples of multistate organizations incorporate only a limited number of nations and do not constitute global political entities. If this reasoning is correct, the terrain of confrontation between opposite social forces in society could be increasingly shifted to the international arena. In turn, the lack of a clearly established State entity could provide the opportunity for creating a system in which equitable and democratic ends could be established. Equally, this "State vacuum" could be transformed into an increasingly repressive global system. Though both outcomes are possible, neither will result from the mechanical reproduction of ongoing trends. It is in the socio, economic and political arenas that future directions of the global society will be decided. Finally, increased attention to the international arena should not be confused with disregard for action at the local level. Disregard for events at the local level for exclusive action at the international level and vice versa could signify forfeiting the possibility of generating emancipatory changes in the new transnational order.

Notes

1. The concept of "superstructure" refers to the political, ideological and cultural components of a society. In the Marxian tradition, the political, ideological and cultural spheres are called superstructural since they are opposed to the economy, which constitutes the structure of society.

2. The term transnationalization is often replaced with the term globalization. Though some differences between the two concepts do exist, for the purposes of this paper they will be considered synonyms.

3. See for example the programs of international and domestic conferences by the Sociology of Agriculture Research Committee of the ISA in the last decade. Particularly, see the programs of the X, XI and XII World Congresses of Sociology which took place respectively in 1982, 1986 and 1990. See also the program of the VII World Congress of Rural Sociology and of the 50th annual American Rural Sociological Society Meetings held respectively in 1988 and 1987.

4. It should be noted that the domestic centered analysis of capitalism developed by Marx is also the outcome of the heuristic task to create a model which would reflect the essential characteristics of capitalism. Marx's emphasis on the method of "abstraction" mandates the underscoring of aspects of the social whole which qualify the essential characteristics of society (see, Sweezy, 1942:31-44). Accordingly, Marx's methodological posture required a simplified and close capitalist system, which was provided, then, by Great Britain.

5. The statement that these theories were elaborated within a Marxian framework of analysis has been challenged by proponents of the so-called "Articulation of Modes of Production Theory" (see, Laclau, 1971 and Taylor, 1979). According to his theory the Dependentistas (i.e. proponents of dependency, World System and Exchange theories) operate outside Marxism as they base their definition of capitalism on a system of exchange rather than on one of production. In his work, articulationists argue, Marx defines capitalism on the basis of relations of production, i.e. wage relations.

The resolution of this dispute is not among the goals of this contribution. However, it is relevant to stress that despite the alteration of some of the orthodoxies of Marxian scholarship, Dependentistas wrote in the spirit of the analytic and political content of the work of Marx. For this reason alone they should be considered within the Marxian framework of analysis.

6. Though difficult in practice, the identification of a company with a country is often used ideologically as a commercial strategy. For example, American garment companies often appeal to their domestic clientele by stressing their American origin. However, many of their products are licensed to be produced overseas. Furthermore, as in the case of car manufacturing companies, domestic

production often signifies joint ventures with foreign capital or simply foreign product masked as domestic. In all this process it is increasingly problematic to maintain a distinction between foreign and domestic capital.

7. This is not to say that responses to the regulatory action of the State generated the transnationalization of capital. Indeed, a number of factors, including the action of the State in favor of the subordinated classes, contributed to the transnationalization of capital.

References

- AMIN, Samir**
 1980 **Class and Nation: Historically and in the Current Crisis.** London: Heinemann.
- ARRIGHI, Giovanni**
 1978 **The Geometry of Imperialism.** London: New Left Books.
- BLOCK, Fred**
 1980 "Beyond relative autonomy: state managers as historical subjects." Pp. 227-240 in R. Miliband and J. Seville (Eds.), **Socialist Register.** London: Merlin Press.
- 1977 "The ruling class does not rule." **Socialist Revolution**, Vol. 7 (3): 6-28.
- BLOMSTROM, Magnus and Bjorn Hettne**
 1984 **Development Theory in Transition.** London: Zed Books.
- BLUESTONE, Barry and Bennett Harrison**
 1982 **The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closing, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry.** New York: Basic Books.
- BONANNO, Alessandro**
 1990 "Introduction." Pp. 1-8 in A. Bonanno (ed.), **Agrarian Policies & Agricultural Systems.** Boulder: Westview Press.
- 1989 "La reorganización económica de los Estados Unidos: el colapso de la dicotomía centro-periferia y la nueva posición de los trabajadores." **Cuadernos del CENDES**, 11:113-121.
- 1988 "Theories of the state: the case of land reform in Italy, 1944-1961." **The Sociological Quarterly** Vol. 29 (1): 131-147.
- 1987a **Small Farms: Persistence with Legitimation.** Boulder: Westview Press.
- 1987b "Agricultural policies and the capitalist state." **Agriculture and Human Values**, Vol. 4 (2,3):40-46.
- BONANNO, Alessandro, Donato Fernández and Jere L. Gilles**
 1990 "Agricultural policies in the US and EC: a comparative analysis." Pp. 227-251 in A. Bonanno (ed.), **Agrarian Policies & Agricultural Systems.** Boulder: Westview Press.
- BREWER, Anthony**
 1980 **Marxist Theories of Imperialism.** London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- BUKHARIN, Nikolai**
 1972 **Imperialism and World Economy.** London: Merlin Press.
- BUSINESS Week**
 1990 "The stateless corporation." **Business Week**, May 14:98-105.
- CAMPBELL, John L. and Leon N. Lindberg**
 1990 "Property rights and the organization of economic activity by the state." **American Sociological Review**, Vol. 55 (5):634-647.
- CAMPBELL, Rex**
 1990 "Global transformation and agriculture." **The Rural Sociologist**, Vol. 10 (3):22-28.
- CARNOY, Martin**
 1984 **The State and Political Theory.** Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- CONSTANCE Douglas and William D. Heffernan**
 forthcoming "The global poultry agro-food complex." **Agricultura y Sociedad**.
- 1989 "The rise of oligopoly in agricultural markets: the demise of family farms." Paper presented at the Agriculture, Food and Human Values Society Meeting. Little Rock, Ark., November.

- DICKENS, David and Alessandro Bonanno
 1988 "Analyzing development, dependency and underdevelopment: suggestions for an alternative approach." *Sociological Spectrum*, Vol. 8 (2):169-186.
- DOBB, Maurice
 1963 *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- DOMHOFF, William G.
 1979 *The Power That Be*. New York: Vintage Books.
 —
 1967 *Who Rules America?* Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- EMMANUEL, Arghiri
 1972 *Unequal Exchange*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- FRANK, André Gunder
 1979 *Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- FRANK, André Gunder
 1967a *The Sociology of Development and the Underdevelopment of Sociology*. London: Pluto Press.
 —
 1967b *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- FRIEDLAND, William H.
 1988 "The transnationalization of agricultural production: palimpsest of the transnational state." Paper presented at the VII World Congress of Rural Sociology, Bologna, Italy, July.
 —
 1983 "State formation and reformation in California grapes." Paper presented at the conference on "The Political Economy of Agriculture." Ann Arbor, MI., August.
- FRIEDLAND, William H. Lawrence Busch, Frederick H. Buttel and Alan P. Rudy (Eds.)
 1991 *Towards a New Political Economy of Agriculture*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- FRIEDMANN, Harriet and Philip McMichael
 1989 "Agriculture and the state system." *Sociologia Ruralis*, Vol. 29 (2):93-117.
- 1988 "The world historical development of agriculture: western agriculture in comparative perspective." *Sociology of Agriculture Working Paper Series*. London: Rural Studies Research Centre.
- GILBERT, Jess and Carolyn Howe
 1988 "Beyond 'state vs society': theories of the state and New Deal agricultural policies." Unpublished manuscript, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
- GORDON, David
 1988 "The global economy: new edifice or crumbling foundations?" *New Left Review*, 168:24-65.
- GRAMSCI, Antonio
 1975 *Quaderni dal Carcere*. Rome: Editori Riuniti.
 —
 1971 *Selection from Prison Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers.
- GREEN, Gary
 1989 "State, class and technology in tobacco production." *Agriculture and Human Values*, Vol. 6 (4): 54 - 61.
 —
 1987 "The political economy of flue-cured tobacco production." *Rural Sociology*, Vol. 52 (2): 221-241.
- HABERMAS, Jurgen
 1975 *Legitimation Crisis*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- HEFFERNAN, William D.
 1990 "Internationalization of the poultry industry." Paper presented at the XII World Congress of Sociology, Madrid, Spain, July.
 —
 1984 "Constraints in the U.S. poultry industry." Pp. 237-260 in H. Schwarzwalder (ed.), *Research in Rural Sociology and Development*. Greenwich: Jay Press.
- HILFERDING, Rudolf
 1970 *Le Capital Financier*. Paris: Edition de Minuit.
- HOOGVELT, Ankie
 1982 *The Third World in Global Development*. London: Macmillan Press.

- HOOKS, Gregory**
 1990 "From an autonomous to a captured state agency." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 55 (1):29-43.
- HORKHEIMER, Max**
 1974 *Eclipse of Reason*. New York: The Seabury Press.
- HORKHEIMER, Max and Theodor Adorno**
 1972 *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. New York: Continuum.
- HOWE, Gary and Alan Sica**
 1980 "Political economy, imperialism and the problem of world system theory." *Current Perspective in Social Theory*, Vol. 1 (1):235-286.
- JENKINS, Craig J. and Barbara Brents**
 1989 "Social protest, hegemonic competition and social reform." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 54 (6):891-909.
- LACLAU, Ernesto**
 1977 *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*. London: New Left Books.
- LENIN, Nikolai Vladimir**
 1926 *Imperialism and the State Revolution*. New York: Vanguard Press.
- LUKACS, Georg**
 1971 *History and Class Consciousness*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- LUXEMBURG, Rosa**
 1971 *The Accumulation of Capital*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- MANDEL, Ernest**
 1977 *Introduction to Karl Marx's Capital*. New York: Vintage Books.
- MARCUSE, Herbert**
 1964 *One Dimensional Man*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- MARX, Karl**
 1977 *Capital*. New York: Vintage Books.
- 1976 *Preface and Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. Peking: Foreign Language Publishing House.
- 1964 *The German Ideology*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- MARX, Karl and Friedrich Engels**
 1963 *The Communist Manifesto*. New York: Russell & Russell.
- MCMICHAEL, Philip and David Myhre**
 1991 "Global regulation vs. the nation state: agro-food systems and the new politics of capital." *Capital & State*, 50:1-18.
- MEDOFF, James and Paul Strassman**
 1985 "About the two-tier workforce and growth of low-pay jobs." *Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association Industry News*, March:1-9.
- MILIBAND, Ralph**
 1970 "The capitalist state: reply to Nicos Poulantzas." *New Left Review*, 59:83-92.
- 1969 *The State in Capitalist Societies*. London: Winfield and Nicholson.
- MINGIONE, Enzo**
 1990 *Fragmented Societies*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- MURRAY, Robin**
 1971 "The internationalization of capital and the nation state." *New Left Review*, 67:84-109.
- MUTTI, Antonio and Irene Poli**
 1975 *Sottosviluppo e Meridione*. Milan: Mazzotta.
- O'CONNOR, James**
 1974 *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- 1973 *The Corporation and the State: Essay in the Theory of Capitalism and Imperialism*. New York: Harper and Row.
- OFFE, Claus**
 1985 *Disorganized Capitalism*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- OFFE, Claus and Volker Ronge**
 1979 "Theses on the theory of the state." Pp. 345-356 in J.W. Freiberg (ed.), *Critical Sociology*. New York: Irvington Press.

- PRECHEL, Harland**
 1990 "Steel and the state: industry politics and business policy formation." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 55 (5):648-668.
- POULANTZAS, Nicos**
 1978 *State, Power, Socialism*. London: New Left Books.
- QUADAGNO, Jill**
 1990 "Race, class, and gender in the U.S. welfare state." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 55 (1):11-28.
- ROWTHORN, Bob**
 1971 "Imperialism in the 1970's—unity or rivalry." *New Left Review*, 69:31-54.
- SASSEN, Saskia**
 1988 *The Mobility of Labor and Capital*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- SWEETZY, Paul**
 1942 *The Theory of Capitalist Development*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- TAYLOR, John**
 1979 *From Modernization to Modes of Production: A Critique of the Sociologies of Development and Underdevelopment*. London: Macmillan.
- WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel**
 1979 *The Capitalist World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-
- 1974 *The Modern World System*. New York: Academic Press.

RESUMEN***La Globalización del Sector Agrícola y Alimentario y las Teorías sobre el Estado***

Este artículo indaga en el desfase teórico existente entre las teorías del Estado, con un carácter orientado hacia lo nacional, y el carácter transnacional de las teorías del desarrollo socio-económico. Con base en el caso del sector agrícola y alimentario, se afirma que la literatura en esta área ha enfatizado la dimensión transnacional de la acumulación de capital y la evasión de la autoridad del Estado en el ámbito nacional. Esta situación requiere reevaluar las teorías del Estado en atención a la dimensión internacional del presente proceso de acumulación de capital. Más aún, este análisis sugiere patrones de "convergencia contradictoria" en lo cual, la expansión de la acción del Estado a nivel transnacional es exigido tanto por las corporaciones transnacionales como por las clases subordinadas. Esta exigencia, sin embargo, es contradictoria ya que se encuentra limitada por el interés de la burguesía transnacional de evadir la acción del Estado. Desde el punto de vista político, como resultado de esta situación, el espacio de la acción social emancipadora debe trasladarse, cada vez más, a la escena internacional.

Alessandro Bonanno asistente de Sociología Rural en la Universidad de Missouri-Columbia, EEUU. Ha investigado, entre otros tópicos: la estructura de la agricultura, desarrollo regional e internacional, envejecimiento y el Estado. Es autor de numerosos artículos de revistas especializadas y libros, entre ellos: *Small Farms* (1987); *Sociology of Agriculture* (1989); y *Agrarian Policies and Agricultural Systems* (1990). Recibió su Phd en Sociología en la Universidad de Kentucky, EEUU.

La Globalización del Sector Agrícola y Alimentario y las Teorías sobre el Estado

Alessandro Bonanno

Este artículo indaga en el desfase teórico existente entre las teorías del Estado, con un carácter orientado hacia lo nacional, y el carácter transnacional de las teorías del desarrollo socio-económico. Con base en el caso del sector agrícola y alimentario, se afirma que la literatura en esta área ha enfatizado la dimensión transnacional de la acumulación de capital y la evasión de la autoridad del Estado en el ámbito nacional. Esta situación requiere reevaluar las teorías del Estado en atención a la dimensión internacional del presente proceso de acumulación de capital. Más aún, este análisis sugiere patrones de "convergencia contradictoria" en la cual, la expansión de la acción del Estado a nivel transnacional es exigido tanto por las corporaciones transnacionales como por las clases subordinadas. Esta exigencia, sin embargo, es contradictoria ya que se encuentra limitada por el interés de la burguesía transnacional de evadir la acción del Estado. Desde el punto de vista político, como resultado de esta situación, el espacio de la acción social emancipadora debe trasladarse, cada vez más, a la escena internacional.

Alessandro Bonanno es profesor asistente de Sociología Rural en la Universidad de Missouri-Columbia, EEUU. Ha investigado, entre otros tópicos: la estructura de la agricultura, desarrollo regional e internacional, envejecimiento y el Estado. Es autor de numerosos artículos de revistas especializadas y libros, entre ellos: *Small Farms* (1987); *Sociology of Agriculture* (1989); y *Agricultural Policies and Agricultural Systems* (1990). Recibió su Phd en Sociología en la Universidad de Kentucky, EEUU.

Introducción

Las transformaciones recientes del sector agrícola y alimentario han llevado a algunos sociólogos rurales a postular la emergencia de un sistema transnacional de producción agrícola y alimentaria (Bonanno et al., 1990; Campbell, 1990; Friedland, 1988; Friedland et al., 1991; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989; McMichael y Myhre, 1991). El punto central de este análisis lo ocupa el rol del Estado frente a las nuevas tendencias de las esferas políticas y económicas. Epistemológicamente, y con algunas excepciones (e.g. Campbell, 1990), las bases teóricas de estos trabajos descansan en las interpretaciones marxistas del desarrollo social y de la relación existente entre la economía y los elementos superestructurales⁽¹⁾ en la sociedad. El centro de la construcción teórica marxista, respecto a esta temática, se evidencia en la importancia largamente concedida al papel del Estado en la sociedad por parte de los estudiosos marxistas y por varios estudios marxistas que han analizado los fenómenos de multinacionalización y transnacionalización⁽²⁾ del sistema agrícola y alimentario. En términos reales, la problemática de la multinacionalización de la producción agrícola y alimentaria y su posterior transnacionalización se ha desarrollado en forma predominante dentro del debate marxista en la sociología de la agricultura⁽³⁾.

(*) Deseo manifestar mi agradecimiento a Gary Green, Bill Friedlan, Phil McMichael y doug Constance por sus comentarios a las primeras versiones de este artículo.

El presente estudio pretende ser una contribución para los estudiosos marxistas de la sociología de la agricultura y del Estado, mediante el análisis de las implicaciones teóricas que tiene la transnacionalización del sector agrícola y alimentario en el papel del Estado. El mismo comienza con una breve revisión de las más importantes teorías del Estado: La "instrumentalista", la "autonomía relativa" y la del "enfoque mixto". A continuación se ilustrará la dimensión nacional de la relación entre la economía y la política en el análisis marxista. Se concederá atención particular a esa dimensión en el trabajo original de Marx.

Al respecto, se sostiene que la fase de desarrollo capitalista alcanzada a mediados del siglo pasado, el esfuerzo para ilustrar las leyes del desarrollo capitalista y el énfasis puesto en el caso británico, no permitieron a Marx transcender la dimensión nacional del desarrollo capitalista. Además, se afirma que a pesar de que las teorías marxistas acerca del colonialismo y el imperialismo fueron desarrolladas después de la muerte de Marx, éstas reflejan al desarrollo multinacional del capital, enfatizando la relación entre los Estados nacionales capitalistas y los capitales nacionales para controlar el campo internacional. En este contexto, se mantuvo la orientación nacional del Estado capitalista. Finalmente, se llevó a cabo una discusión acerca de la dimensión cultural y nacional que demanda la ley de reproducción capitalista.

En la tercera sección se ilustra brevemente la transnacionalización de la esfera económica y en la cuarta se revisa alguna literatura acerca del Estado y la transnacionalización, la siguiente sección se dedica a la discusión de la dislocación existente entre la acumulación de capital a nivel global y la acción del Estado a nivel nacional. Se argüye que los basamentos teóricos de las actuales teorías sobre el Estado están siendo cada vez más inadecuadas.

Se sostiene, además, que la mediación de varias fracciones de capital en manos del Estado

en el ámbito interno no se resuelven en el nivel internacional.

Finalmente, se señala que las clases subordinadas encuentran reducido su poder del Estado y las actividades económicas. Para concluir, se ilustran los patrones de "convergencia contradictoria" en la cual la expansión del nivel transnacional de la acción del Estado es demandada, al mismo tiempo, tanto por el capital transnacional como por las clases subordinadas. Esta demanda es contradictoria en la medida en que encuentra sus límites en los deseos de la burguesía transnacional de eludir la acción del Estado. Políticamente el resultado es que el campo de la acción social emancipadora se transfiere a la escena internacional.

Teorías sobre el Estado en la Literatura Sociológica

El rol del Estado en la sociedad ha sido un tema central en el debate sociológico en años recientes (Block, 1980; Domhoff, 1979; Hooks, 1990; Offe, 1985; Poulantzas, 1978; Prechel, 1990; Quadagno, 1990). Formuladas originalmente en el contexto de la sociología política, la sociología marxista y la sociología de las organizaciones complejas, las teorías sobre el Estado se han utilizado en forma creciente en el tratamiento de temáticas en el área de Sociología de la Agricultura (Bonanno, 1987a, 1987b; Fiedland, 1988; 1983; Friedmann y McMichael, 1989; McMichael y Myhre, 1991; Green, 1987; Gilbert y Howe, 1988). En este debate, el Estado ha sido identificado como a) una institución instrumentalmente controlada por la clase dominante b) una entidad dotada de autonomía relativa; y c) una institución en la cual la dimensión instrumental y la dimensión autónoma están ambas contenidas en el rol histórico del Estado.

La visión instrumentalista (Domhoff, 1978) considera al Estado en el capitalismo bien como "un instrumento para promover los intereses comunes de la clase (capitalista) dominante

directamente" (Offe y Ronge, 1979:346) o, "un comité de la clase gobernante directamente manipulado por miembros de dicha clase" (Carnoy, 1984:214).

Han surgido dos tipos de teoría instrumentales. La primera de ellas postula la existencia de una identidad entre la clase dominante y el funcionariado estatal (Miliband, 1969; 1970; Domhoff, 1979; 1967). En este caso, los burócratas del Estado tienden a pertenecer a la misma clase o clases que dominan a la sociedad, encontrándose ligada a ella mediante un **background** educativo común, amigos y relaciones familiares. A pesar de que miembros de otras clases entran en la clase alta, es ésta la que controla el aparato político.

La segundo teoría, la cual se ha denominado también "teoría del capital monopolista estatal", indica que las fracciones monopolistas corporativas de la burguesía ejercen un control directo sobre el Estado (O'Connor, 1973; 1974). Esencialmente, se sostienen que el control que ejerce la clase monopolista corporativa sobre la economía implica, casi de manera automática, el control sobre el Estado.

Las bases teóricas y empíricas del enfoque instrumentalista han sido criticadas por diversos estudios que han enfatizado el carácter complejo de la relación entre la economía y la política. Más aún, las discrepancias observadas entre la acción del Estado y la de la clase dominante han arrojado dudas sobre la capacidad de ésta última para controlar directamente a la primera. A partir de porciones del trabajo de Marx (1964: 5-69) y de formulaciones más recientes (Gramsci, 1975, 1971; Habermas, 1975; Horkheimer, 1974; Horkheimer y Adorno, 1972; Lukács, 1971; Marcuse, 1964) que enfatizan el rol que la ideología, la política y la superestructura, en general, juegan en el proceso de desarrollo del capitalismo, el enfoque de la autonomía relativa del Estado subraya la independencia parcial de los elementos de la superestructura respecto a la estructura económica. Por ello, reclama la

autonomía relativa del Estado (un elemento de la superestructura) de la economía (la estructura) (Block, 1980; 1977; Offe y Ronge, 1979; Poulantzas, 1978).

Se considera en esencia que el Estado reproduce las relaciones de clase no porque una clase o fracción de clase lo controle directamente, sino porque el Estado tiene interés en reproducir "...las leyes y las relaciones sociales que presupone el dominio de clase de la clase capitalista" (Offe y Ronge, 1979:346).

Las teorías "instrumentalistas" y de la "autonomía relativa" han sido generalmente empleadas en términos excluyentes (para el debate en Sociología de la Agricultura, ver: Bonanno, 1987a; 1987b; Green, 1987, 1989). En otras palabras, se ha sostenido que los dos campos se basaban en diferentes asunciones. En realidad en la ilustración de las teorías instrumentalista y de la autonomía relativa ha llamado la atención los orígenes relativamente diversos de las dos posiciones. Por ejemplo, aunque Offe y Ronge (1979:345-347) reconocen las raíces marxistas de ambas posiciones, señalan que la posición "instrumentalista" se basa en ciertos pasajes de **El Manifiesto**, mientras que la de la "autonomía relativa" tiene su origen en el análisis contenido en la **Ideología Alemana**. Sin embargo, se reconoce, igualmente, que esta distinción es más "heurística" que real (Green, 1987:122) y que hay más similitudes que diferencias entre ambas (Bonanno, 1988:133).

Un análisis que refleja explícitamente la separación entre la instrumentalista y de autonomía relativa, es el realizado por William H. Friedland (1988; 1983). El trabajo de Friedland adquiere aún más relevancia para la presente discusión por cuanto que ha sido desarrollado dentro del debate en la sociología de la agricultura y representa uno de los intentos innovadores por adaptar debates que se están llevando a cabo en la sociología general y a temas relevantes para la sociología rural. En esencia, para Friedland, el rol del Estado en la sociedad no está dado por las

circunstancias históricas específicas, sino que más bien depende de ellas. En realidad, estas circunstancias son las fuentes de las teorías instrumentalistas y de la autonomía del Estado en la sociedad. El autor, tomando como punto de partida varios casos de bienes agrícolas, demuestra que el Estado está llamado a organizar diferentes intereses de la clase dominante y simultáneamente a mediar entre los intereses de esa clase dominante y los intereses opuestos que emergen en el seno de otras clases sociales (teoría de la autonomía relativa). Sin embargo, demuestra que instancias específicas del Estado también operan como un instrumento de las clases gobernantes puesto que éstas últimas controlan directa y efectivamente la acción del primero (teoría instrumentalista). El autor empíricamente concluye, que ninguna de las dos teorías es suficiente para describir los complejos patrones mediante los cuales el Estado se involucra en la sociedad. Paradójicamente, cada una de estas dos teorías puede ser correcta bajo diferentes circunstancias.

Varios estudiosos han llegado a conclusiones semejantes trabajando tanto con el paradigma marxista como con el paradigma centro-estado a través del examen de una variedad de casos históricos (e.g. Campbell y Lindberg, 1990; Hooks, 1990; Jenkins y Brents, 1989; Prechel, 1990).

Muchos estudiosos (Carnoy, 1984; Bonanno, 1987; Green, 1987; O'Connor, 1973; 1974), han subrayado que varias teorías sobre el Estado tienen importantes similitudes. Entre éstas se encuentra la creencia generalizada de que la acumulación de capital no es posible sin la ayuda del Estado y que el Estado no puede existir sin un continuo proceso de acumulación. En términos más específicos esto significa, primero, que la acumulación de capital y el dominio de la clase burguesa en la sociedad dependen de la capacidad del Estado de mantener las condiciones necesarias para la reproducción del capital. Segundo, la acumulación de capital debe ser legitimada y el Estado concede esa legitimación a través de la

mediación de diferentes intereses en la sociedad. Este fenómeno se refiere tanto a la mediación entre miembros de la clase burguesa como entre la burguesa y otras clases. Tercero, el Estado obtiene sus recursos financieros de la carga impositiva a los ingresos generados mediante el proceso de acumulación es fundamental para la existencia del Estado. Para las mencionadas escuelas, hay una relación intrínseca entre el proceso de desarrollo capitalista y la existencia del aparato del Estado.

Desarrollo Global y las Teorías del Estado

La Dimensión Nacional de la Relación entre Política y Economía.

Uno de los objetivos centrales de este artículo, siendo una característica común a varias teorías sobre el Estado, es la relación entre economía y política enmarcada en lo nacional. Más específicamente, en los análisis marxistas el Estado se ha conceptualizado como una entidad predominantemente nacional la cual regula el proceso de reproducción del capital.

Esta posición encuentra sus raíces en las fases históricas del desarrollo capitalista, en la importancia analítica que el marxismo concede al contexto histórico. En síntesis, el desarrollo de las teorías marxistas del Estado reflejan la evolución del capitalismo y las interpretaciones que de él han hecho círculos científicos y políticos. Aquí hay tres puntos generales importantes:

a) El trabajo original de Marx se basa en el desarrollo del capitalismo nacional. Más específicamente, constituye una ilustración del establecimiento y desarrollo del modo de producción capitalista en la Gran Bretaña (e.g. *El Capital*).

b) Primero las teorías del colonialismo y el imperialismo y luego las teorías que analizan el desarrollo del capital multinacional consideraban el colonialismo y el imperialismo como fenómenos que reflejan la extensión de los

intereses nacionales al campo internacional.

c) Los trabajos de los marxistas de comienzos del siglo veinte, preocupados por la relación entre política y economía, enfatizaron la dimensión cultural nacional necesaria para el mantenimiento del capitalismo (e.g. Gramsci, 1975; 1971).

Revisemos cada uno de estos puntos brevemente.

El Trabajo Original de Marx.

El análisis marxista original del desarrollo del capitalismo (e.g. *El Capital*; ver Sweezy, 1942) y particularmente las discusiones sobre "la acumulación primitiva" (Marx, 1977:873-940) y sobre "las leyes generales de la acumulación primitiva" (Marx, 1977:762-853) se basan en el análisis de un solo caso nacional (el británico). En el trabajo de Marx se hacen referencias a otros casos "nacionales", tal como el prusiano y el francés, con el objeto de indicar las diferencias históricas respecto al ejemplo británico. Tales ejemplos son introducidos a fin de demostrar la generalidad de las leyes del desarrollo capitalista, las cuales, no obstante, producen resultados particulares a los niveles nacionales individuales. Al respecto, estos ejemplos recapturan las etapas del desarrollo capitalista que han ocurrido históricamente y que han caracterizado la formación y consolidación de los capitalismos nacionales (Brewer, 1980:18; Friedmann y McMichael, 1989:98-99).

El capitalismo, de acuerdo con Marx, debido a su inicial establecimiento en algunos pocos enclaves geográficos, se expandió a otras regiones hasta llegar a ser el modo de producción dominante (Marx, 1977:940; Marx y Engels, 1963:25-29). Desde el punto de vista histórico el análisis de Marx pudo a duras penas ser diferente, por cuanto examinó un período caracterizado por la emergencia del capitalismo nacional, en el cual su expansión internacional era, heurística y políticamente, menos relevantes (Dobb, 1963).

El acento que Marx pone en la dimensión nacional del desarrollo capitalista⁽⁴⁾ ha llevado a muchos estudiosos modernos a recalcar la limitada contribución que el filósofo alemán dio a la temática internacional (Brewer, 1980:18-20; Dobb, 1963; Mutti y Poli, 1975:28-29). A pesar de estudiar el funcionamiento del capitalismo como un sistema cerrado (Brewer, 1980:27; Mandel, 1977:12) y su declarada intención de estudiar el mercado internacional y el desigual desarrollo capitalista internacional (e.g. ver la Introducción de 1857 a la Introducción a la Crítica de la Economía Política; Marx, 1976), Marx nunca logró elaborar una teoría orgánica de la acumulación capitalista a escala mundial, ni siquiera con el período histórico del colonialismo. Un análisis limitado sobre éste último se sugiere, de una manera no sistemática en algunos pasajes de *El Capital* y en una serie de artículos sobre la penetración europea en China e India, los cuales fueron escritos en el período 1853-60 cuando Marx se desempeñaba como corresponsal extranjero del "New York Daily Tribune". Entonces, tanto desde el punto de vista de la creación del sistema capitalista como de la internacionalización del capitalismo, el trabajo de Marx está centrado en lo nacional. En este sentido, la formulación marxista original de la relación entre la política y la economía no constituye una excepción.

Teorías del Colonialismo y el Imperialismo.

Nos engañaríamos si afirmásemos que la dimensión internacional del desarrollo capitalista es un tema ajeno a los trabajos de Marx y la tradición marxista. No obstante el carácter incompleto de los trabajos clásicos de Marx en ese sentido, la riqueza de la teoría marxista ha llevado a muchos estudiosos a emprender la tarea de analizar la expansión del capitalismo a escala mundial. Además, desde el punto de vista histórico, a solo unos pocos años después de la muerte de Marx, la rápida expansión del capitalismo hizo del análisis de la cuestión

internacional un imperativo científico y político. Fue en este contexto donde surgieron los trabajos de Lenin, Luxemburgo, Bujarin, Hilferding y otros sobre el colonialismo y el imperialismo.

Estos estudios clásicos conceptualizaron los fenómenos del colonialismo y el imperialismo en términos de "capitales nacionales" los cuales maduraron hacia sus formas monopólicas, expandiéndose más allá de sus territorios originales (Bujarin, 1972; Hilferding, 1970; Lenin, 1926; Luxemburgo, 1971).

De hecho, de acuerdo con Bujarin (1972) y Lenin (1926) se pensaba que el establecimiento de los monopolios nacionales se desarrollo en la fase imperialista. En esta perspectiva, el crecimiento del capitalismo en los países occidentales condujo al establecimiento de los monopolios nacionales. Por otra parte, los monopolios tomaron los poderes organizacionales del estado-nación para promover sus propios intereses internamente y competir internacionalmente con otros capitales nacionales.

La competencia entre varias naciones monopólicas creó los requisitos para la dominación imperialista del mundo. Con consideraciones similares, Hilferding (1970) afirmaba que los monopolios pueden desarrollarse más fácilmente a nivel nacional en la medida en que se impongan barreras a la competencia externa. Una vez que se alcanza la etapa monopólica, el proteccionismo estatal asegura la viabilidad de los capitales nacionales en el mercado mundial. Finalmente, Rosa Luxemburgo (1972) concibió la solución capitalista a la crisis de realización (a.e. la incapacidad de los capitalistas de gastar [realizar] todas sus ganancias) como la incorporación de áreas geográficas no capitalistas en la esfera de influencia del capital nacional.

Estas clásicas formulaciones marxistas de la expansión del capitalismo desde unos pocos centros al mundo entero, fue enfrentada durante las décadas del sesenta y el setenta por la Teoría de la Dependencia" (Frank, 1967a, 1967b) por la

"Teoría del Sistema Mundial" (Wallerstein, 1974, 1979) y la "Teoría del Intercambio Desigual" (Emmanuel, 1972). Las mismas, permaneciendo dentro del encuadre marxista⁽⁵⁾, intentan dar respuesta al proceso de crecimiento del capitalismo y su evolución en la fase del "capital multinacional" (Dickens y Bonanno, 1988:173; Hoogvelt, 1982). Estas mantienen que el capitalismo ha sido un sistema mundial desde el principio (alrededor del siglo dieciseis) y que las economías nacionales se han ubicado jerárquicamente en un sistema de dominación adoptando tres estatus desiguales: Centro, semi-periferia y periferia (Wallerstein, 1979). La dominación se establece a través de la apropiación, por parte de los países centrales, del excedente generado en los países periféricos y semi-periféricos; así la naturaleza cíclica del sistema capitalista se refleja en los movimientos de auge y decadencia de las naciones (Dickens y Bonanno 1988: 174-175; Howe y Sica, 1980: 235-236).

El mérito principal de estas teorías es el establecimiento de una clara cohesión entre desarrollo y subdesarrollo a través de fronteras nacionales y de continentes al mismo tiempo que se reconoce la emergencia de la dimensión multinacional del desarrollo capitalista. Sin embargo, a pesar de su reformulación del análisis marxista clásico, la concepción del desarrollo del capitalismo que tienen las teorías de la dependencia y del sistema mundial, se centra todavía en los conceptos de capital nacional y sus ramificaciones internacionales. Los países centrales son necesariamente exportadores de capital, el cual penetra los países periféricos y semi-periféricos con el objeto de promover el proceso de explotación (Brewer, 1980: 158). Por otra parte, los países dependientes permanecen como objetos de los mecanismos de explotación, los cuales se mantienen a través del establecimiento de un "estado dependiente" (Camoy, 1984: 184-1920). En esta construcción teórica el Estado dependiente es de suprema importancia por dos razones. Primero, desde el

punto de vista internacional el Estado depende, del proceso de acumulación multinacional de capital y del mantenimiento del sistema de división del trabajo, para su propia existencia. Esta situación significa que el Estado dependiente actúa como un vehículo para la extracción de excedentes de las economías periféricas, a favor de la metrópolis (Amin, 1980: 135-136; Frank, 1979:5). Segundo, el proceso de explotación multinacional exige el control social de la situación interna, el cual se logra a través de la acción del aparato del Estado. A nivel nacional, el Estado dependiente asegura el dominio de la burguesía dependiente (burguesía compradora) y la subordinación de las clases trabajadoras al capital extranjero (Dickens y Bonanno, 1988: 175-178). En última instancia, la multinacionalidad del desarrollo del capital requiere de la permanencia del Estado nacional.

La teoría de la articulación de los Modos de producción (Arrighi, 1978; Laclau, 1971; Taylor, 1979) constituye otra moderna alternativa a los análisis clásicos. Aunque critica a los dependientes y es considera un intento de retomar algunas de las ortodoxias del marxismo violadas por las teorías de la dependencia y del sistema mundial (Blomstrom y Hettne, 1984:81-90), al final suscribe el carácter nacional de la acumulación capitalista. Los adherentes a la teoría de la articulación de Modos de Producción se basan en el concepto de formación social (sociedad), el cual constituye su unidad de análisis. Se examinan las características de las relaciones de producción dentro de las formaciones sociales para determinar hasta qué punto los modos de producción capitalista o pre-capitalista existen o co-existen. De acuerdo con ello, se enfatiza el carácter nacional (formación social) de las relaciones de producción, lo cual postula una limitada dimensión analítica: La nación. En esta perspectiva se le concede poco espacio teórico a las relaciones salariales a pesar de que las mismas transcinden las fronteras nacionales y son dominantes a nivel mundial.

La Dimensión Cultural Nacional de las Sociedades Capitalistas.

De acuerdo a la tradición marxista, el desarrollo del capitalismo tiene sus orígenes en la disolución de las formas de producción precedentes (la economía) y en la organización de los aparatos político e ideológico, los cuales pueden sostener acumulación de capital (la política) (Marx y Engels, 1963:28-30). Es esencial para el crecimiento del capitalismo que la economía y las esferas política, económica e ideológica sean controladas por la burguesía. En la esfera económica, el control ejercido por parte de la burguesía se logra a través del control directo de los medios de producción. En las esferas política e ideológica este control se genera a través del establecimiento del aparato burgués (propiedad privada, libertades individuales, individualismo, etc.) el cual legitima la acumulación de capital (Gramsci, 1975). Sin embargo, las condiciones para establecer los aparatos legitimadores, político e ideológico, son fundamentalmente nacionales por cuanto se enraizan en las tradiciones históricas y culturales de esa nación. Tal como ha sido ilustrado por Gramsci (1971, 1975, e.g. ver la discusión sobre el materialismo histórico), la clase dominante tiene una gran capacidad para re-interpretar las tradiciones históricas y culturales de un país y ponerlos a trabajar a su favor (ej. emplear esas tradiciones en su proyecto hegemónico) lo cual es una de las condiciones fundamentales para el establecimiento y el éxito de su dominio en la sociedad. En este sentido, el intento por parte del Estado de legitimar el poder de clase depende de su habilidad para mantener la visión que tiene la clase dominante de la historia y la cultura de un país.

La Nueva Fase del Desarrollo Capitalista: La Transición de la Multinacionalidad a la Transnacionalidad

Las condiciones históricas que hicieron posible

la conceptualización del Estado y de la acumulación de capital centrado en lo nacional, se han alterado en las décadas recientes. Más concretamente, el capitalismo ha abandonado su fase "multinacional" para entrar en la nueva fase "transnacional". En la base multinacional del desarrollo capitalista era posible identificar corporaciones con países de origen (Bonanno, 1987a; Mingione, 1990; Sassen, 1988) y, al mismo tiempo, afirmar que los segmentos más importantes del Estado eran controlados por el capital monopólico (Poulantzas, 1978). En este contexto, se consideraban las operaciones internacionales como extensiones de actividades empresariales diseñadas y planeadas en el país anfitrión y apoyadas por el aparato del Estado anfitrión.

En la fase transnacional, las actividades económicas, la identidad y la lealtad de una corporación con un determinado país son cada vez menos evidentes⁽⁶⁾. Gran número de compras de compañías por parte de otros consorcios internacionales, la descentralización de la producción a través de las fronteras nacionales y la transnacionalización del sector financiero son todos hechos ilustrativos de ese proceso (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Bonanno, 1987a; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989; Mingione, 1990; Heffernan, 1990; Sassen, 1988). Un informe de los medios especializados describe verazmente este proceso: "Mientras al comercio internacional y los flujos de inversiones aumentan, las grandes compañías globales están tomando decisiones sin tomar en cuenta las fronteras nacionales. A pesar de que los países de origen de las compañías no les imponen límites, la tendencia a formar corporaciones —sin Estado— es inequívoca" (Business Week, 1990:98).

La extensión y las características del proceso de transnacionalización han sido objeto de debates. En el campo progresista, Gordon (1988) cuestiona la aseveración de que hay un incremento del movimiento del capital productivo alrededor del mundo y que, en la última instancia, las

interpretaciones de los cambios recientes en la economía global han sido distorsionadas. En el campo conservador se discute incluso la propia existencia del fenómeno, el cual es considerado como una de las razones más importantes para la existencia del proceso de transnacionalización (Medof y Strassman, 1985). A pesar de ello, los argumentos que toman en consideración la transnacionalización de la economía y la nueva dimensión del papel del Estado en este proceso son reconocidos en el debate (Gordon, 1988:63).

Los cambios a nivel global han afectado la organización interna de varios sectores productivos, incluyendo el sector agrícola y alimentario. Realmente no es una coincidencia que el surgimiento de límites al Estado nacional hayan sido objeto de un reciente debate (Friedland, 1988; Friedmann y McMichael, 1989:112; McMichael y Myhre, 1991). La globalización del sector agrícola y alimentario y las implicaciones que dicho fenómeno tiene en la cuestión del Estado serán discutidas en las siguientes partes de este trabajo.

La Globalización del Sector Agrícola y Alimentario y sus Implicaciones en el Rol del Estado

Análisis recientes del sector agrícola y alimentario han subrayado el proceso de globalización que caracteriza la presente fase histórica. Friedmann y McMichael (1989; 1988) discuten el desarrollo de el "segundo régimen alimentario", su carácter global y transnacional y sus implicaciones para el Estado. De acuerdo con estos autores, el primer régimen alimentario se caracterizó por la emergencia de las economías nacionales, que regían el desarrollo de los estados nacionales. En este contexto, la producción agrícola se concentró en las colonias que comerciaban productos agrícolas, trabajo y capital con la metrópolis europea. El segundo régimen alimentario emergió en concomitancia con la

transnacionalización del orden agrícola y alimentario. La transnacionalización indica: "i) intensificación de la especialización agrícola (tanto para las regiones como para las empresas) e integración de productos agrícolas específicos y de ganadería dentro de las cadenas agroalimentarias dominadas enteramente por el creciente capital industrial y ii) un cambio de los productos agrícolas de consumo inmediato para constituirse en insumos industriales destinados a la producción de alimentos manufacturados" (Friedmann y McMichael, 1989:105). En concordancia, la reestructuración de la producción agrícola y alimentaria disminuyó grandemente, aunque no eliminó la posibilidad de que el Estado nacional dirigiera la producción agrícola hacia determinados fines, tales como la seguridad alimentaria, el desarrollo de la comunidad, etc. (Friedmann y McMichael 1989:95).

William D. Heffernan y sus asociados (Heffernan, 1990; 1984; Constance y Heffernan 1989, próximo a publicarse) han discutido problemas similares a los anotados. De acuerdo con estos autores, la evolución del problema alimentario ha transcendido el ámbito del Estado nacional puesto que existe una concentración del sector alimentario orquestado por los pocos consorcios globales. La dimensión global de la concentración de la producción de alimentos se basa en las acciones de estos consorcios dirigidas a a) incrementar las ganancias mediante el desplazamiento de un lugar a otro con el propósito de reducir las incertidumbres económicas y b) eludir las leyes del Estado (tales como leyes de protección del ambiente, leyes de salud, etc.), lo cual ha generado costos de producción adicionales. Se argüye que los consorcios productores de alimentos están controlando crecientemente los mercados de bienes alimenticios a nivel global y que este control se mantiene gracias a eludir el Estado nacional. Aunque estos autores reconocen que las políticas agrícolas nacionales y la agricultura nacional relacionadas con políticas son relevantes en

términos de producción nacional, además recalcan que los efectos "indeseados" de estas políticas pueden ser evadidos por los consorcios que operan a nivel transnacional.

Bonanno et al. (1990) también han señalado la dimensión global de la producción agrícola y de alimentos, así como la incapacidad de los Estados nacionales para mediar las contradicciones que emergen a los niveles productivo y legislativo. Al comparar los casos de Estados Unidos y la Comunidad Europea, los autores entre el Estado y los sectores productores de alimentos no permiten el retorno al sistema de *Laissez-faire*. Específicamente, se afirma que el propósito de "retornar a las leyes del mercado" y de eliminación del papel interventor del Estado es sólo una opción teórica puesto que, en la actual fase de capitalismo avanzado, ello no es viable ni económica, ni social ni políticamente. Aunque habría alguna ventaja en eliminar la intervención del Estado, las desventajas y las contradicciones que generaría el abandono de la acción del Estado serían mucho mayores e inaceptables tanto para las fuerzas progresistas como para las reaccionarias por igual (Bonanno et al., 1990:240-244).

William H. Friedland (1988) va más allá, y discute ambos: el proceso de transnacionalización y el Estado, y la emergencia del Estado transnacional. A partir del caso de los consorcios transnacionales en el sector de alimentos, Friedland afirma que el surgimiento de la corporación transnacional implica que el Estado sólo puede controlar particularmente estas nuevas formas económicas, de hecho, "solo puede ser controlada parcialmente por los Estados nacionales debido a que muchas de sus funciones están nacionalmente dispersas" (Friedland, 1988:4). El autor concluye que, a pesar del empuje que tiene esa tendencia embrionaria para la creación del Estado transnacional, todavía no ha aparecido ninguna entidad ni política ni legal a este nivel.

Discusión sobre el Estado y la Economía

La literatura existente sobre el Estado y la globalización del sector agrícola y alimentario nos da un cuerpo de conocimientos del cual pueden inferirse una serie de consideraciones generales. De hecho, si la literatura es correcta y el fenómeno en discusión ha sido descrito adecuadamente, es obvio que estamos frente a una desfase entre la internacionalización del proceso de acumulación y la acción del Estado. Dicho desfase, a su vez, puede tener repercusiones tanto a niveles teórico como socioeconómico. Examinemos algunos de estos niveles:

a) si la literatura sobre globalización es ajustada, las bases teóricas de las actuales teorías sobre el Estado son inadecuadas. Las teorías sobre la globalización de la acumulación de capital no se han acompañado todavía de una transnacionalización de la conceptualización de las acciones del Estado, que continúan centradas en lo nacional. Los actuales análisis sobre el Estado presentan una discrepancia entre la dimensión nacional, en la cual este es considerado, y la dimensión no necesariamente nacional en la que se analiza el desarrollo capitalista. En esencia, la asunción de la dimensión transnacional del proceso económico. Esta situación impone una reformulación a través del análisis empírico. Como han indicado Friedmann y McMichael (1989:112), ya es insostenible considerar al Estado-nación como un "fundamento organizado de la economía mundial".

No obstante, como ha indicado Friedland (1988) la emergencia de un Estado transnacional es todavía embrionario y contingente a la transnacionalización de la esfera económica. Con todo, el proceso de transnacionalización de la esfera económica, no necesariamente supone la transnacionalización de otros componentes constitutivos del Estado tales como las esferas cultural e ideológica. Podría argüirse, adoptando

una posición marxista ortodoxa que la transnacionalización del aparato cultural e ideológico automáticamente seguiría a la transformación de la esfera económica. Sin embargo, y tomando de otras corrientes teóricas marxistas, puede rechazarse esta hipótesis y sostener que la autonomía relativa de los elementos de la superestructura no supone una transformación automática de las esferas cultural e ideológicas. Por el contrario, la autonomía relativa de los elementos superestructurales puede prolongar la existencia simultánea de un sistema económico cada vez más orientado hacia lo transnacional y un sistema de consenso social de legitimación todavía basado en lo nacional. En este sentido, los movimientos políticos regionales, culturales y étnicos pueden representar fuerzas importantes contra la emergencia de un Estado transnacional. A despecho de estas y otras hipótesis, la relación entre los elementos constitutivos del Estado en relación al proceso de transnacionalización debe ocupar un lugar central.

b) Si las teorías del Estado describen correctamente las "funciones históricas del Estado en la sociedad, entonces el proceso de mediación entre las diversas fracciones del capital a nivel internacional no está resuelto". Se ha señalado que para que la acumulación ocurra, debe haber cierto grado de armonía en la sociedad. Esta situación, que Block (1980) llamó "confianza de negocios" está relacionada con dos aspectos. El primero estriba en crear armonía entre la clase dominante como un todo y las clases subordinadas. La segunda se refiere a armonizar la competencia y el conflicto existente entre las diferentes fracciones de la clase dominante. Actualmente a nivel internacional las fracciones de la burguesía que compiten entre sí, al parecer, no tienen una entidad organizada como ocurre a nivel nacional (el Estado nacional). En otras palabras, la burguesía transnacional no cuenta con un Estado organizado que medie sus acciones frente a las clases opuestas. Estas acciones, mediadora y organizativa, son necesarias puesto que estas

fracciones de la burguesía compiten entre sí por conseguir un aumento de sus respectivos beneficios.

Paradójicamente, la globalización de la acumulación de capital se ha desarrollado como una respuesta parcial a la creciente intervención del Estado a nivel nacional (Bonanno, 1987a, Friedmann y McMichael, 1989; Sassen, 1988). Empero, la limitación del poder del Estado en el proceso de acumulación llevada a cabo por las corporaciones transnacionales ha afectado la capacidad del Estado para organizar actividades económicas en una situación en la cual la transnacionalización de la economía demanda más coordinación del Estado (Sassen, 1988:135). Después de todo, históricamente el Estado ha jugado un papel fundamental en las fases previas de la expansión internacional del capital (Murray, 1971; Rowthorn, 1971). Entonces, la necesidad de organización por parte de la burguesía encuentra sus límites en el deseo de esta clase de eludir la acción del Estado.

Podría afirmarse que las corporaciones intentan en realidad coordinar sus acciones y, por lo tanto, suplir la falta de un Estado coordinador. De hecho, estos intentos no son nuevos como lo indica el caso de la Comisión Trilateral, establecida hace dos décadas. Debe subrayarse, sin embargo, que este tipo de organizaciones, como la Comisión Trilateral, no puede nunca obtener todos los poderes asociados con un aparato de Estado. Las corporaciones no tienen el monopolio del poder que tiene el Estado y no pueden legislar directamente y/o implantar una legislación. Pueden influenciar el cuerpo legal, y en general, la acción política pero, como se refleja en la literatura sobre el Estado, (Poulantzas, 1978:179-185), ellas no son el Estado. Aunque es innegable el hecho de que las corporaciones transnacionales están realizando esfuerzos para organizarse a nivel global, éstas no han reemplazado históricamente las funciones mediadoras y organizativas del Estado.

c) Si el Estado es cada vez más incapaz de

extender su acción al campo internacional, las clases subordinadas encuentran reducido su poder en la sociedad. Las teorías sobre el Estado resaltan que, junto al papel represivo, el Estado puede en ciertas circunstancias desempeñar un rol progresista (i.e. el hecho de que las clases subordinadas, a través de la acción política, fuercen al Estado a proteger sus intereses) (Offe, 1985; Poulantzas, 1978). Sin embargo, los intereses de las clases subordinadas son protegidos en tanto que el Estado mantenga el control normativo sobre el proceso productivo. Una vez que ese control se reduce o es eliminado, también la protección de los intereses de las clases subordinadas se reduce o se elimina. Así, las leyes que establecen niveles salariales, de seguridad y de salud, y el desarrollo regional y de las comunidades se eluden a través de maniobras económicas tales como la migración del capital, la producción de equipos más allá de las fronteras nacionales y otras formas de evadir la autoridad del Estado (Sassen, 1988).

Conclusiones

Convergencia contradictoria.

La acción del Estado en favor de las empresas transnacionales y la simultánea protección del Estado a los intereses de las clases subordinadas apuntan a una convergencia de intereses de parte de estos dos grupos para preservar la intervención del Estado, en lo social y económico. Sin embargo, esta convergencia de acción es contradictoria. Los intereses de las empresas transnacionales y las clases subordinadas en mantener la acción del Estado son motivados por razones opuestas y, más importante aún, éstas tendencialmente socavan los objetivos fundamentales de cada uno de ellos.

El capital transnacional se interesa en la acción del Estado puesto que éste promueve la acumulación. Si esta acción es contestada se adoptan acciones para neutralizarla. En años recientes esto último ha asumido la forma de

evasión del papel coordinador y mediador del Estado. Esta solución, a su vez, disminuye la capacidad del Estado de asistir a las corporaciones en el proceso de acumulación.

Las clases subordinadas están interesadas en las acciones del Estado las cuales protegen su bienestar frente a los problemas económicos (inflación, disminución del salario) y los problemas sociales (limitación de los servicios de salud, deterioro de la educación, etc.). La reestructuración transnacional de la economía— llevada a cabo fundamentalmente por el desplazamiento de la producción a través de las fronteras nacionales, basada en bajos salarios y la concentración del capital— ha limitado severamente la acción del Estado nacional dirigida a proteger las reivindicaciones logradas por las clases subordinadas en períodos anteriores (Bonanno, 1989; 1988).

El Ambito Internacional

La dimensión nacional de la acción del Estado y la globalización de la acumulación de capital pueden ser superadas mediante el establecimiento de una entidad que continuaría jugando el papel del Estado a nivel internacional (Friedland, 1988).

Empíricamente, las tendencias que apuntan hacia el surgimiento de un Estado multinacional se encuentran en la expansión y consolidación de la Comunidad Europea, en la firma del Acuerdo de Libre Comercio entre Estados Unidos y Canadá, con la propuesta inclusión de México, en los intentos realizados por Japón en el orden político para conformar una organización multiestatal en el Oriente y las regulaciones de la OCDE en el área agrícola y alimentaria, etc. Entre estos intentos, la CE es realmente la más avanzada con treinta años de historia y un cronograma propuesto para una eventual unificación económica y política (Bonanno, 1990:3).

Los intentos de creación de un Estado multinacional representan, sin embargo, sólo una solución parcial del desfase existente entre el

espacio del poder del Estado y el espacio de la acumulación de capital. De hecho, este desfase puede muy bien continuar existiendo puesto que tanto la EC como otras organizaciones multiestatales incorporan sólo un número limitado de países y no constituyen entidades políticas globales. Si este razonamiento es correcto, el terreno de confrontación entre fuerzas sociales opuestas en la sociedad pueden desplazarse cada vez más hacia el escenario internacional. A su vez, la falta de una entidad estatal claramente establecida puede dar la oportunidad de crear un sistema en el cual puedan fijarse fines democráticos y equitativos. De la misma manera, este "vacío estatal" puede transformarse en un sistema represivo global. Aunque ambos resultados son posibles, ninguno será consecuencia de la reproducción mecánica de las tendencias actuales. Será en los campos político, económico y social en los que se decida las futuras direcciones que tome la sociedad global.

Finalmente, la atención creciente que se ha puesto en el campo internacional no debe ser confundido con el abandono de la acción a nivel local. Este abandono del nivel local por el nivel internacional exclusivamente, y viceversa, puede significar la pérdida de la posibilidad de generar cambios emancipadores en el nuevo orden internacional.

Notas:

1. El concepto de "superestructura" se refiere a los componentes culturales, ideológicos y políticos de una sociedad. En la tradición marxista las esferas política, cultural e ideológica con denominadas superestructurales debido a que se oponen a la economía, la cual constituye la estructura de una sociedad.

2. El término transnacionalización se reemplaza frecuentemente con el término globalización. Aunque existen algunas diferencias entre ambos conceptos, en el marco de este trabajo se consideran sinónimos.

3. Ver por ejemplo, los programas de las conferencias nacionales e internacionales organizadas por el Comité de

Investigación de Sociología de la Agricultura de la ISA en la última década. Particularmente, los programas de los X, XI y XII Congresos Mundiales de Sociología, los cuales se realizaron respectivamente en 1982, 1986 y 1990. Ver también el programa del VII Congreso Mundial de Sociología Rural y del 50 Encuentro Anual de la Sociedad Americana de Sociología Rural, llevados a cabo en 1988 y 1987, respectivamente.

4. Debe hacerse notar que el análisis centrado en lo nacional del capitalismo realizado por Marx es también el resultado del objetivo heurístico de crear un modelo que reflejase las características esenciales del capitalismo. El énfasis de Marx en el método de la "abstracción" impone el acento en los aspectos de la totalidad social, el cual califica las características esenciales de la sociedad (Ver: Sweezy, 1942:31-44). En concordancia, la perspectiva metodológica de Marx requirió de un sistema capitalista simplificado y cerrado como el de Gran Bretaña.

5. La afirmación de que estas teorías fueron elaboradas dentro del marco de análisis marxista ha sido discutido por los que proponen la llamada "teoría de la articulación de modos de producción" (Ver: Laclau, 1971 y Taylor, 1979). De acuerdo con esta teoría, los dependentistas (i.e. los adherentes de las teorías de la dependencia, del intercambio y del Sistema Mundial) operan fuera del marxismo por cuanto basan su definición del capitalismo en un sistema de intercambio más que en uno de producción. En este trabajo, los articulacionistas argüyen que Marx define el capitalismo sobre las bases de las relaciones de producción, i.e. relaciones salariales.

La solución de esta disputa no es uno de los objetivos de este trabajo. Sin embargo, es importante puntualizar que a pesar de la alteración de algunas ortodoxias de los estudiosos marxistas, los dependentistas han escrito dentro del espíritu del contenido político y analítico de los trabajos de Marx. Por esta sola razón deben considerarse dentro del marco de análisis marxista.

6. Aunque es difícil en la práctica la identificación de una compañía con un país, se usa frecuentemente en términos ideológicos como una estrategia comercial. Por ejemplo, las compañías americanas de confección textil atraen a su clientela apelando a su origen americano.

No obstante, muchos de sus productos son confeccionados fuera del país. Más aún, en el caso de la manufactura de vehículos de las empresas automotrices la producción nacional se efectúa a través de "joint ventures" con capital extranjero, o simplemente, la producción extranjera se presenta camuflada como nacional. Cada vez es más problemático mantener la distinción entre capital nacional y extranjero.

7. Esto no quiere decir que la respuesta a la acción reguladora del Estado hay generado la transnacionalización del capital. En realidad varios factores han contribuido a esta transnacionalización, incluyendo la acción del Estado en favor de las clases subordinadas.

Referencias Bibliográficas

- AMIN, Samir
1980 *Class and Nation: Historically and in the Current Crisis*. London: Heinemann.
- ARRIGHI, Giovanni
1978 *The Geometry of Imperialism*. London: New Left Books.
- BLOCK, Fred
1980 "Beyond relative autonomy: state managers as historical subjects." Pp. 227-240 in R. Miliband and J. Seville (Eds.), *Socialist Register*. London: Merlin Press.
- 1977 "The ruling class does not rule." *Socialist Revolution*, Vol. 7 (3): 6-28.
- BLOMSTROM, Magnus and Bjorn Hettne
1984 *Development Theory in Transition*. London: Zed Books.
- BLUESTONE, Barry and Bennett Harrison
1982 *The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closing, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry*. New York: Basic Books.
- BONANNO, Alessandro
1990 "Introduction." Pp. 1-8 in A. Bonanno (ed.), *Agrarian Policies & Agricultural Systems*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- 1989 "La reorganización económica de los Estados Unidos: el colapso de la dicotomía centro-periferia y la nueva posición de los trabajadores." *Cuadernos del CENDES*, 11:113-121.
- 1988 "Theories of the state: the case of land reform in Italy, 1944-1961." *The Sociological Quarterly* Vol. 29 (1): 131-147.

- 1987a **Small Farms: Persistence with Legitimation.** Boulder: Westview Press.
- 1987b "Agricultural policies and the capitalist state." *Agriculture and Human Values*, Vol. 4 (2,3):40-46.
- BONANNO, Alessandro, Donato Fernández and Jere L. Gilles
1990 "Agricultural policies in the US and EC: a comparative analysis." Pp. 227-251 in A. Bonanno (ed.), *Agrarian Policies & Agricultural Systems*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- BREWER, Anthony
1980 *Marxist Theories of Imperialism*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- BUKHARIN, Nikolai
1972 *Imperialism and World Economy*. London: Merlin Press.
- BUSINESS Week
1990 "The stateless corporation." *Business Week*, May 14:98-105.
- CAMPBELL, John L. and Leon N. Lindberg
1990 "Property rights and the organization of economic activity by the state." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 55 (5):634-647.
- CAMPBELL, Rex
1990 "Global transformation and agriculture." *The Rural Sociologist*, Vol. 10 (3):22-28.
- CARNOY, Martin
1984 *The State and Political Theory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- CONSTANCE Douglas and William D. Heffernan
forthcoming "The global poultry agro-food complex." *Agricultura y Sociedad*.
- 1989 "The rise of oligopoly in agricultural markets: the demise of family farms." Paper presented at the Agriculture, Food and Human Values Society Meeting. Little Rock, Ark., November.
- DICKENS, David and Alessandro Bonanno
1988 "Analyzing development, dependency and underdevelopment: suggestions for an alternative approach." *Sociological Spectrum*, Vol. 8 (2):169-186.
- DOBB, Maurice
1963 *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- DOMHOFF, William G.
1979 *The Power That Be*. New York: Vintage Books.
- 1967 *Who Rules America?* Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- EMMANUEL, Arghiri
1972 *Unequal Exchange*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- FRANK, André Gunder
1979 *Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- FRANK, André Gunder
1967a *The Sociology of Development and the Underdevelopment of Sociology*. London: Pluto Press.
- 1967b *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- FRIEDLAND, William H.
1988 "The transnationalization of agricultural production: palimpsest of the transnational state." Paper presented at the VII World Congress of Rural Sociology. Bologna, Italy, July.
- 1983 "State formation and reformation in California grapes." Paper presented at the conference on "The Political Economy of Agriculture." Ann Arbor, MI., August.
- FRIEDLAND, William H., Lawrence Busch, Frederick H. Buttel and Alan P. Rudy (Eds.)
1991 *Towards a New Political Economy of Agriculture*. Boulder: Westview Press.

- FRIEDMANN, Harriet and Philip McMichael
 1989 "Agriculture and the state system." *Sociologia Ruralis*, Vol. 29 (2):93-117.
- 1988 "The world historical development of agriculture: western agriculture in comparative perspective." *Sociology of Agriculture Working Paper Series*. London: Rural Studies Research Centre.
- GILBERT, Jess and Carolyn Howe
 1988 "Beyond 'state vs society:' theories of the state and New Deal agricultural policies." Unpublished manuscript. University of Wisconsin-Madison.
- GORDON, David
 1988 "The global economy: new edifice or crumbling foundations?" *New Left Review*, 168:24-65.
- GRAMSCI, Antonio
 1975 *Quaderni dal Carcere*. Rome: Editori Riuniti.
- 1971 *Selection from Prison Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers.
- GREEN, Gary
 1989 "State, class and technology in tobacco production." *Agriculture and Human Values*, Vol. 6 (4):54-61.
- 1987 "The political economy of flue-cured tobacco production." *Rural Sociology*, Vol. 52 (2): 221-241.
- HABERMAS, Jürgen
 1975 *Legitimation Crisis*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- HEFFERNAN, William D.
 1990 "Internationalization of the poultry industry." Paper Presented at the XII World Congress of Sociology. Madrid, Spain, July.
- 1984 "Constraints in the U.S. poultry industry." Pp. 237-260 in H. Schwarzweller (ed.), *Research in Rural Sociology and Development*. Greenwich: Jay Press.
- HILFERDING, Rudolf
 1970 *Le Capital Financier*. Paris: Edition de Minuit.
- HOOGVELT, Ankie
 1982 *The Third World in Global Development*. London: Macmillan Press.
- HOOKS, Gregory
 1990 "From an autonomous to a captured state agency." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 55 (1):29-43.
- HORKHEIMER, Max
 1974 *Eclipse of Reason*. New York: The Seabury Press.
- HORKHEIMER, Max and Theodor Adorno
 1972 *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. New York: Continuum.
- HOWE, Gary and Alan Sica
 1980 "Political economy, imperialism and the problem of world system theory." *Current Perspective in Social Theory*, Vol. 1 (1):235-286.
- JENKINS, Craig J. and Barbara Brents
 1989 "Social protest, hegemonic competition and social reform." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 54 (6):891-909.
- LACLAU, Ernesto
 1977 *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*. London: New Left Books.
- LENIN, Nikolai (Vladimir)
 1926 *Imperialism and the State Revolution*. New York: Vanguard Press.
- LUKACS, Georg
 1971 *History and Class Consciousness*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- LUXEMBURG, Rosa
 1971 *The Accumulation of Capital*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- MANDEL, Ernest
 1977 *Introduction to Karl Marx's Capital*. New York: Vintage Books.
- MARCUSE, Herbert
 1964 *One Dimensional Man*. Boston: Beacon Press.

- MARX, Karl**
 1977 *Capital*. New York: Vintage Books.
-
- 1976 **Preface and Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy**. Peking: Foreign Language Publishing House.
-
- 1964 **The German Ideology**. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
-
- MARX, Karl and Friedrich Engels**
 1963 *The Communist Manifesto*. New York: Russell & Russell.
-
- MCMICHAEL, Philip and David Myhre**
 1991 "Global regulation vs. the nation state: agro-food systems and the new politics of capital." *Capital & State*, 50:1-18.
-
- MEDOFF, James and Paul Strassman**
 1985 "About the two-tier workforce and growth of low-pay jobs." *Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association Industry News*, March:1-9.
-
- MILIBAND, Ralph**
 1970 "The capitalist state: reply to Nicos Poulantzas." *New Left Review*, 59:83-92.
-
- 1969 **The State in Capitalist Societies**. London: Winfield and Nicholson.
-
- MINGIONE, Enzo**
 1990 **Fragmented Societies**. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
-
- MURRAY, Robin**
 1971 "The internationalization of capital and the nation state." *New Left Review*, 67:84-109.
-
- MUTTI, Antonio and Irene Poli**
 1975 *Sottosviluppo e Meridione*. Milan: Mazzotta.
-
- O'CONNOR, James**
 1974 **The Fiscal Crisis of the State**. New York: St. Martin's Press.
-
- 1973 **The Corporation and the State: Essay in the Theory of Capitalism and Imperialism**. New York: Harper and Row.
-
- OFFE, Claus**
 1985 **Disorganized Capitalism**. Cambridge: MIT Press.
-
- OFFE, Claus and Volker Ronge**
 1979 "Theses on the theory of the state." Pp. 345-356 in J.W. Freiberg (ed.), *Critical Sociology*. New York: Irvington Press.
-
- PRECHEL, Harland**
 1990 "Steel and the state: industry politics and business policy formation." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 55 (5):648-668.
-
- POULANTZAS, Nicos**
 1978 **State, Power, Socialism**. London: New Left Books.
-
- QUADAGNO, Jill**
 1990 "Race, class, and gender in the U.S. welfare state." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 55 (1):11-28.
-
- ROWTHORN, Bob**
 1971 "Imperialism in the 1970's —unity or rivalry." *New Left Review*, 69:31-54.
-
- SASSEN, Saskia**
 1988 **The Mobility of Labor and Capital**. New York: Cambridge University Press.
-
- SWEEZY, Paul**
 1942 **The Theory of Capitalist Development**. New York: Oxford University Press.
-
- TAYLOR, John**
 1979 **From Modernization to Modes of Production: A Critique of the Sociologies of Development and Underdevelopment**. London: Macmillan.
-
- WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel**
 1979 **The Capitalist World Economy**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-
- 1974 **The Modern World System**. New York: Academic Press.

ABSTRACT

The Globalization of the Agricultural and Food Sector and Theories of the State

The paper investigates the theoretical dislocation between the domestic oriented character of theories of the State and the transnational character of theories of socio-economic development. Employing the case of the food and agricultural sector, it is argued that the literature in this area has emphasized the transnational dimension of capital accumulation and the process of by-passing State authority at the national level. This situation mandates re-evaluation of State theories in regard to the international dimension of current processes of capital accumulation. Furthermore, the present analysis suggests patterns of "contradictory convergence" in which expansion at the transnational level of State action is demanded by transnational corporations and subordinate classes alike. This demand, however, is contradictory, as it finds its locus in the transnational bourgeoisie's desire to avoid State action. Politically, as a result of this situation the locus of emancipatory social actions should be increasingly transferred to the international arena.

*Alessandro Bonanno is Assistant Professor of Rural Sociology at the University of Missouri-Columbia, USA. He has researched among other topics, the structure of agriculture, regional and international development, aging and the State. He is the author of numerous journal articles and books, among them *Small Farms* (1987) *Sociology of Agriculture* (1989) *Agrarian Policies and Agricultural Systems* (1990). He received his Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Kentucky, USA.*

The Transnationalization of Agricultural Production: Palimpsest of the Transnational State

William H. Friedland

This paper explores theoretically the emergence of the transnational State. Based on the historical experience of the emergence of the state at the national level fulfilling four major functions—accumulation, legitimization, mediation of inter- and intra-class conflict—and social reproduction, and utilizing empirical research in an agricultural commodity, frozen concentrated orange juice, the paper argues that the increased significance of transnational corporations requires the emergence of a state apparatus beyond the level of the nation. The paper suggests ways and means of looking for such an emergence.

William H. Friedland has been Professor of Community Studies and Sociology at the University of California, Santa Cruz since 1969. He has been active in the development of the sociology of agriculture having co-authored "Manufacturing Green Gold: Capital, Labor, and Technology in the Lettuce Industry," Destalking the Wily Tomato: "A Case Study in Social Consequences in California Agricultural Research;" and "Agricultural Workers in America's Northeast." He recently co-edited the new volume "Toward a New Political Economy of Advanced Capitalist Agriculture." He has helped organize conferences on the sociology of agriculture in Guelph (Canada), Ann Arbor and Madison (USA) and Bologna (Italy).

Introduction

This paper develops an exploratory way of looking at and for the State. Drawn largely from an empirical analysis of an agricultural commodity, this paper undertakes an exploratory safari into the *terra incognita* of the transnational State. Although this paper originates in an empirical study of a mundane agricultural commodity, frozen concentrated orange juice, it will not deal with empirical matters but will focus on theoretical and logical issues that are derivative from the empirical study.

First, I will review the levels of analysis currently utilized in the examination of agricultural policy: national and the international. This is necessary to create the environment for a juxtaposition relating to the transnational State. Second, while the analysis emerges from an empirical study of an agricultural commodity, it will be concerned with preliminary theoretical formulations about the transnational State.

Levels of Analysis in State Policy on Agriculture

Two and a half levels of analysis regarding State policy and agriculture have emerged in recent decades.

First and foremost, the national levels of policy with respect to agriculture have long been established and institutionalized. These have varied widely in Western Europe and the United

States and have centered on a number of considerations including the political base and importance of the agricultural population; maintenance of a national capacity to sustain population by maintaining food security or as sources of external earnings; and ideological beliefs about the role of agriculture as a population-holding or—retrieval system, i.e., a labor reserve.

Whatever the reasons, and they are often complex, most nations have established agricultural policies since these relate to **food policies**. Food policy is a major consideration for a nation once a significant segment of its population no longer sustains itself directly from the land. This has been the case in all the advanced capitalist societies of Western Europe.

The second level of analysis relating to agriculture and food policy emerged after the second World War. While the importance of food as an instrument of national policy had been primitively understood before, it was not until the second World War that a new level of understanding emerged with respect to food.

Focused on such popular formulations as world hunger, there developed clearer conceptions of food as an instrument of national policy in the **international arena**. Whereas food had been thought of largely before in terms of trade, there emerged a conception of food as a political instrument. The organizational manifestation of this conception was focused initially in the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) but later was shared with a complex of organizations including the World Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the regional development banks, and the World Food Conference.

While these international organizations have provided important loci for meetings and debates, these have been, almost entirely, venues in which **national interests** and concerns are brought to bear. Some regional interests—particularly north-south, developed-developing, first world-fourth/

fifth world splits—have crystallized at this international level but policies continue to reflect to a considerable degree, national interests manifested through national representation.

The half-level to which reference was made applies to the European Community (EC) which has made agricultural policies a major focus of activity. The EC represents a curious intermediate level that conjoins national levels and policies with a new level of political economy reflective of super-national and regional interests of nation-states with very uneven levels of agricultural development.

As can be expected, data sources, information, and analysis about each of the two and a half levels reflect the historic importance of each. Thus, data and analysis at the national level is most detailed, with ministries of agriculture producing all sorts of information about agricultural production and the movement of agricultural products. **Production and trade**, in other words, are key processes which nation-states address. Information at the international level is more abstract, being focused less on production, which is seen as being a national jurisdiction, and more on exchange.

Following Frozen Orange Juice

The lacunae in the organization of data sources and the basis for the theoretical considerations that are the focus of this paper have developed from a study of an agricultural commodity, oranges. Having been involved for a number of years in the analysis of the social organization of agricultural commodity production systems, including processing tomatoes, iceberg lettuce, fresh grapes, raisins, and wine, additional research in citrus has generated involvement in a very different form of analysis (Friedland and Barton 1975, 1976; Friedland, Barton, and Thomas 1981; Friedland 1984; Friedland forthcoming).

This is because all of the previous items studied represent commodities primarily in

national production, processing, and distribution with only wine being important in international trade. Citrus, in contrast, particularly in the form of frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ), while produced, processed, and distributed nationally, represents a commodity whose overall system—production, processing, and distribution—has become transnational.

Although having national origins, the emergence of a transnational system, in contrast to a simply international one, is what is of interest. This is because FCOJ is now being produced in a variety of different national locations but its successive forms of transformation and distribution have moved significantly beyond the national level.

Research in citrus as a commodity system has revealed:

1. FCOJ technology, having emerged during the 1940s, resolved the problem of Florida's chronic overproduction of oranges by creating a transformed, i.e., processed, product.

2. After several decades of expanding and developing a national market, the United States began to export FCOJ to high income countries in Northern Europe.

3. In 1960, Coca-Cola emerged as a major factor in FCOJ production through its purchase of Minute Maid (a processing firm), including orange groves and processing plants in Florida. Although Coca-Cola is big—probably the largest single firm in FCOJ production—the FCOJ system is characterized by oligopoly rather than monopoly.

4. With a sizable market for FCOJ in the U.S. but with the vagaries of weather affecting production, Brazil came "on line" during the 1960s as a major producer of oranges with processing capacity because of occasional freezes that upset the supply of FCOJ (Wilson 1980).

5. Brazilian production began with an initial focus on the U.S. market but, during the 1970s, opened or penetrated other markets.

In particular, the Canadian market, which had

been dominated by U.S. production, became increasingly "brazilianized." This same process also began in Northern Europe.

6. Coca-Cola became an important organization involved in growing, processing, and distribution. Coke's role outside the U.S. was more involved with "downstream" rather than "upstream" activities, i.e., processing, reprocessing, distribution, and marketing, rather than growing (except in Florida).

7. Methodologically, excellent data sources exist at the national level with respect to production of citrus, imports and exports, but not about ownership of production facilities or market shares.

It is this last finding, as well as research in other agricultural commodities and in non-agriculture, that has stimulated interest in the issue of the transnational State, the subject of this paper. The citrus case exemplifies the new transnational production and distribution systems built around new corporate forms of organization, the transnational corporation (TNC).

Unlike Coca-Cola in its more "normal" multinational form in which production and distribution facilities are maintained within discrete national boundaries even though ownership is fundamentally national (i.e., Coca-Cola being registered under national laws of the U.S., Lebanon, or Lichtenstein, etc.), in this new transnational form, the various stages of production, processing, and distribution are owned and controlled differentially and the TNC may shift different aspects of the three basic activities to maximize its economic performance.

Thus, Coca-Cola grows, processes and distributes FCOJ in the U.S. but reprocesses and distributes in Canada. It apparently does not grow in Brazil. It may process there, however, but distribution locally is not in FCOJ form. Since most Brazilian FCOJ is exported, Coke is undoubtedly an important factor in importation into the U.S. (although one whose magnitude is, at least at present, unclear). But Coke did not

import Brazilian FCOJ into the U.S. for reprocessing in Florida, since that State's standards for the levels of sugar (degrees brix) required in FCOJ were, until 1980, higher than the federal standard. Thus, Coca-Cola could take advantage of differential Florida-U.S. standards by importing Brazilian FCOJ outside of Florida and reprocessing it with Florida FCOJ (for taste and quality reasons) for U.S./Canadian markets. Or, Coke could export U.S. FCOJ from Florida and import, through a Canadian subsidiary, Brazilian FCOJ into Canada for reprocessing and distribution.

How Coca-Cola brings its juice into the European market is still unclear. It may no longer be importing U.S. juice since the Brazilian product is cheaper. In EC countries, it could import FCOJ via Israel, an importer of the Brazilian product, for mixture with Israeli juice and re-export to the EC with which Israel bears a special relationship and therefore has some tariff advantages. The point is, however, that Coca-Cola maintains differential capacity in different locations and is therefore capable of maximizing its advantages in growing, processing, re-processing, and marketing. With respect to FCOJ alone, let alone its other products, Coca-Cola has become a truly transnational corporation.

Considering the Transnational State Theoretically

The approach taken in this paper is frankly exploratory.

Essentially it is concerned with (1) an exploration on the character of an emergent social form, the transnational State; and (2) a consideration of agricultural policy as the venue within which the transnational State emerges.

Readers will probably raise questions immediately. What is the character of the State? How can there be a transnational State when the political forms of such a formation do not appear to exist? And finally, why utilize agriculture as

the functional location to explore such a complex problem; why not use industry, or trade?

The last question can be answered most easily. There is one important reason for utilizing agriculture to explore the transnational State: agriculture and agricultural policies at the national level constitute a basic set of concerns for all national societies and states; unless there is a constant flow of food in abundance and relatively cheaply to the urbanized and industrialized populations of the advanced capitalist countries, domestic unrest will increase. Thus, agricultural policy is fundamentally concerned with food policies and these concerns are ubiquitous.

The first question raised on the character of the State is difficult to deal with since philosophers and scholars have been debating the character of the State ever since Hegel. This paper will not review the literature on the State, so let me define the State as it will be developed in this paper⁽¹⁾.

First, I take the State, following Marx, to represent the interests of any ruling group, i.e., any set of social categories that exercise dominance in productive activities. Second, I look upon the State as a process and not simply a collection of formal entities. Thus, the State is not equivalent to the government; segments of governmental organizations may constitute elements of the State but much of the government is concerned with routine administration of things that are far too mundane to be designated under the rubric "the State." Third, the State as process emerges in fulfilling four functional requisites: accumulation, legitimization, mediation of inter- and intra-class conflicts, and social reproduction⁽²⁾.

This still leaves the definition of the State problematic.

The State, as Marx argued, may constitute the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie" (in the bourgeois State) but this is, at one and the same time, a useful but illusory formulation. It indicates that the State represents the significant, important, "cutting edge" of political economic organization.

In this formulation, the State does not include every petty bureaucrat working for the government but does include segments where decision making power resides. It also includes entities and things outside of government, i.e., in various social sectors that participate in decision making about the political-economic organization of society.

But Marx' formulation is illusory because it attributes to the State, in my view, too much formal organization. An executive committee implies, for example, that there exists subordinate levels in a formal organizational system and some relationship between subordinate strata and the "executive committee." It also implies some regularity of organization, i.e., meetings, agreements formally reached, etc. While many of these attributes may exist in the State, other nonformal arrangements also must exist.

Thus the State is a superorganic or metasocial process existing only partially in formal organization, but also in nonformal arrangements, agreements, and understandings that are immanent in the activities of key structural elements of the advanced capitalist countries.

Turning to the middle question: how can there be a transnational State when its political forms have not yet appeared? The answer is that, if a theoretical analysis indicates the existence of a certain phenomenon, it becomes logically incumbent to pursue empirical analysis. What this means concretely is the need to initiate processual forms which might constitute such a State.

In the case in hand, the argument would run something as follows.

First, the national state has become less significant and important since the 1960s. Following Borrego's (1981) analysis, the nation-state as a political-economic formation peaked around the 1960s; until that time, national interests continued to predominate. While a global economy had emerged much earlier, the dominant political-economic forms were built around the

nation. The defeat of the United States in the Viet Nam war marks the end of the period of dominance of the nation-state as a political-economic form.

Second, the emergence of a transnational political economy predates the peaking and the initiation of decline of the nation-state. Here I want to make a distinction, again following Borrego, between the development of a world system based on national political-economic interests and a transnational political economy. In the former, a host of economic organizations emerged concerned with economic exploitation all over the world. This was a period characterized by the term "imperialism." Imperialism represented the national political form of economic development, i.e., the nation-state pursuing the economic interests of its national bourgeoisie.

Even prior to the 1960s, however, a new economic formation could be discerned, the transnational corporation. Originally referred to as the "multinational corporation," this semantic formulation was probably accurate in the early phases of the political economic development of these social forms. When companies such as General Motors, Castle and Cooke, Coca-Cola, Phillips, and Exxon (in their original corporate manifestations) moved abroad, they began with a national base, a national orientation, a national leadership, and a national market. As production and markets broadened, the character of these entities have been transformed. While each may continue to have a leadership which is predominantly from one nation and/or more of a tendency to market and distribute in one national location, increasingly the orientations of these corporate entities has shifted. The emphasis shifts from being multinational, i.e., concerned with having locations in a number of nations in which activity is carried on but with a retained national orientation, to becoming transnational, i.e., less concerned with specific national interests, national markets, and/or internal organization which is nationally-based and more concerned with a

global orientation.

Thus, new political-economic forms are emergent, the transnational corporations. Since these economic forms can only partially be controlled by the nation-state, it follows that some new State form must emerge to function as the "executive committee" of a new transnational bourgeoisie. Transnational corporate entities can only partially be controlled by nation-states because so much of their productive, manufacturing, distributing, and marketing functions are nationally-dispersed. The nation-state seeking to "control" a transnational corporation can do so only to the extent that the entity can be located within the nation. Since only part of a transnational corporation is physically located within a nation, no single nation can control or regulate a transnational corporation. Nor does there exist any supernational level of political organization, at present, which can regulate a transnational corporation beyond the borders of nation-states. Thus, concluding Borrego's argument, transnational corporate organization constitutes a new manifestation of capitalism which is only partially regulatable by nation-states, only to the extent that it has physical production and distribution activities within national boundaries. As an overall entity, the transnational corporation is not regulatable by any existing State form since there are no such political forms.

An essential element of the analysis of capitalism is that capitalists and capitalist organizational forms seek to minimize uncertainty. While many aspects of production may have uncertainties, it is reasonable to expect that capitalists, in their relations with each other and, equally important, in their relations with the working class, will want to have some kind of predictability about the rules of the game. Means must be developed within which competition can occur, in which resources and markets can be developed, setting the boundaries on conflict so that capitalists will know what the costs of various

production factors will be under any given set of conditions. It is because of the demand for these certainties, predictabilities, rules, that we can logically infer (once we have made assumptions about the character of the State as a given) that a transnational State must become emergent as transnational political economy spreads.

If a transnational State is immanent, how shall we look for it? What rules can we follow in discerning the development of a new political form? What is clear, at the outset, is of what the transnational State does not consist. It does not consist, for example, of the United Nations and/or other subsidiary UN forms although there may be segments within UN structures that may be shaping some of the rules of the new transnational "game" and therefore constitute parts of an emergent transnational State.

Nor does the transnational State consist of political entities such as the European Community and its Common Agricultural Policy. The EC is an entity which functions above the level of the nations encompassed within it but, in fact, it behaves more as a nation-state than as a transnational State. It can regulate certain activities within its borders but it has no capacity to regulate activities beyond. It can influence relationships with former colonial territories of its major nations but it cannot regulate the significant economic inter-relationships on which the transnational corporations are based.

Looking for the Transnational State

Looking for the transnational State resembles Diogenes' task: in the darkness of historical immediacy, it is difficult to discern outlines of new political formations. Let me essay an attempt:

1. The new transnational State must be concerned with the setting of limits or boundaries on the activities of transnational corporations with respect to each other.

2. The new transnational State must be concerned with establishing predictability with

respect to labor, costs, conditions, supply, movements, standards, and markets.

3. The new transnational State does not yet have open, explicit, political character of a formal nature.

4. Therefore, the shape of the new transnational State must be discerned more in informal venues, in formal organizations which have not yet taken transnational character, and/or in formal organizations that have taken transnational character but have not yet been given an explicit legal-political basis.

Two methodological questions might be initially addressed: **how** and **where** to look for the transnational State?

The **how** of this process raises several interesting methodological problems. Since we are dealing with a prefigurative phenomenon in which there is no visibly identifiable entity, two possibilities suggest themselves as to how to go about delineating the phenomenon. First, we might utilize historical analysis to examine the emergence of the modern bourgeois State. Essentially this might entail placing ourselves in feudal Europe sometime after the 12th century to consider the socio-economic conditions that gave rise to the modern State. Then by some comparative process, recognizing the differences between the times and circumstances, ask ourselves questions about where we might discern the shaping of the transnational State.

The second process might entail consideration of entities that would be closest to the development of a transnational State, i.e., in particular those transnational forms that are most advanced, oldest. In this case, it might be advantageous to examine a commodity such as oil since so much of world production and distribution are controlled by seven firms. While many internal processes of the seven firms and their interrelationships are hidden, these organizations are fairly public in the sense that they occupy the attention of many people. Thus, by asking empirical questions of a body of literature on the "seven sisters," we

might discern some of the outlines of the transnational State.

The issue of **where** to look poses some very different questions. One way to begin is to formulate, at least in preliminary fashion and based on what we currently understand to be the character of the State, a series of functions. By asking where these functions are carried out, we may gain some sense as to where to look for the transnational State.

Following the initial approach suggested under **how**, one way of functioning might be to take an historical analysis that deals with the emergence of the modern State and seek to abstract some salient elements from it. A useful example can be found in Hechter and Brustein (1980) who argue that three modes of production —sedentary pastoral, petty commodity, and feudal— existed in 12th century western Europe. After comparatively examining the three modes of production, Hechter and Brustein conclude that:

"...state formation will be more likely to the degree that powerful individual actors form two groups on the basis of divergent economic and political interests. The reason is that, in politically divided societies, actors in the more powerful group always have an incentive to band together and create an organization — a state apparatus — to tax, repress, or otherwise expropriate the members of the weaker group. This incentive is magnified if, as in the case of late feudalism, the weaker group seems capable of mounting a challenge to the system of property rights under which the stronger group prospers (p. 1085)."

Hechter and Brustein argue that the growing threat of the bourgeoisie and their allied artisans in the towns led the feudal aristocracy to form the modern State in self-protection. Differing with Marx' analysis that the bourgeoisie within

feudalism developed class consciousness first, they argue:

“...that in late feudalism the nobility, not the bourgeoisie, was more likely to have attained class consciousness. The modern state was the direct result of this development. Thus, bourgeois class consciousness in the late medieval period did not grow from the seeds of a new, capitalist mode of production so much as reemerge in reaction to the policies of the first modern states (p. 1090).”

This approach suggests that (1) the emergence of the transnational State must occur through some form of opposition, i.e., where those involved in transnational organization are being threatened by opposing forces dependent on some other base; (2) that the emergence of a phenomenon such as the transnational State should be thought about dialectically since it is in the primitive struggle of the burghers against the feudal lords that a modern State emerged at the behest of the feudal lords anxious to protect their property, rights, and prestige from weaker interlopers. This State, in turn, would be captured by the bourgeoisie in the revolutionary struggles that marked the transition to modern capitalist States in Great Britain and France.

Applying the analysis to our problem, we have to ask the question: with which class forces does the transnational bourgeoisie come into conflict that would lead to explorations toward the formation of a transnational State? Three sources of challenge can be potentially identified.

First, there is the international proletariat. A transnational bourgeoisie must deal with a number of national proletariats since its production and distribution facilities are scattered over many nations. In each national case, it must deal with a national (and/or localized) proletariat. The totality of national proletariats, however, is qualitatively different from an international proletariat⁽³⁾.

A second “figure” with whom the transnational

bourgeoisie might find themselves in conflict are their equivalents with the Centrally-Planned Economies⁽⁴⁾. Here the problem is that the transnational bourgeoisie is not in conflict (to the extent that I can see) with the ruling classes of the centrally planned economies. Transnational corporations have penetrated the centrally planned economies by the establishment of contractual relations in production (such as Fiat has done extensively throughout the eastern bloc countries such as the Soviet Union and Poland). Similarly, transnational corporations of Japanese and other national origin have now penetrated China.

One conceivable formulation might argue that CPE-based transnational corporations will come into conflict with the capitalist transnational corporations. There are a number of questions that must be raised by this formulation the most important one of which is: are there CPE-based transnational corporations (or their equivalents)? For me, the answer is not clear. My sense is that the equivalent development of the transnational corporation has not yet occurred within the centrally planned economies since no State-operated organizations are involved in production and distribution among the various centrally planned economies.

This leads, then, to the third potential source of conflict. I see this residing primarily with national bourgeoisies. While the transnational bourgeoisie has emerged from national antecedents, it stands in sharp contrast to those segments of the bourgeoisie that are still limited to national boundaries. Here I run into problems of delineating the character of the national bourgeoisie in contrast to the transnational bourgeoisie. Impressionistically, I have the feeling that steelmakers constitute more of a national bourgeoisie than any other category I can call to mind. The problem is that steel production has long been linked to banking and to capital forms that have long been transnationalized. My impression, however, is that steelmakers, at least in the U.S., are more nationally oriented than

many other manufacturers and producers.

In any case, additional empirical research is necessary. However, one can see the possibilities for conflicts between the transnational and national bourgeoisies and this looks like the most probable source of conflict.

What this discussion, developing from Hechter and Brustein, suggests that it is necessary to (1) develop empirical data that distinguishes the transnational bourgeoisie from national bourgeoisies; (2) examine conflicting loci between the two; and (3) seek to delineate the loci of "solutions" to such conflicts.

Turning to a consideration of where to look for the manifestations of the transnational State provides a different kind of analysis.

First, since there is no such State but we are hypothesizing an emergent force known as the transnational bourgeoisie, there will have to be some kind of apparatus in which a normative organization of the transnational bourgeoisie and the transnational State emerges. An example can be found in the Trilateral Commission, organized as a manifestation of "the transnationalisation of the State" (Gill 1990: 1). The Commission draws its membership from major economic and political figures in Trilateral nation-states including the U.S., western Europe, and Japan. Its purposes are to improve communications, develop policies that the Trilateral States can follow, and to pursue the implementation of such policies within their national governments and societies (Gill 1990: Chapter 1).

The internal processes of the Commission are intended to produce agreements that can be pursued in a unified manner in the national societies of advanced capitalism. Out of this develops a common normative orientation about how the world ought to be organized. Since the leadership of a number of transnational corporations are prominent in Trilateral Commission, the Commission represents a potential venue for the development of the normative system of the transnational State. But

the development of a normative order can only be accomplished in part by discussions over general analytic questions. Perhaps as important, if not more so, is the development of a normative order through specific interactions over concrete activities of the TNCs. What I have in mind here is that the TNCs are not simply involved in autonomous production and distribution activities, i.e., they also must interrelate with each other. Perhaps this can best be illustrated by utilizing an example that developed in the citrus research: the setting of standards for frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ).

In the international trade in FCOJ there is an international standard used by all agencies: it is 64 degrees Brix (degrees Brix is a measure of soluble solids [such as sugar]). This measure, used in all movement of FCOJ in global trade, is not the standard which is used for juice sold at retail (11.8 degrees Brix), by U.S. regulators in setting the standard for concentrate sold at retail (41.8 degrees Brix), or by the state of Florida until 1980 (44.8 degrees Brix). Nor is it the standard which is utilized by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in the *Codex Alimentarius* which ostensibly sets standards for international trade (20 degrees Brix)⁽⁵⁾.

Thus we have an interesting case in which the *de facto* standard in global trade, acceptable to all parties involved in this trade, is not the same as the standard used by any governmental or intergovernmental agency such as the FAO. The 65 degrees Brix standard is an arbitrary one since it has at least been feasible to concentrate orange juice to 72 degrees Brix (Redd 1983:17). Where did this *de facto* standard come from? Clearly not from the FAO or the standard setting agencies of the U.S. government⁽⁶⁾.

Some group, somewhere, determined the global standard and that standard has apparently been in use for several decades. It is through the discovery of such standard setting processes which are probably informal (in the sense that

they are not set by any formally delineated governmental or intergovernmental bodies) that one must look for the emergent transnational State.

For, clearly, commonly understood standards are essential to the accumulation activity of global capitalist enterprises. Without such common understandings, each transaction would have to be individually negotiated and distinctive standards set. At the level of the nation, it is the national government that normally establishes such standards. Since there is no transnational government, we can impute the existence of informal instrumentalities where such standards are actually developed and accepted. It is in such instrumentalities that it becomes possible to impute the emergent forms of the transnational State.

Conclusion

In all likelihood, this paper raises more questions than it resolves. Frankly exploratory, I have argued for the logical existence—or, more appropriately, the emergence—of something I have labelled the “transnational State.” Based upon the reasoning that something known as the State must exist in capitalist economies to formulate the rules of the economic game (as well as fulfilling other functions), the most important of which is the accumulation function, my argument is that, with the increasing significance of economic organization that transcends the nation state in the form of the transnational corporation, some metasocial organism must emerge to facilitate the “normal” functions of capitalist economy.

How, where, and in what forms that transnational state will emerge remains unclear; what is clear is that some kind(s) of organizational entities must undertake to regulate the basic functions of capitalist societies, functions of accumulation, legitimization, mediation of inter- and intra-class conflict, and of social reproduction. Like Hechter and Brustein's actors in the period of feudalism, we may not have a very clear notion

of the way in which the new State is emergent, the very exigencies of economic evolution indicate the emergence of new state forms.

Notes

1. For a review of this literature and the primary arguments about the theory of the state, see the paper by Bonanno (1991) in this issue.

2. I will be developing this delineation of the state as process and its functional requisites in a forthcoming study, “Trampling Out Advantages: The Political Economy of California Grapes.”

3. Distinctions should be made conceptually between an international proletariat (which would be defined as a number of national proletariats having developed forms of organization transcending national boundaries) and a transnational proletariat (which would be constituted of an integrated organizational form based on production and distribution of the transnational corporation rather than on national boundaries [and therefore not limited by national legal systems.]) It would be helpful here to use the concept of **structural parallelism** (Lipset 1961), i.e., working class organization is constructed organizationally on forms which parallel the bourgeoisie with which it must deal. Just as the transnational corporation now transcends nation boundaries and legal systems, a proletariat might. It should, of course, be noted that international organization of the working class is very weak and the organization of a transnational proletariat exists only in the barest of prefigurative forms.

4. This designation describes the so-called “socialist” or “communist” countries ranging from the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Albania, to Yugoslavia. I am aware of the conceptual problems involved in the usage of the formulation “centrally planned economies”. Countries such as the U.S., France, Great Britain, West Germany, etc., are now considerably centrally planned in their economies. In addition, events since 1990 have challenged the viability of central planning in these economies.

5. The **Codex Alimentarius** is a collection of internationally adopted food standards presented in a uniform manner” (Food and Agriculture Organization 1981:21).

6. I experienced an interesting disjuncture in a discussion with one of the persons responsible for administration of the **Codex Alimentarius** standards determination process in Rome in 1985. This official informed me that the international standard for FCOJ was 20 degrees Brix; when I informed him that the standard which was used in global trade (according to the trade literature) was 64 degrees Brix, we had one of those fundamental breakdowns in communication.

References

- BONANNO, Alessandro
1991 "The globalization of the agricultural and food sector and theories of the state." *International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food*, Vol 1 (1): XX-XX.
- BORREGO, John
1981 "Metanational capitalist accumulation and the emerging paradigm of revolutionist accumulation." *Review*, Vol. 4 (44): 713-777.
- Food and Agriculture Organization
1981 *Codex Alimentarius Commission, Procedural Manual*. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.
- FRIEDLAND, William H.
1984 "Commodity systems analysis: an approach to the sociology of agriculture." Pp. 221-235 in Harry K. Schwarzweller (ed.), *Research in Rural Sociology and Development: A Research Annual*. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press.
- FRIEDLAND, William H., and Amy Barton
1975 *Destalking the Wily Tomato: A Case Study in Social Consequences in California Agricultural Research*. Davis: University of California, Department of Applied Behavioral Sciences, Research Monograph No. 15.
- 1976 "Tomato Technology." *Society*, Vol. 13 (6):34-42.
- FRIEDLAND, William H., Amy E. Barton, and Robert J. Thomas
1981 *Manufacturing Green Gold: Capital, Labor, and Technology in the Lettuce Industry*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- FRIEDLAND, William H.
forthcoming *Trampling Out Advantage: The Political Economy of California Grapes*.
- GILL, Stephan
1990 *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- HECHTER, Michael, and William Brustein
1980 "Regional modes of production and patterns of state formation in Western Europe" *American Journal of Sociology* Vol. 85 (5): 1061-1094.
- LIPSET, Seymour Martin
1961 "Trade unions and social structure: a comparative analysis," unpublished paper.
- REDD, James B.
1983 "Processed o.j., definition of quality, purity and the effects of processing on these characteristics." *The Citrus Industry*, Vol. 64 (10):15 and 17-18.
- WILSON, John H.
1980 *Brazil's Orange Juice Industry*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, FAS-M-295.

RESUMEN***La Transnacionalización de la Producción Agrícola: Palinceso del Estado Transnacional***

Este artículo explora, en lo teórico, el surgimiento del Estado transnacional. Parte de la experiencia histórica del Estado a nivel nacional -el cual cumple cuatro funciones principales: acumulación, legitimación, mediación en los conflictos intra e inter-clase, y reproducción social-, así como, de la utilización de los resultados de una investigación empírica sobre un producto agrícola: el jugo de naranja concentrado. Se argumenta que la creciente importancia de las corporaciones transnacionales requieren de un aparato de Estado que traspase las fronteras de la nación. En este sentido, el presente trabajo sugiere formas y medios de abordar este fenómeno.

William H. Friedland Profesor de Sociología y Estudios de Comunidad en la Universidad de California, Santa Cruz, desde 1969. Ha participado activamente en el desarrollo de la Sociología de la Agricultura siendo coautor de las siguientes publicaciones: *Manufacturing Green Gold: capital, labor and technology in lettuce industry*; *Destalking The Wily Tomato: A case study in social consequences in California agricultural research*; *Agricultural workers in American Northeast* y recientemente *Toward a new political economy of advanced capitalist agriculture*. Igualmente ha ayudado a organizar conferencias sobre Sociología de la Agricultura en Guelph (Canadá); An Harbor y Madison (EEUU) y Bologna (Italia).

La Transnacionalización de la Producción Agrícola: Palinceso del Estado Transnacional

William H. Friedland

Este artículo explora, en lo teórico, el surgimiento del Estado transnacional. Parte de la experiencia histórica del Estado a nivel nacional -el cual cumple cuatro funciones principales: acumulación, legitimación, mediación en los conflictos intra e inter-clase, y reproducción social-, así como, de la utilización de los resultados de una investigación empírica sobre un producto agrícola: el jugo de naranja concentrado. Se argumenta que la creciente importancia de las corporaciones transnacionales requieren de un aparato de Estado que traspase las fronteras de la nación. En este sentido, el presente trabajo sugiere formas y medios de abordar este fenómeno.

William H. Friedland es Profesor de Sociología y Estudios de Comunidad en la Universidad de California, Santa Cruz, desde 1969. Ha participado activamente en el desarrollo de la Sociología de la Agricultura siendo coautor de las siguientes publicaciones: *Manufacturing Green Gold: capital, labor and technology in lettuce industry*; *Destalking The Wily Tomato: A case study in social consequences in California's agricultural research*; *Agricultural workers in American Northeast* y recientemente *Toward a new political economy of advanced capitalist agriculture*. Igualmente ha ayudado a organizar conferencias sobre Sociología de la Agricultura en Guelph (Canadá); An Harbor y Madison (EEUU) y Bologna (Italia).

Introducción

Este trabajo desarrolla un intento exploratorio de mirar y de buscar el Estado. Basado ampliamente en un análisis empírico de una mercancía agrícola, este trabajo emprende un safari exploratorio en la tierra incógnita del Estado transnacional. Aunque tiene su origen en un estudio empírico de una mundana mercancía agrícola: el jugo concentrado congelado de naranja, no abordará asuntos empíricos sino se concentrará en problemas teóricos y lógicos que se derivan del estudio empírico.

Primero, examinaré los niveles de análisis actualmente utilizados en el examen de la política agrícola, tanto nacional como internacional. Esto es necesario para crear el ambiente para una yuxtaposición relativa al Estado transnacional. Segundo, aunque el análisis emerge de un estudio empírico de una mercancía agrícola, procurará algunas formulaciones teóricas preliminares sobre el Estado transnacional.

Niveles de análisis sobre política agrícola

Endécadas recientes han aparecido dos niveles y medio de análisis respecto a la política estatal en materia agrícola.

Primero y principal, el nivel nacional de política respecto a la agricultura ha sido establecido e institucionalizado hace tiempo. Tales políticas han variado ampliamente en

Europa Occidental y Estados Unidos y se han centrado en un número de criterios, incluyendo la base política y la importancia política de la población agrícola, el mantenimiento de la capacidad nacional para sustentar la población garantizando la seguridad alimentaria, o como fuente de ingresos exógenos, así como las creencias ideológicas acerca del papel de la agricultura como sistema de retención y disponibilidad de población, esto es, como reserva de trabajo.

Cualesquiera sean las razones -y éstas son a menudo complejas- la mayoría de las naciones han establecido políticas agrícolas en tanto se vinculan con **políticas alimentarias**. La política alimentaria es una preocupación básica para una nación toda vez que una fracción significativa de su población ya no se sostiene por sí misma directamente de la tierra. Este ha sido el caso en todas las sociedades capitalistas avanzadas de Europa Occidental.

El segundo nivel de análisis relativo a la política agrícola y alimentaria surgió después de la segunda guerra mundial. Mientras la importancia de la alimentación como un instrumento de la política nacional había sido comprendido desde antes, no fue sino hasta la segunda guerra mundial que emergió un nuevo nivel de comprensión respecto a la alimentación.

Enfocadas hacia formulaciones populares tales como el hambre mundial, se desarrollaron concepciones más claras de la alimentación como un instrumento de la política nacional en el **ámbito internacional**. En tanto que los alimentos se habían concebido desde hace mucho tiempo como elementos de comercio internacional, surgió ahora una concepción de ellos como instrumentos políticos. La manifestación organizacional de esta concepción se condensó inicialmente en la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura (FAO), pero más tarde fue compartida por un complejo de organizaciones que incluyó el Banco Mundial, el Fondo Internacional para el Desarrollo Agrícola,

los bancos regionales de desarrollo y la Conferencia Mundial de la Alimentación.

Mientras otras organizaciones internacionales han proporcionado importantes escenarios para reuniones y debates, ellas han sido casi exclusivamente foros donde los intereses y preocupaciones nacionales han venido a expresarse. Algunos intereses regionales - particularmente conflictos norte-sur, desarrollados- en desarrollo, primer mundo-cuarto/quinto mundo- han cristalizado en este nivel internacional, pero las políticas siguen expresando en gran medida intereses nacionales manifestados a través de representaciones nacionales.

El segundo nivel a que se hizo referencia se aplica a la Comunidad Europea, que ha hecho de las políticas agrícolas un elemento central de actividad. La CE representa un curioso nivel intermedio que conjuga políticas y niveles nacionales con un nuevo nivel de economía política que refleja intereses supranacionales y regionales de naciones-estados con muy desiguales niveles de desarrollo agrícola.

Como es de esperarse, las fuentes de datos, la información y los análisis acerca de cada uno de los dos y medio niveles reflejan su importancia histórica respectiva. Así, los datos y análisis del nivel nacional son más detallados, con ministerios de agricultura que producen todo género de información sobre producción agrícola y movimientos de los productos agrícolas. En otras palabras, **producción y comercio** son los procesos claves para las naciones-estados. La información a nivel internacional es más abstracta, centrándose menos en la producción, que es vista como de jurisdicción nacional, y más en el intercambio.

Siguiendo el Jugo de Naranja Congelado

Las lagunas en la organización de las fuentes de datos y las bases para las consideraciones teóricas que constituyen el foco de este trabajo se

han desarrollado de un estudio de una mercancía agrícola: Las naranjas. Habiendo estado involucrado por varios años en el análisis de la organización social los sistemas de producción agrícola comercial, incluyendo procesamiento de tomates, lechuga "iceberg", uvas frescas, pasas y vino, la nueva investigación ha generado un involucramiento en forma de análisis muy diferente (Friedland y Barton, 1975, 1976; Friedland, Barton y Thomas, 1981; Friedland, 1984; Friedland por publicarse).

Esto se debe a que todos los rubros previamente estudiados son mercancías primordialmente de carácter nacional en producción, procesamiento y distribución, con excepción del vino únicamente como ítem importante en el comercio internacional. Los cítricos, por contraste, particularmente en la forma de **concentrado de jugo de naranja congelado (CJNC)**, aunque sea producido, procesado y distribuido nacionalmente, representa una mercancía cuyo circuito general -producción, procesamiento y distribución- se ha convertido en transnacional.

Aunque habiendo tenido origen nacional, la emergencia de un sistema transnacional, a diferencia de uno simplemente internacional, es lo que provoca interés. Ello se debe a que el CJNC está ahora produciéndose en una variedad de diferentes espacios nacionales, pero sus sucesivas formas de transformación y distribución se han desplazado significativamente allende las fronteras nacionales.

La investigación sobre naranjas como un sistema mercantil ha revelado lo siguiente:

1. La tecnología CJNC, que surgió durante los años 40, resolvió el crónico problema de Florida de superproducción de naranjas, convirtiéndola en un producto transformado, es decir, procesado.

2. Luego de varias décadas de expansión y desarrollo nacional, Estados Unidos comenzó a exportar CJNC a países de altos ingresos de Europa del Norte.

3. En 1960, Coca-Cola emergió como un factor fundamental en la producción de CJNC

por medio de la compra de la firma procesadora Minut Maid, incluyendo naranjales y plantas procesadoras en Florida. Aunque Coca-Cola es una empresa en gran escala -probablemente la mayor empresa en producción de CJNC- el sistema CJNC se caracteriza más bien por el oligopolio que por el monopolio.

4. Con un mercado considerable para el CJNC en Estados Unidos pero con las incertidumbres del tiempo afectando la producción, Brasil estuvo listo durante los años 60, como un gran productor de naranjas con capacidad procesadora, debido a las heladas ocasionales que perturbaban la oferta de CJNC (Wilson, 1980).

5. La producción brasileña se enfocó inicialmente hacia el mercado norteamericano, pero durante los años 70 abrió o penetró otros mercados. En particular, el mercado canadiense, que había sido dominado por la producción estadounidense, se "brasileñizó" en forma creciente. Igual proceso comenzó en Europa del Norte.

6. Coca-Cola se convirtió en una importante organización involucrada en el cultivo, procesamiento y distribución. Su papel fuera de los Estados Unidos estuvo más ligado a las actividades "**Corriente arriba**" que a las "**corriente abajo**", esto es, a procesamiento, reprocessamiento, distribución y mercadeo, y no a cultivo (excepto en Florida).

7. Metodológicamente, existen excelentes fuentes de datos a nivel nacional sobre producción, importación y exportación de cítricos, pero no acerca de la propiedad de medios de producción o de participación en el mercado.

Es este último hallazgo, así como investigaciones en otros rubros agrícolas y no agrícolas, lo que ha estimulado el interés en el asunto del Estado transnacional, tema del presente trabajo. El caso de los cítricos ejemplifica los nuevos sistemas transnacionales de producción y distribución construidos alrededor de las nuevas formas corporativas de organización: la corporación transnacional.

A diferencia de Coca-Cola en su forma multinacional más "normal", en la que las instalaciones de producción y distribución se mantienen dentro de fronteras nacionales discretas y aún la propiedad es fundamentalmente nacional (esto es, Coca-Cola se registra según las leyes nacionales de Estados Unidos, Líbano o Liechtenstein, etc.), en esta nueva forma transnacional, las sucesivas etapas de producción, procesamiento y distribución son poseídas y controladas diferenciadamente y la corporación transnacional puede manipular diferentes aspectos de las tres actividades básicas para maximizar su resultado económico.

Así, Coca-Cola cultiva, procesa y distribuye CJNC en Estados Unidos pero reprocessa y distribuye en Canadá. Aparentemente no cultiva en Brasil. Puede procesar allí, sin embargo, pero la distribución local no es en forma de CJNC. Puesto que la mayor parte del CJNC brasileño se exporta, Coca-Cola es un importante factor en su importación a los Estados Unidos (cuya significación, no obstante, poco clara, al menos por ahora). Pero Coca-Cola no importa CJNC brasileño a Estados Unidos para procesamiento en Florida, ya que los patrones de ese estado para los niveles de azúcar (grados Brix) requeridos en el CJNC eran, hasta 1980, más altos que la pauta federal. Así, Coca-Cola podía aprovechar el diferencial de los Standar Florida-Estados Unidos importando CJNC brasileño fuera de Florida y reprocesándolo en el CJNC de Florida (por razones de gusto y calidad) para los mercados norteamericanos/canadienses. O también podía exportar CJNC norteamericano desde Florida e importar, vía una subsidiaria canadiense, CJNC brasileño a Canadá para reprocessamiento y distribución.

Cómo lleva Coca-Cola su jugo al mercado europeo no está aún claro. No puede ser importando jugo norteamericano, pues el brasileño es más barato. En la CEE podría importar CJNC vía Israel, importador del producto brasileño, para ser mezclado con el jugo israelí,

y reimportado a la CEE, con la cual Israel goza de una relación especial de la que deriva en tasas arancelarias. El punto clave es que Coca-Cola mantiene capacidades diferenciadas según la distintas localizaciones, y es capaz por ello de maximizarse sus ventajas en cultivo, procesamiento, reprocessamiento y mercadeo. Con respecto al CJNC, para no hablar de sus otros productos, Coca-Cola se ha convertido en una verdadera corporación transnacional.

Considerando teóricamente el Estado transnacional

El enfoque adoptado en este trabajo es francamente exploratorio. Esencialmente se interesa en: 1) una exploración del carácter de una forma social emergente: el Estado transnacional, y 2) una consideración de la política agrícola como la vía a través de la cual el Estado transnacional emerge.

Los lectores plantearán algunas preguntas inmediatamente. ¿Cuál es el carácter del Estado? ¿Cómo puede haber un Estado transnacional cuando las formas políticas de tal formación no parecen existir? Y finalmente, ¿Por qué utilizar la agricultura como la ubicación funcional para explorar tan complejo problema? ¿Por qué no la industria o el comercio?

La última pregunta puede responderse más fácilmente. Hay una razón importante para utilizar la agricultura para explorar el Estado transnacional: La agricultura y las políticas agrícolas nacionales constituyen un factor básico de preocupación para todos los estados y sociedades nacionales; si no hay un flujo constante de alimentos en abundancia y relativamente baratos para las poblaciones urbanizadas e industrializadas de los países capitalistas avanzados, el descontento nacional se incrementará. Así, la política agrícola está fundamentalmente vinculada con las políticas alimentarias y estas preocupaciones son ubicuas.

La primera pregunta sobre el carácter del

Estado es difícil de manejar, puesto que filósofos y académicos la han estado debatiendo todo el tiempo desde Hegel. Este trabajo no revisará la bibliografía sobre el Estado, de modo que permítaseme definir el Estado tal como será desarrollado en este trabajo.⁽¹⁾

Primero, tomo el Estado, siguiendo a Marx, como representante de los intereses de cualquier grupo dominante, esto es, cualquier conjunto de categorías sociales que ejercen dominio sobre actividades productivas. Segundo, miro al Estado como un proceso y no simplemente una colección de entidades formales. Así, el Estado no es equivalente al gobierno, ciertos segmentos de organizaciones gubernamentales pueden constituir elementos del Estado, pero buena parte del gobierno se ocupa de la administración rutinaria de cosas que son demasiado banales para ser cubiertas por la rúbrica de "Estado". Tercero, el Estado como proceso surge en el cumplimiento de cuatro requisitos funcionales: acumulación, legitimación, mediación en conflictos inter e intraclases y reproducción social.⁽²⁾

Esto nos da una problemática la definición de Estado. Este puede, como afirmaba Marx, constituir el "comité ejecutivo de la burguesía" (en el Estado burgués), pero esta es, a la vez, una útil y a la vez ilusoria formulación. Ella indica que el Estado representa el significante, importante "filo cortante" de la organización político-económica. En esta formulación, el Estado no incluye cualquier pequeño burocrata al servicio del gobierno, pero sí incluye los segmentos donde se ubica el poder para tomar decisiones. También incluye entidades y cosas fuera del gobierno, es decir, en diversos sectores sociales que participan en la toma de decisiones sobre la organización político-económica de la sociedad.

Pero la formulación de Marx es ilusoria porque atribuye al Estado, a mi juicio, demasiada organización formal. Un comité ejecutivo, implica, por ejemplo, que existen niveles

subordinados en un sistema organizacional formal y alguna relación entre los estratos subordinados y el "comité ejecutivo". También supone alguna regularidad organizativa, es decir, reuniones, acuerdos formalmente logrados, etc. Aunque muchos de estos atributos pueden existir en el Estado, otros arreglos no formales también pueden darse.

Así, el Estado es un proceso supra-orgánico o metasocial que existe sólo parcialmente como organización formal, pero también en arreglos no formales, convenimientos y entendimientos que son inminentes en las actividades de elementos estructurales claves de los países capitalistas avanzados.

Volviendo a la segunda pregunta: ¿Cómo puede existir un Estado transnacional cuando sus formas políticas no han aparecido todavía? La respuesta es que si el análisis indica la existencia de un cierto fenómeno, resulta pertinente lógicamente someterlo a análisis empíricos. Lo que esto significa concretamente es la necesidad de percibir formas procesales que pudieran constituir tal Estado.

En el presente caso, el argumento podría rezar algo por el estilo. Primero, el Estado nacional se ha hecho menos significativo e importante desde los años 60. Según el análisis de Borrego (1981) la nación-estado como formación político-económica llegó a su clímax alrededor de los 60; hasta ese momento, los intereses nacionales continuaron predominando. Mientras la economía global había emergido mucho antes, las formas político-económicas dominantes eran construidas en torno a la nación. La derrota de Estados Unidos en la guerra de Vietnam marca el fin del período de dominio de la nación-estado como una forma político-económica.

Segundo la emergencia de una economía política transnacional antes del clímax y el inicio del declive de la nación-estado. Aquí quiero hacer una distinción, siguiendo de nuevo a Borrego, entre el desarrollo de un sistema mundial basado en intereses político-económicos

nacionales y una economía política transnacional. En la primera surgió un conjunto de organizaciones económicas dedicadas a la explotación en todo el mundo. Este fue un período caracterizado por el término "imperialismo". El imperialismo representaba la forma política nacional del desarrollo económico, es decir, la nación-estado persiguiendo los intereses económicos de su burguesía nacional.

Sin embargo, aún antes de los 60 podía distinguirse una nueva formación económica: la corporación transnacional. Originalmente bautizada como la "corporación multinacional", esta formulación semántica era probablemente adecuada en las fases iniciales del desarrollo político-económico de estas formas sociales. Cuando compañías como General Motors, Castle and Cooke, Coca-Cola, Phillips y Exxon (en su conformación corporativa original) se desplazaron al exterior, empezaron con una base nacional, una orientación nacional, una dirigencia nacional y un mercado nacional. A medida que la producción y el mercado se ensanchaban, el carácter de estas entidades se fue transformando. Aunque cada una podía tener la dirección predominante de una nación o la tendencia arraigada de mercadear o distribuir en una plaza nacional, de más en más la orientación de estas entidades corporativas fue cambiando. El énfasis pasó, de ser multinacional, es decir, en lo relativo a tener ubicaciones en un número de naciones en las cuales la actividad es realizada con una orientación nacional, a convertirse en transnacional, es decir, menos preocupada por intereses nacionales específicos, mercados nacionales o por una organización interna con base nacional y más preocupada por una orientación global.

Así, nuevas formas político-económicas emergen, las corporaciones transnacionales. Ya que estas formas económicas pueden ser controladas sólo parcialmente por la nación-estado, se deduce que alguna nueva forma de estado debe surgir para funcionar como el "comité

ejecutivo" de una nueva burguesía transnacional. Las entidades corporativas transnacionales pueden ser controladas sólo parcialmente por las naciones-estados porque muchas de sus funciones productivas, manufactureras, de distribución y mercadeo, están nacionalmente dispersas. La nación-estado en busca del "control" de una corporación transnacional puede lograrlo sólo en la medida en que la entidad esté ubicada dentro de la nación. Dado que sólo una parte de una corporación transnacional se encuentra físicamente ubicada en una nación, ninguna nación individual puede regularla o controlarla. No existe tampoco un nivel supranacional, hoy en día, que pueda regular una corporación transnacional más allá de los límites de las naciones-estados. Así, concluye el argumento de Borrego, la organización corporativa transnacional constituye una nueva manifestación del capitalismo que es sólo parcialmente regulable por naciones-estados, únicamente en la medida en que sostiene producción física y actividades de distribución dentro de las fronteras nacionales. En su conjunto la corporación transnacional no es regulable por ninguna forma de Estado existente puesto que no existen hoy formas políticas análogas.

Un elemento esencial en el análisis del capitalismo es que los capitalistas y las formas capitalistas buscan minimizar la incertidumbre. Aún cuando muchos aspectos de la producción pueden tener incertidumbres, es razonable esperar que los capitalistas, en sus relaciones mutuas, e igualmente importante, en sus relaciones con la clase trabajadora, desearán tener alguna forma de pronosticar las reglas del juego. Deben desarrollarse los medios dentro de los cuales pueda darse la competencia, en donde los recursos y mercados puedan desenvolverse, estableciendo límites a los conflictos de modo que los capitalistas puedan saber cuáles serán los costos de los diversos factores productivos bajo cualquier conjunto dado de condiciones. Es en razón de la demanda de estas certidumbre, predictabilidades,

reglas, que podemos lógicamente inferir (una vez que hemos hecho algunas suposiciones sobre el carácter del Estado como se ha especificado) que un Estado transnacional deberá emerger a medida que una economía política transnacional se expanda.

Si un Estado transnacional es inminente ¿Cómo lo buscamos? ¿qué reglas podemos seguir en busca del desarrollo de una nueva forma política? Lo que está claro, de principio, es lo que no es el Estado transnacional. El no consiste, por ejemplo, en las Organizaciones de Naciones Unidas, o cualquiera de sus formas, aunque pueda haber segmentos dentro de las estructuras de la ONU que pudieran moldear algunas de las reglas dentro del nuevo "juego" transnacional y por tanto constituir parte del Estado transnacional emergente.

Tampoco consiste el Estado transnacional en entidades políticas tales como la Comunidad Europea y su Política Agrícola Común. La CE es una entidad que funciona por sobre el nivel de las naciones miembros, pero de hecho, se comporta más como una nación-estado que como un Estado transnacional. Puede regular ciertas actividades dentro de sus fronteras, pero no tiene capacidad para regularlas más allá de ellas. Puede influir en las relaciones con los antiguos territorios coloniales de sus naciones más grandes, pero no puede regular las significativas interrelaciones económicas en que se basan las corporaciones transnacionales.

En busca del Estado Transnacional

La búsqueda del Estado transnacional se parece a la tarea de Diógenes: en la oscuridad de la contingencia histórica, es difícil discernir esbozos de nuevas formaciones políticas. Permitanme intentarlo.

1. El nuevo Estado transnacional debe ocuparse de establecer límites o fronteras a las actividades de las corporaciones transnacionales entre sí.

2. El nuevo Estado transnacional debe ocuparse de establecer pronósticos respecto al trabajo, costos, movimientos, standards y mercados.

3. El nuevo Estado transnacional todavía no tiene un carácter político abierto, explícito, de naturaleza formal.

4. Por tanto, la conformación del nuevo Estado transnacional debe ser avizorada más bien en foros informales, en organizaciones formales que aún no tienen carácter transnacional o en organizaciones formales que han asumido carácter transnacional pero que no han sido dotadas de una base político-legal explícita.

Hay dos interrogantes que deben ser tratadas inicialmente: **Cómo y dónde buscar el Estado transnacional.**

El **cómo** de este proceso plantea varios interesantes problemas metodológicos. Dado que estamos tratando con un fenómeno prefigurativo en que no hay entidad visiblemente identificable, se nos presentan dos posibilidades acerca de cómo proceder para delinear el fenómeno. Primero, podríamos utilizar el análisis histórico para examinar el surgimiento del moderno Estado burgués. Esencialmente esto comportaría colocarnos en la Europa Feudal algo después del siglo XII para considerar las condiciones socio-económicas que dieron lugar al Estado moderno. Luego, por medio de algún procedimiento comparativo, reconociendo las diferencias de tiempo y circunstancias, preguntarnos dónde podríamos discernir el proceso formativo del Estado transnacional.

El segundo proceso podría comportar la consideración de entidades que estarían más próximas al desarrollo de un Estado transnacional, es decir, en particular aquellas formas transnacionales que son las más avanzadas, las más viejas. En este caso, podría ser aconsejable examinar una mercadería como el petróleo, ya que mucha de la producción y distribución mundial es controlada por siete empresas. Aunque muchos procesos internos de estas siete empresas

y sus interrelaciones están ocultas, estas organizaciones son claramente públicas en el sentido de que ocupan la atención de mucha gente. Así, formulando preguntas empíricas derivadas de la bibliografía sobre las "siete hermanas", podríamos distinguir algunos de los rasgos del Estado transnacional.

La cuestión de dónde buscar plantea algunas preguntas muy diferentes. Una manera de empezar es formular, al menos a título preliminar, y en base a lo que entendemos como carácter del Estado, una serie de funciones. Indagando dónde se llevan a cabo tales funciones, se puede tener una idea de dónde buscar el Estado transnacional.

Siguiendo el enfoque inicial sugerido acerca del *cómo*, una manera de proceder podría ser tomar un análisis histórico que aborde la emergencia del Estado moderno y procurar extraer de allí algunos elementos cardinales. Un ejemplo útil puede hallarse en Hechter y Brustein (1980), quienes sostienen que existían tres modos de producción en la Europa Occidental del siglo XII: El sedentario pastoral, la pequeña producción mercantil y la feudal. Luego de examinarlos comparativamente, Hechter y Brustein concluyen que:

"La formación del Estado será más probable en la medida en que poderosos actores individuales formen dos grupos en base a intereses económicos y políticos divergentes. La razón es que, en sociedades políticamente divididas, los actores del grupo más poderoso siempre tendrán un incentivo para coalizarse y crear una organización -un aparato estatal- para fijar impuestos, reprimir o expropiar de algún modo a los miembros del grupo más débil. Este incentivo se magnifica si, como en el caso del feudalismo avanzado, el grupo más débil parece capaz de representar un desafío al sistema de derechos de propiedad bajo el cual el grupo más fuerte prospera". (p. 1085)

Hechter y Brustein argumentan que la creciente amenaza de la burguesía y sus aliados artesanos en los burgos, llevó a la aristocracia feudal a formar el Estado moderno para protegerse. Apartándose del análisis de Marx según el cual la burguesía dentro del feudalismo desarrolló primero su conciencia de clase, ellos argüyen:

"...que en el feudalismo tardío la nobleza, no la burguesía, fue más propensa a alcanzar conciencia de clase. El Estado moderno fue el resultado directo de este desarrollo. Así, la conciencia de clase burguesa del último período medieval no nació de las semillas de un modo de producción capitalista incipiente, sino que más bien resurgió como reacción a las políticas de los primeros estados modernos". (p. 1090)

Este enfoque sugiere que: 1) La emergencia del Estado transnacional debe ocurrir a través de alguna forma de oposición, es decir, donde aquellos involucrados en la organización transnacional estén siendo amenazados por fuerzas opuestas dependientes de alguna otra base; 2) Que la emergencia de un fenómeno tal como el Estado transnacional debe pensada dialécticamente, puesto que fue de la lucha inicial de los burgos contra los señores feudales de donde emergió un Estado moderno, a instancias de éstos, ansiosos de proteger su propiedad, sus derechos y su prestigio, de intrusos más débiles. Ese Estado, a su tiempo, habría de ser capturado por la burguesía en las luchas revolucionarias que marcaron la transición a Estados Modernos Capitalistas en Gran Bretaña y Francia.

Aplicando ese análisis a nuestro problema, tenemos que preguntarnos: ¿Con cuáles fuerzas de clase entra en conflicto la burguesía transnacional que podrían conducir a exploraciones hacia la formación de un Estado transnacional? Se pueden identificar tres fuentes potenciales de desafío.

Primero, hay un proletariado internacional.

Una burguesía transnacional debe tratar con un número de proletariados nacionales, ya que sus instalaciones de producción y distribución están diseminadas en muchas naciones. En cada caso nacional, ella debe tratar con un proletariado nacional (o residente). La suma de proletariados nacionales, sin embargo, es cualitativamente diferente de un proletariado internacional.⁽³⁾

Un segundo personaje con quien la burguesía transnacional podría entrar en conflicto son sus homólogos de las Economías Centralmente planificadas.⁽⁴⁾ En este punto, el problema es que la burguesía transnacional no está en conflicto (hasta donde puedo ver) con las clases gobernantes de las economías centralmente planificadas. Las corporaciones transnacionales han penetrado esas economías mediante el establecimiento de relaciones contractuales en producción (tal como la Fiat ha hecho extensamente a través de países del bloque oriental, como la URSS y Polonia). Análogamente, corporaciones transnacionales de Japón y otros países, han penetrado ahora en China.

Una formulación concebible podría argumentar que las corporaciones transnacionales basadas en las Economías Centralmente Planificadas entrarán en conflicto con las transnacionales capitalistas. Hay muchas preguntas que se pueden plantear por esta formulación, la más importante de las cuales es ¿existe transnacionales basadas en las Economías Centralmente Planificadas o algo equivalente? Para mí, la respuesta no es clara. Mi impresión es que un desarrollo análogo al de las transnacionales no ha ocurrido aún en las Economías Centralmente Planificadas, pues no hay organizaciones operadas por el Estado envueltas en producción y distribución entre las diversas Economías Centralmente Planificadas.

Esto lleva, entonces, a la tercera forma potencial de conflicto. Lo veo principalmente en las **burguesías nacionales**.

Mientras la burguesía transnacional ha emergido de antecedentes nacionales, se erige en

agudo contraste con aquellos segmentos de la burguesía que están limitados a las fronteras nacionales. Aquí, me meto en problemas al delineando el carácter de la burguesía nacional en contraste con la burguesía transnacional. Impresionísticamente, tengo el sentimiento de que los fabricantes de acero forman parte de la burguesía nacional más que cualquier otra categoría que pueda imaginar. El problema es que la producción de acero ha estado por mucho tiempo ligada a la banca y a las formas de capital que hace ya mucho han sido transnacionalizadas. Mi impresión, sin embargo, es que los fabricantes de acero, al menos en Estados Unidos, están más nacionalmente orientados que muchos otros manufactureros y productores.

En cualquier caso, hace falta más investigación empírica. Sin embargo, uno puede ver las posibilidades de conflictos entre las burguesías nacionales y transnacionales y esta parece la más probable fuente de conflicto.

Lo que esta discusión, inspirada en Hechter y Brustein, sugiere es que hace falta: 1) Desarrollar datos empíricos que permitan distinguir la burguesía nacional de la transnacional; 2) Examinar los puntos de conflicto entre las dos; 3) Intentar delineando los modos de "solución" para tales conflictos.

Volviendo a la consideración de **dónde** buscar las manifestaciones del Estado transnacional, entraremos en un tipo distinto de análisis.

Primero, puesto que no hay tal Estado sino que estamos hipotetizando una fuerza emergente conocida como la burguesía transnacional, tendrá que haber algún tipo de aparato en que una organización normativa de la burguesía transnacional y el Estado transnacional emerja. Un ejemplo puede hallarse en la Comisión Trilateral, organizada como una manifestación de "la transnacionalización" (Gill 1990:1). La Comisión extrae su membresía de las más descollantes figuras económicas y políticas de naciones-estados trilaterales: Estados Unidos, Europa Occidental y Japón. Sus propósitos son

mejorarlas comunicaciones, desarrollar políticas que los Estados Trilaterales puedan aplicar e inducir su ejecución dentro de sus gobiernos y sociedades nacionales (Gill 1990: Capítulo 1).

Los procesos internos de la Comisión se han diseñado para producir acuerdos que puedan ser aplicados de manera unificada en las sociedades nacionales del capitalismo avanzado. De ello se deriva una orientación normativa común acerca de cómo debería organizarse el mundo. Puesto que el liderazgo de un número de transnacionales es notable en la Comisión Trilateral, ésta representa un foro potencial para el desarrollo del sistema normativo del Estado transnacional. Pero el desarrollo de este orden normativo puede realizarse sólo en parte mediante discusiones sobre cuestiones generales analíticas. Quizás, tan importantes, si no más, es el desarrollo de un orden normativo a través de interacciones específicas sobre corporaciones transnacionales. Lo que tengo en mente es que las corporaciones transnacionales no están simplemente involucradas en actividades autónomas de producción y distribución, sino que además deben estar interrelacionadas unas con otras. Quizás eso pueda ilustrarse mejor utilizando un ejemplo que derivó de la investigación sobre críticos: El establecimiento de pautas para el CJNC.

En el comercio internacional del CJNC hay una pauta utilizada por todas las empresas: 64 grados Brix (grados Brix es la medida de sólidos solubles, como el azúcar). Esta medida, usada en todas las transacciones del comercio global, no es el standard para el jugo vendido al detal (11.8 grados Brix), ni por las regulaciones norteamericanas para el concentrado vendido al detal (41.8 grados Brix), ni por el Estado de Florida hasta 1980 (44.8 grados Brix). Tampoco es el standard utilizado por la FAO en el *Codex Alimentarius* que fija pautas para el comercio internacional (20 grados Brix).⁽⁵⁾

Así, tenemos un caso interesante en que el standard de facto en el comercio global, aceptable para todas las partes que lo practican, no es el

mismo que el usado por cualquier autoridad gubernamental o intergubernamental, tal como la FAO.

El standard de 64 grados Brix es arbitrario, puesto que ha sido factible concentrar el jugo de naranja hasta 72 grados Brix (Redd, 1983: 17). ¿De dónde salió esta pauta de facto? Claramente no de la FAO ni de las autoridades reguladoras del gobierno norteamericano.⁽⁶⁾

Algún grupo, en alguna parte, determinó el standard global y ese mismo ha estado aparentemente en uso por varias décadas. Es a través del descubrimiento de tales procesos de fijación de pautas que son probablemente informales (en el sentido de que no son fijadas por ningún cuerpo formalmente asignado gubernamentalmente o intergubernamental) como uno debe buscar el Estado transnacional emergente.

Por esta razón, queda claramente entendido que la existencia de los standard aceptados es esencial para el proceso de acumulación de las empresas capitalistas globales. Sin tales entendimientos globales, cada transacción tendría que ser negociada individualmente con pautas particulares para cada caso. A nivel de nación, es el gobierno el que normalmente establece tales pautas. Puesto que no hay gobiernos transnacionales, podemos imputar la existencia de medios informales donde tales pautas son realmente desarrolladas y aceptadas. Es en tales medios donde se torna posible imputar las formas emergentes del Estado transnacional.

Conclusiones

Con toda probabilidad, este trabajo plantea más preguntas que las que resuelve. Francamente, en forma exploratoria he argumentado en razón de la existencia lógica -o más propiamente de la emergencia- de algo que he bautizado el "Estado Transnacional". Basado en el razonamiento de que algo conocido como el Estado debe existir en las economías capitalistas para formular las

reglas del juego económico, así como para cumplir otras funciones, la más importante de las cuales es la función de acumulación, mi argumento es que, con la creciente importancia de las organizaciones económicas que transcinden la nación-estado en la forma de corporaciones transnacionales, algún organismo metasocial debe surgir para facilitar las funciones "normales" de la economía capitalista.

Cómo, dónde y en qué forma ese Estado Transnacional emergirá sigue siendo oscuro; lo que es claro es que algún (os) tipo (s) de entidades organizacionales deben ocuparse de regular las funciones básicas de las sociedades capitalistas, funciones de acumulación, legitimación, mediación de conflictos inter e intra-clases, y de reproducción social. Como los actores de Hechter y Brustein en el período del feudalismo, puede que no tengamos una noción muy clara de la vía a través de la cual el nuevo Estado está emergiendo, pero las exigencias mismas de la evolución económica indican el surgimiento de nuevas formas de Estado.

Notas:

1. Para una revisión de esta bibliografía y de los argumentos primarios sobre la teoría del estado véase el trabajo de Bonanno (1991)

2. Desarrollaré este deliniamiento del Estado como proceso y sus requisitos funcionales en mi próximo trabajo "Trampling Out Advantage: The Political Economy of California Grapes".

3. Se podría distinguir conceptualmente entre un proletariado internacional (que sería definido como un número de proletarios nacionales que hayan desarrollado formas de organización más allá de las fronteras nacionales) y un proletariado transnacional (que estaría constituido de una forma organizacional integrada, basada en la producción y distribución de la corporación transnacional más que dentro de fronteras nacionales -y por tanto no limitada por fronteras nacionales. Sería útil usar aquí el concepto de **parallelismo estructural** (Lipset, 1961), esto es, la organización de la clase obrera se construye organizacionalmente en formas que son paralelas a las de la

burguesía con la cual debe tratar. Así como la corporación transnacional ahora transciende las fronteras nacionales y los sistemas legales, también pudiera hacerlo el proletariado. Debería, no obstante, notarse que la organización internacional de la clase trabajadora es muy débil y que la organización de un proletariado transnacional existe sólo en la más rudimentaria de las formas prefigurativas.

4. Esta designación señala a los países llamados "socialistas" o "comunistas", yendo desde la Unión Soviética, China, Cuba, Albania, hasta Yugoslavia. Estoy consciente de los problemas conceptuales envueltos en el uso de la formulación de "Economías Centralmente Planificadas". Países tales como Estados Unidos, Francia, Gran Bretaña, Alemania Occidental, etc., son ahora en forma considerable centralmente planificados en sus economías. Además, los acontecimientos desde 1990 han cuestionado la viabilidad de la planificación central en aquellas economías.

5. El **Codex Alimentarius** es una colección de pautas internacionalmente aceptadas sobre alimentos, presentada en forma uniforme (FAO, 1981: 21)

6. Yo experimenté un interesante malentendido en una discusión con una de las personas encargadas de la administración de las pautas del **Codex Alimentarius** en Roma en 1985. Este funcionario me informó que el standard internacional para el CJNC era 20 grados Brix; cuando le informé que el standard usado en el comercio mundial (según la bibliografía comercial) era 64 grados Brix, llegamos a uno de esos trastornos cardinales en la comunicación.

Referencias Bibliográficas

BONANNO, Alessandro

1991 "The Globalization of the agricultural and food sector and theories of the state". *International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food/ Revista Internacional de Sociología sobre Agricultura y Alimentos*, Vol. 1.:

BORREGO, John

1981 "Metanational capitalist accumulation and the emerging paradigm of revolutionist accumulation". *Review*, Vol. 4 (4): 713-777.

Food and Agriculture Organization

1981 **Codex Alimentarius Commission, Procedural Manual**. Tome: Food and Agriculture Organization.

FRIEDLAND, William H.

1984 "Commodity systems analysis: an approach to the sociology of agriculture". Pp. 221-235 in Harry K. Schwarzweller (ed.), *Research in Rural Sociology and Development: A Research Annual*. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press.

FRIEDLAND, William H., and Amy Barton

1975 *Destalking the Wily Tomato: A Case Study in Social Consequences in California Agricultural Research*. Davis: University of California, Department of Applied Behavioral Sciences, Research Monograph No. 15.

1976 "Tomato Technology". *Society*, Vol. 13 (6): 34-42.

FRIEDLAND, William H., Amy E. Barton, and Robert J. Thomas

1981 *Manufacturing Green Gold: Capital, Labor and Technology in the Lettuce Industry*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Friedland, William H.

forthcoming *Trampling Out Advantage: The Political Economy of California Grapes*.

Gill, Stephan

1990 *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

HECHTER, Michael, and William Brustein

1980 "Regional modes of production and patterns of state formation in Western Europe" *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 85 (5): 1061-1094.

LIPSET, Seymour Martin

1961 "Trade unions and social structure: a comparative analysis", unpublished paper.

REDD, James B.

1983 "Processed o.j., definition of quality, purity and the effects of processing on these characteristics". *The Citrus Industry*, Vol. 64 (10): 15 and 17-18.

WILSON, John H.

1980 *Brazil's Orange Juice Industry*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Services, FAS-M-295.

ABSTRACT***The transnationalization of Agricultural Production: Palimpsest of the Transnational State***

This paper explores theoretically the emergence of the transnational State. Based on the historical experience of the emergence of the state at the national level fulfilling four major functions—accumulation, legitimization, mediation of inter- and intra-class conflict—and social reproduction, and utilizing empirical research in an agricultural commodity, frozen concentrated orange juice, the paper argues that the increased significance of transnational corporations requires the emergence of a state apparatus beyond the level of the nation. The paper suggests ways and means of looking for such an emergence.

William H. Friedland has been Professor of Community Studies and Sociology at the University of California, Santa Cruz since 1969. He has been active in the development of the sociology of agriculture having co-authored "Manufacturing Green Gold: Capital, Labor, and Technology in the Lettuce Industry;" *Destalking the Wily Tomato: A Case Study in Social Consequences in California Agricultural Research*, and "Agricultural Workers in America's Northeast." He recently co-edited the new volume "Toward a New Political Economy of Advanced Capitalist Agriculture." He has helped organize conferences on the sociology of agriculture in Guelph (Canada), Ann Arbor and Madison (USA) and Bologna (Italy).

Food, the State, and The World Economy

Philip McMichael

The growing literature on the "internationalization" of agricultural and food systems has paid too little attention to the way in which the state itself not only sponsors this process, but is changed by it. In most accounts of internationalization, the state (and state system) is taken as a given. This paper attempts to remedy this by offering a sketch of the world historical character of state-economy relations, across different periods of world capitalism. The goal is to stress that currently the transnationalization of the state is a key to the internationalization of agro-industrial food systems.

Philip McMichael is Associate Professor of Rural Sociology at Cornell University. His major research interests are in comparative-historical sociology, with current focus on state-building and food systems in world-historical perspective. His *Settlers and the Agrarian Question* (Cambridge University Press, 1984) received the Allan Sharlin Memorial Award from the Social Science History Association for the outstanding scholarly work of 1984. He has published or forthcoming articles in *Sociología Ruralis*, *American Sociological Review*, *Theory and Society*, *Capital and Class*, *Review*, and *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*.

Introduction

The recent trends in the global organization of markets have sparked an interest in the so-called new internationalization of agriculture and food systems (eg., Sanderson, 1985; Barkin, 1987). By and large, the literature has focused on the structural-economic dimensions of this process, with little attention paid to theorizing the changing role of the state in this movement. This paper addresses this issue because (a) the state is central to the process of the internationalization of capital, and (b) the current form of internationalization of capital is transforming the state. There are two primary issues. The first is theoretical, and concerns how we relate the state to (global) economic change. The second is more directly historical, and this concerns the global context within which the process of internationalization takes place.

* The link between a theoretical and a historical understanding of the state is made through a historical conception of the state. My own perspective is to view the state as central to the historical genesis of capitalism and its subsequent spatial forms, governed by an evolving state system that is neither uniform nor stable across time. Within this framework we can examine the shifting political dimensions of international agro-food systems, the goal being to comprehend

(*)The author wishes to thank Alessandro Bonanno for constructive suggestions in the preparation of this paper

more adequately current forms of internationalization. This task is informed by four propositions:

1. That agro-food internationalization must be related to the more general process of internationalization of capital.
2. That to theorize state-economy relations historically, it is useful to consider the state as a relation of production itself.
3. That states need to be conceptualized as members of the state system, to provide historical context for the modern state.
4. That it is important to distinguish the nation-state from the state as such, in order to grasp the fluid political character of the state within the development of capital.

Towards a world-historical view of state-economy relations.

Current conceptions of the crisis and restructuring of capitalism by and large retain an unproblematic conception of the state. While economic relations and processes are reorganized globally, the state is taken as a given, substantively. That is, the state may organize new transnational linkages (Evans, 1985), but this is understood instrumentally, rather than as a qualitative shift in the character of the state. Underlying this view is an unexamined assumption that the state is a national construct, reproducing capitalism nationally (Gordon, 1988). From a historical viewpoint this assumption is untenable, since the nation-state is a recent, and increasingly fragile, form of state political organization. And this historical fact is related to capitalism's transformation from a national, to an increasingly transnational, form.

It is important not to conflate state and nation-state here, recognizing that the latter is a historical form deriving from the social movement of the nineteenth century, and that it is the state's national organization that is currently in crisis. It is in crisis precisely because capital, in all its forms, is

reorganizing above and below the administrative level of the nation-state. It is directly challenging the national constraints (such as social and financial regulatory policies) that evolved within the social-Keynesian era. The state itself is still critical to the movement of capital, albeit in a transformed sense. From a brief historical overview, I shall argue that the state/capital relation is presently undergoing restructuring, and that this process can be observed at the level of agro-food systems.

a. State/Economy relations.

Orthodox Marxism perceives the state as a politico-legal superstructure astride an economic base, with causal movements either from base to superstructure, or, more subtly, either way, depending on the circumstances. This perception, however, reinforces the separation of economy from politics identified by Marx, and later Polanyi, as the fundamental shortcoming of liberal economic theory. For Marx, granting autonomy to the economy from its socio-political foundations, was the essence of commodity fetishism. That is, the representation of economic relations as discrete categories is a historical product of capitalist development, and must be understood as such. In the post-feudal era, economic relations formally appear devoid of political and social attachments, and yet substantively they are saturated with social relations. For Polanyi, the belief in a "self-regulating market" gave rise to fictitious conceptions of the requirements of modern social organization (1957). As both analysts have shown, the market economy is a historical institution that cannot be understood apart from its political elements. From this point of view, the state must be understood, among other things, as a relation of production itself (cf., Corrigan et. al., 1980)⁽¹⁾. The following discussion attempts to locate the history of the state, and state system, within the broad, global, movement of capitalism.

b. Political origins of capital's world market.

Historically, capitalism has always been international, having had its genesis in the fusion of the state and commercial capital. This fusion was simultaneously a nationalization and internationalization of capital, where Absolutist rule depended on a (mercantilist) world market based in rival colonial systems (cf., Polanyi, 1957:65; Mann, 1980:176). Thus the history of capital dates from the integration of age-old merchant capital into the structure and functioning (trade and national debt) of the early modern state. Politically-organized markets provided the conditions for systematic accumulation of capital through the regulation of private property as a social form involving labor force formation, banking regulation, contract law, and so forth. States' organization of markets and legalization of ownership of rights to mobile capital institutionalized (initially merchant) capital's distinctive ability to link and unify regions/systems of production, laying the foundation for the rise of a state system (McMichael, 1987:189).

The institutional distinction between state and private property facilitated the cumulative and reciprocal development of each, producing the classic division, or opposition, of 'state' and 'society.' Private property inevitably imposed itself upon the state-making process, via the mutual dependence of rulers and merchants, and the growing class power of the bourgeoisie (cf., von Braunmuhl, 1979:174). Thus the partnership into which the early modern state entered with merchant capital, laying the foundations of capital's world market, transformed both state and capital. It was in the age of industrial capital that this nexus, rooted in world commerce, assumed an increasingly national form, as the economic movement and political relations of capital insinuated themselves into the home markets and institutions of the metropolitan states.

The national movement stemmed from the development, organization and regulation of wage labor in the nineteenth century. The colonial

system was the principal mechanisms for generating surpluses for the metropolitan economy, and markets for metropolitan manufacturing. This global process anticipated and then coexisted with wage labor, as the Industrial Revolution heralded a new regime in the history of capital. It was new in the sense that capital now controlled, rather than mediated, production, and the enhanced scale and productivity of wage labor generated new (extra-colonial) markets and a mode of self-expansion leading to the relaxing of mercantilist regulations. While non-capitalist colonial labor was incorporated into the industrial regime alongside new wage and family farm labor systems, all commodity-producing labor was subordinated to the competitive requirements of wage labor in a truly global economy.

c. Rise and demise of the national movement.

The distinctive feature of the nineteenth-century world economy was the national movement. While originating within the metropolitan center, it was projected via British hegemony as a political-economic principle throughout the non- and post-colonial world (McMichael, 1985). Within this dynamic, the attempt to establish a self-regulating (world) market via the gold standard institutionalized national banking and political constitutionalism (see Polanyi, 1957). Britain's global engineering to constitute itself as the "workshop of the world" provoked rival nationalist capitalisms, anchored in the new central banking.

What we are witnessing today is the *dénouement* of this nineteenth-century national movement. It is neither clear-cut nor inevitable, nevertheless it is arguably the principal source of tension in contemporary global political-economy. Briefly, as the "nationally-organized" capital of the nineteenth century has been replaced, or subordinated to, conglomerate, or "transnationally-organized" capital in the post-World War II era, so the state-economy relation

has been transformed. In order to ground this movement in our subject, it is useful to sketch out the associated developments within the agro-food sphere. This will help to specify the changing role of the state. A fruitful method of conceptualizing the modern history of agriculture is through the idea of the "food regime," derived from Friedmann's initial conception of the "international food regime" (1987). The "food regime" is an international political-economic relation linking food production and consumption to dominant historical forms of capital accumulation. It directly implicates, and shapes, the state system across time. Two such food regimes have been identified (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989).

First food regime: 1870-1914. This was characterized by an extensive form of accumulation, geared to lowering metropolitan wage costs. Here, exports from New World family farms (and ranches) provisioned the new European proletariat with relatively cheap staple wage-foods in the forms of grains and meats. This regime comprised two related, but opposing movements.

First, was the culmination of colonialism (e.g., the late-nineteenth-century imperial scramble, expressing emerging national rivalries (US, Germany and France vs Britain; Britain retreats to its dominions), and yielding supplies of tropical products to provision new metropolitan class diets (sugar, tobacco, coffee, cocoa, tea, vegetable oils, bananas) and to supply new industrial raw materials (cotton, timber, rubber, indigo, jute, copper, tin).

Second, was the rise of the nation-state system, as new settler states established an alternative post-colonial system organization of the world-economy in political and economic terms. Politically, representative governments regulated national economies (including complementary commercially-specialized agricultural and industrial sectors) within their jurisdiction. Economically, competitive inter-national trade

in temperate agricultural products and manufactures, replaced complementary colonial trade in tropical products in exchange for manufactured goods. With this movement emerged a truly inter-national division of labor, as settler states replicated European agricultural and industrial production on a more cost-efficient basis.

The agro-industrial complex implicit in this national articulation of economic sectors, especially in the U.S., would become the foundation of the second food regime, based as it was in U.S. hegemony. That is, the United States became the model of national economic organization—both in European and East Asian post-war reconstruction schemes, as well as in the post-colonial world. Substantively, the model presumed the industrialization of agriculture, and, therefore, a fluidity of sectoral boundaries. This had two spatial dimensions. Economically, there was the growing subordination of agriculture to capital begun in the nineteenth century as a commercializing trend—initially separating agriculture and industry into distinct economic sectors, then reuniting them in the agro-industrial complex as the concentration of capital and the industrialization of food proceeded. The steady erosion of the sectoral boundaries of agriculture continues, where "by 1980 some two-thirds of the total final value of agricultural production in the USA was realized 'downstream' of agriculture itself, in processing, packaging, transport, storage and distribution. Of the third remaining to agriculture 80 per cent went out again in expenditures on inputs, equipment, services and debt-service" (Raikes, 1988:114).

Politically, there was the growing possibility of internationalization as the subordination of agriculture to capital promoted specialized sub-sectors, which, like components of industrial processes, could be relocated and/or reintegrated globally (as agro-food chains) in a relatively open world economy. This process fragments national agricultural sectors, and promotes

international competitive advantages which often redefine national food security as access to commodities in the world market. In short, the industrialization of agriculture embodies an ongoing tension between national and international forces.

Second food regime: 1945-73. This was characterized by an intensive accumulation process geared, not to cheapening consumption, rather to incorporating consumption relations into the accumulation process itself as required by the Fordist model of a rising wage/productivity contract. It intensified the industrialization of agriculture, producing new durable foods, which paralleled the role of "consumer durables" in the prosperous post-war Pax Americana.

This regime comprised two related, but opposing movements. First, the state system was extended to former colonies. This destroyed the political base for specialization within protected colonial trading blocs, expressed in declining markets for tropical exports such as sugar and vegetable oils as a result of metropolitan import-substitution. Food surpluses from the intensive metropolitan accumulation in turn provisioned an emerging Third World proletariat —largely through the US food aid system, constructed to offset agricultural overproduction and to replace now protected European markets with those in the post-colonial world (Friedmann, 1982).

Second, agricultural sectors were restructured transnationally by agro-food capitals. Intensification of metropolitan agriculture involved first, the elaboration of agro-food chains across national boundaries, and second, the increasing conversion of food from final-use farm products to manufactured, even durable products. This restructuring occurred via two new complexes:

(a) the intensive meat complex, which integrates separate and specialized animal and grain (carbohydrate)/soy (protein) producers across national borders (originating in advanced capitalist countries, and spreading to state socialist

countries, like Hungary and the Soviet Union, and middle-income Third World countries like Mexico, Brazil, Korea, Taiwan, and more recently, Thailand). For the intensive meat complex we have the analogue of the 'world car' in the 'world steer': combining for example, European antibiotics, US feedgrains, and Mexican calves moved to US feedlots to produce boxed beef for Japanese consumers (Sanderson, 1986).

(b) the durable foods complex, built around the principle of "substitutionism": either reduction of the agricultural product to an industrial input, and/or its replacement by non-agricultural components (Goodman, et. al., 1987). This complex transformed food from a local, perishable ingredients into globally marketed manufactured products, frozen, processed and reconstituted with key ingredients such as sweeteners and fats.

d. Conceptualizing "internationalization" vis-a-vis the state

Following the above sketch of global trends whereby national economies are compromised by this process of transnational intra-sectoral integration, it is now possible to theorize internationalization as a process implicating the state. I begin with the proposition that since capital is constituted through the circulation of money and commodities, it is inherently non-national in its characteristics. While the circulation of value in its various forms (money, commodities and labor) is not coincident with geo-political boundaries, and may be subnational or transnational in scope, this does not mean the state is insignificant. It is quite the contrary. The production of value depends on state-secured property relations, and its relative mobility depends on monetary, trade and investment controls (Bryan, 1987). From this perspective, the modern state is not so much a self-evident (national) economic unit, as a social and institutional complex governing segments of value circuits, some of which are international. While production (organization of labor markets and

processes) occurs within a national context, associated processes of realization and reproduction (purchase of means of production) may occur in national or international settings.

In this sense the domestic economy is constituted by fractions of capital that have different, and often contradictory, political and social interests. Bryan (1987) has classified these fractions into four types of capital circuits: the "national circuit" (import-competing production and reproduction encouraged by the state), the "global circuit" (world market production by TNC's in multiple national sites), the "investment-constrained circuit" (export production under special conditions guaranteed by a state), and the "market-constrained circuit" (import-competing production in one or more national sites by TNC's). Aside from the first type of circuit, internationalization can take these three other forms — individually or in combination. In principle, there is no common pattern nor trend since for historical and structural reasons there are various combinations, implying different styles of state regulation.

The state is the arena for competition among these various forms, meaning that internationalization itself has dynamic and diverse manifestations in any one state. And the heterogeneity across the state system is also a condition for fluidity. Of course certain dominant trends appear in the state system at certain conjunctures —such as the phenomenon of export-oriented production in the 1970s, but there are a variety of forms of export production and reproduction. At the same time, it is possible to see that the process of concentration and centralization of capital has intensified the internationalization process—but again, without necessarily taking any one particular form, or direction, of internationalization process. Thus, while there are definite secular trends to be identified, such as the intensification of transnational capital circuits associated with global banking and the integration of specialized

sub-sectors of production across national boundaries, the process of internationalization within states assumes a variety of local forms. We now turn to the experience of internationalization.

Current restructuring of state and economy

The breakdown of the post-war food order is commonly identified with the dismantling of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. In fact, this event precipitated the current erosion of the nation-state in the face of an intensified internationalization of capital in general. In order to understand the current transformation of agro-food systems, it is useful to summarize trends in global economy during this period, and their implications for the state. The issue is not whether internationalization is a new trend in global integration, but what kind of integration is afoot. The most obvious feature of the internationalization of capital has been the increased velocity of capital mobility in the world economy over the last two decades. Both institutional (dismantling of national currency regulation via the gold-dollar standard with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system), and compositional (centralization of banking capital on a world scale) changes underlie the globalization of markets that is responsible for destabilizing conditions for national accumulation policy (see Raynolds et al.).

The vortex within which the state currently finds itself is the increased tension between national and international forces. New social movements press their national governments for material (including food) security (Gouveia and Stanley, 1990; Walton and Ragin, 1990), while international capital and its financial agencies impose austerity policies and commodity export-production schemes which gear Third World economies to world markets. Liberalization policies attempt to substitute market regulation at the global level (administered by para-global-statal agencies such as the World Bank and the

IMF) for the political regulation of national economies.

With the disintegration of the Bretton Woods system there emerged new institutional mechanisms of control and cooperation in the global movement of capital. Briefly, transnational banks wield influence in the multilateral lending institutions, and among OECD policymakers. The Structural Adjustment Loan indicates the resulting shift in multilateral financial institutions. Adjustment lending differs from traditional lending for short-term balance of payments adjustments (IMF) and development projects (World Bank). Adjustment loans typically extract and underwrite policy changes such as market liberalization, sectoral restructuring, privatization, and export promotion to service debt. At the same time, the policy shifts redistribute power within the state from national program-oriented ministeries (e.g., social services, agri-culture, education) to the central bank and to trade and finance ministeries (Canak, 1989; Bienefeld, 1989). This process of "trans-nationalization" of the state includes the displacement of the policymaking framework from South to North (see McMichael and Myhre, 1991).

At this juncture it is difficult to know whether and to what extent the displacement of national policy is a secular trend either within the South, or indeed within the state system in general. The 1980s were a decade of class restructuring, under the effect of near universal neo-liberal policies responding to the global accumulation crisis. These events, which compromise national coherence, were cyclical, although it may be that the world has entered an "end-of-the-millennium" era of "permanent crisis" (Shanin, 1988:111). What does seem clear is that to the extent that the gross inequality between North and South (loosely speaking), is thereby reinforced, the actual meaning or possibility of a national project in the South is fundamentally compromised in the long run. After all, the national movement is possibly only a moment in the history of capitalism, realized

most fully in the above outlined settler project, and thence projected as a contradictory ideal in the postwar world. Since then there has been a consistent disjuncture between the aspiration to, and the reality of, the ideal of national organization for states.

In the post-World War II era, the national organization of capital was on the policy agenda, being the idealized model of U.S. development informing both contemporary social theory and U.S. foreign aid programs. The model was possible so long as the dollar/gold standard operated. In real terms, the gold standard imposed a requirement of a stable national trade account as a condition of low interest rates and therefore a favorable environment for capital. Stable trade depended on national success in the world market. And so, the ideal conditions for development were those elaborated by the nation-state (Phillips, 1977). National management of "development" stemmed from the nineteenth-century movement, as demonstrated by Polanyi, and was legitimized by Keynesian theory of national regulation. In other words, viable capitalist development (and socialist development, under the circumstances) depended ultimately on the nation-state.

The essence of the national model was a dynamic complementarity between the agricultural and industrial sectors (Johnston and Kilby, 1975; Senghaas, 1988). Third World states sought to escape the colonial model of tropical export agriculture by encouraging metropolitan capital and technology to modernize their agricultural sectors and so provision a growing national industrial sector with food and labor surpluses. The Green Revolution was a form of agro-food import substitution. Paradoxically enough, it internationalized the US model of capital-intensive agriculture geared to new class diets of wheat products and animal protein. Allegedly a vehicle of national food security, the Green Revolution internationalized the industrial food system (George, 1984). This contradictory outcome stems from the idealization of the US

model. While it did represent a goal of national articulation of agriculture and industry as national economic sectors, this was ideal-typical only. Its very success was the foundation of international agribusiness (see, e.g., Burbach and Flynn, 1980), which, supported by US global policy, threatened the possibility of inter-sectoral integration as an inclusive, national phenomenon in most of the developing world. Where post-colonial states by definition lacked coherent national organization (cf., Migdal, 1988), instead of actively denationalizing agro-food systems — outside of exceptional cases such as Mexico's Sistema Alimentario Mexicano, abandoned in 1982 (Barkin, 1987) — internationalization has by and large been a preemptive movement.

The context of this movement has been the fundamental asymmetry of the state system with respect to the national regulation of agriculture. Levels of agricultural protection divide fairly evenly (in a declining trend) along North/South lines. A 1985 World Bank report stated that: "the industrial countries have erected high barriers to imports of temperate-zone products from developing countries and then have subsidized their own exports" (quoted in Danaher, 1989: 42). This asymmetry is rooted in the concentration of agro-industrial capital, including farming capital — a process reinforced by metropolitan states via commodity support price schemes, which promote single crop specialization (Bonanno et. al., 1990). Metropolitan protectionism in turn destabilizes world markets by subordinating them to the politics of farm subsidies, overproduction and intense competition (Runge, 1988:144). The lowered prices resulting from this "trade crisis" (Hathaway, 1987) in turn influence Third World national food price policies, often under-cutting domestic food self-sufficiency schemes (Barkin, 1987).

In addition to the political-economic subordination of the Southern state within the state system at large, the internationalization of capital has intensified with the diffusion of the

U.S. model of capital- and energy-intensive agriculture. Internationalization has taken several forms. The technological dependence inherent in the Green Revolution represented one form of internationalization, which, following Bryan (1987), can be termed the "market-constrained circuit of capital" (import-competing production in one or more national sites under the joint sponsorship of transnational capital and the state). This has extended into the so-called "second Green Revolution" associated with the "new agriculture" (Feder, 1983; DeWalt, 1985; Rama, 1985), and involving two other forms of internationalization: "investment-constrained capital circuits" (export production under special conditions guaranteed by the state) and "global capital circuits" (world market production by TNCs in multiple national sites). In these latter forms of internationalization, state policy has encouraged the supplying of high-value markets for luxury foods and agro-food components in both local and export markets.

Associated with this technological change in world agriculture has been the proliferation and transnational integration of specialized sub-sectors of production stemming from the long-term processes of industrialization of agriculture (Goodman, et. al., 1987). Growing consumption of animal protein intensifies market competition in feedstuffs, as countries like Brazil, China and Thailand rival traditional exporters such as the ex-settler states. Grain substitutes, such as cassava, corn gluten feed and citrus pellets, have become key export commodities in the restructuring of international trade, since they have been unprotected imports to the EEC (Hathaway, 1987:30). As substitutes, they furnish new accumulation strategies for agribusiness firms in a glutted world market.

These trends have transformed production relations within Third World agriculture, giving rise to new farming classes such as capitalized family farmers geared to grain, forage and feedstuffs (Byres, 1981; DeWalt, 1985; Llambi,

1989; Barkin et al., 1990); and contract farmers: peasants reconstituted via integration into agribusiness operations organized variously by public, local private and TNC capital (Watts, 1990; Mackintosh, 1989). As Sorj and Wilkinson have noted:

"Technological modernization has, in fact, been the main avenue through which peasants have come to participate in the (dys)functioning of the state system via credit, insurance, subsidies and technical assistance. These new levels of integration have been responsible for modifying the politico-ideological universe of technified family farmers, leading to a shift in demands away from questions of land redistribution in favor of issues related to agricultural policy" (1990:131).

However, the other side of this process is the steady marginalization of the non-integrated peasantry, which loses not just its land but also its political mass. Among this group is the growing mass of multiple job holders whose fragmented employment patterns express the processes of cross-national, and cross-sectoral integration of production, further undermining possibilities for political action.

Thus, throughout (and via) the world market new class diets, in conjunction with structural adjustment policies promoting export agriculture to repay mounting debt, have recomposed class and production relations in the "new agricultures" and their associated industrial food systems. The "new agriculture" is capital-intensive and invariably state-supported — whether under pressure from international financial agencies, such as in the case of Mexico (Barkin, 1990; McMichael and Myhre, 1991), or submitting to the logic of the global market, such as Chile (Petras, 1988; Goldfrank, 1989), Senegal (Mackintosh, 1989) and Thailand. Agro-industry, even when geared to affluent markets at home,

stimulates "export-substitution," replacing or complementing traditional primary commodity exports and/or strategies of export industrialization promoted across the Third World from the 1970s. The new export-oriented luxury-food agro-industry is the fastest growing sector, accounting (in 1980) for 25% of the Third World's total processed food output, much of which is marketed by a handful of transnational corporations (Ho Kwon, 1980:53).

For example, Thailand's recent foreign debt-financed state-led development strategy, encouraged by a 1978 World Bank report, has given highest priority to the agro-food sector. This shift in strategic sectors exemplifies the new politics of agro-food expansion, where "while much emphasis was placed upon the promotion of manufactured exports, it was soon realized that export oriented industrialization (EOI) was not merely a strategy for industrial manufacturing and that the export of luxury foods is a logical extension of the strategy" (Hewison, 1989:87). Agro-food development from the 1970s has led to land concentration and intensified contract farming (Chiengkal, 1983:357-358). Targeted as "Asia's supermarket," Thailand's food processing industry has expanded rapidly on a contract-farming basis. Food companies from "Japan, Taiwan, the U.S. and Europe see Thailand as the most promising base for export-oriented production, especially in comparison with competitors like Indonesia, the Philippines, or Taiwan" (Goldstein, 1988:48). The Thai Board of Investment first encouraged large agribusiness feedstuff producers with investment promotion privileges in 1969, subsequently extending this privilege to corporations exporting processed chicken (Chesley, 1985:69-70). Thailand's intensive poultry sector (sourced by local feedstuffs) has become a dynamic source of exports, 90% of which supply Japan's broiler market—surpassing U.S. broiler exports to Japan in the late 1980s (McMichael, 1990).

In all these cases, while agricultural

productivity increases, raising some rural incomes, those rural producers not expelled from the land are inevitably incorporated into higher-value or global markets at the expense of staple food production, most dramatically expressed in the substitution of feed for food grains (Barkin et al., 1990). Meanwhile the dispossessed often cannot afford the new foods (Goldfrank, 1989; Bouis and Haddad, 1990). Scholars may debate the impact of cash/export crops on nutrition levels (see Maxwell and Fernando, 1989), but the overriding issue is that where states are compelled directly or indirectly to adjust agricultural policy to the logic of the world market, in which industrial/luxury foods increasingly dominate investment decisions, local food markets and the (potential) national coherence of agricultural sectors suffer.

The social consequences of commodification and subordination of food supply to world, rather than local, markets, is underscored dramatically by Yotopoulos: "For the first time, whether wheat produced in Australia will go to feed people in Bangladesh, pigs in the USSR, or sheep to be exported to the EEC, becomes a question for the world market to decide" (1985: 447). Of course, the "world market" is not an entity with a life of its own. It only assumes those proportions when the full force of class advantage in the state is concealed behind the universalist appearance of policies pursuing national trade and financial equilibrium. And this has been occurring more frequently lately as international financiers impose stringent criteria of solvency on states. Under these conditions, it is difficult for governments to maintain consistent and coherent national policy with respect to such basics as entitlement rights to food at accessible prices and in culturally and nutritionally appropriate form.

Conclusion

The elevation of the world market stems from three key forces. First, the expansion of

transnational corporations in the organization of the production and circulation of food, especially as "substitutionism" has enhanced the profitability of agro-food investment. Second, class recomposition on a global scale, involving a concentration of social power within states of wealthy classes with global horizons, the transnational integration of consumption circuits and the biasing of food markets. Third, the power of (increasingly centralized) transnational capital (Andreff, 1984), institutionalized in the international financial agencies and their economic prescriptions for borrowers to adjust and open national economies to global markets.

At the same time global food markets are politically structured by the unequal pattern of agricultural protection in the state system. Persistent Northern farm supports have enforced a global division of labor, where a ready supply of (cheap) low-value crops from the North dictates Southern investment in high-value agriculture for the world market at the expense of a domestic basic grains sector (Buttel, 1989). Third World exports expand to finance food imports — since 1970 growth in export production has outpaced basic food production by two and one half times (Danaher, 1989: 6).

In conclusion, the state/economy relation has been transformed, not only in the sense that capital, arguably, has gained the upper hand, but more fundamentally in the sense that state structures are undergoing a process of "transnationalization." For want of more adequate language to convey the erosion of the national movement, this means that states' political bureaucracies, and economic capacities and policies are increasingly geared to extra-national demands and markets. Whereas internationalization historically linked specific sub-sectors within states to global circuits as a basis for domestic accumulation in the process of nation-state building, there is an apparent intensification of this process that contradicts the integrity of national economic and political

organization. This development has its clearest statement in the growing movements of opposition to the dismantling of such organization (the proximate cause of which is the draconian adjustments meted out to indebted states by the international financial community). That is, it is ultimately a political question and necessarily imprecise.

We live in an age in which there is a strong legacy of national organizing capacity, deriving from the historic role of the nation-state as a material and ideological force and recently institutionalized in international agencies geared to national solutions. Twentieth-century state-building has included the provision of social rights, including food security organized via national agricultural sectors on the ruins, or residue, of local subsistence agricultures. This process was never complete in the post-colonial world, and is in decline now in the First World. We also live in an age in which transnational capital, with or without the assistance of states, is reorganizing space, and therefore, the nation-state itself. Capital can be global precisely because, unlike the nation-state, it can coordinate production and circulation activities across national boundaries. Where corporations organize agro-industrial complexes transnationally, they preempt national agricultural complexes by transforming specific crops into world market commodities. States certainly mediate this, partly because they have little choice if they wish to benefit from the increased exchanges. And some states do more than mediate—for example, the U.S. actively promotes export markets for its agricultural products, and Japanese foreign aid programs sponsor agro-capital investment to resolve Japan's food dependency problem (Berlan, 1989: 227).

World markets may be of net benefit to a nation—there is nothing inherently superior about local markets (other than freshness and energy conservation), especially when social and economic equality is not guaranteed. The issue

rather is how markets are structured according to class privilege, and whether they are regulated via the state, or state-system, for the purposes of production/distribution on a world scale geared to social justice and long-term environmental security. At present it is clear enough that this is not the way in which the world market is organized. Further, its very organization is eroding the possibility of national, or collective international, action to secure these goals. This process is by no means even, nor clear cut, since there remains a strong residue of national organization in the current world order. However, we are witness to growing political tensions as the contradiction between private (global) accumulation and the national-political legitimacy of states intensifies. One of the clearest currents in this development is the food security movement, which at its most elemental level expresses the decline of community and the subordination of the state to global economic forces.

Notes

1. Methodologically, we cannot appropriate the material world without thought, but that process of abstraction (conceptualization) reifies categories where it accepts them at face value, so to speak. In other words, the base-superstructure terminology in Marx is a metaphor for the process whereby we abstract from real social relations: the "base/superstructure metaphor applies to the relation between social being and social consciousness, it is not a putative model of societal 'levels' at all" (Sayer, 1987:92).

The point of this methodological aside is to conceptualize the state as a historical category which has both ideal and real conditions. That is, the state is an institutional feature of capitalist development, broadly conceived. It is an arena of social action, in which policy emerges under the mutual conditioning of real (briefly, structures of accumulation) and ideal (briefly, projections of social interest) forces. The contradictory character of state and state policy is largely due to the considerable discrepancies between ideal and real forces in time and space (for example, policies pursuing national prosperity may be undercut by cyclical and/or international movements of capital).

References

- ALEXANDRATOS, Nikos (ed.)
1988 **World Agriculture: Toward 2000. An FAO Study.** New York: NYU Press.
- ANDREFF, Vladimir
1984 "The international centralization of capital and the re-ordering of world capitalism" *Capital & Class*, 22:59-80
- Barkin, David
1987 "The End to Food Self-Sufficiency in Mexico". *Latin American Perspectives*, 14 (3):271-297
- 1990 **Distorted Development: Mexico in the World Economy.** Boulder: Westview Press.
- BARKIN, David, Rosemary Batt, and Billie DeWalt
1990 **Food Crops vs. Feed Crops: The Global Substitution of Grains in Production.** Boulder: Lynne Reiner.
- BERLAN, Jean-Pierre
1989 "Capital Accumulation, Transformation of Agriculture and the Agricultural Crisis: A Long-Term Perspective". Pp. 205-224 in A. MacEwan and W.K. Tabb (eds.) *Instability and Change in the World Economy.* New York: Monthly Review.
- BIENEFIELD, Manfred
1989 "The Lessons of History and the Developing World", *Monthly Review*, 41 (3):9-41.
- BONANNO, Alessandro, Donato Fernández and Jere L. Gilles
1990 "Agricultural policies in the US and EC: a comparative analysis". Pp. 227-251 in A. Bonanno (ed.) *Agrarian Policies & Agricultural Systems.* Boulder: Westview Press.
- BOUIS, Howard E. and Lawrence J. Haddad
1990 **Effects of Agricultural Commercialization on Land Tenure, Household Resource Allocation, and Nutrition in the Philippines.** Washington D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
- BRYAN, Richard
1987 "The State and the Internationalisation of Capital: An Approach to Analysis". *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 17 (3):253-275.
- BURBACH, Roger and Patricia Flynn
1980 **Agribusiness in the America.** New York: Monthly Review.
- BUTTEL, Frederick H.
1989 "The U.S. Farm Crisis and the Restructuring of American Agriculture: Domestic and International Dimensions. Pp. 46-83 in D. Goodman and M. Redclift (eds.) *The International Farm Crisis.* New York: St. Martin's Press.
- BYRES, Terry
1981 "The new technology, class formation and class action in the Indian countryside". *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 8 (4):405-454
- CANAK, William
1989 "Debt, Austerity, and Latin America in the New International Division of Labor". Pp. 9-27 in W. Canak (ed.) *Lost Promises: Debt, Austerity and Development in Latin America.* Boulder: Westview Press.
- CHESLEY, Carol M.
1985 "The Demand for Livestock Feed in Thailand". Unpublished MS Thesis., Cornell University.
- CHIENGKAL, Witayakorn
1983 "The Transformation of the Agrarian Structure of Central Thailand, 1960-1980". *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 13 (3):340-360.
- CLEAVER, Harry
1977 "Food, Famine and the International Crisis". *Zerowork*, 2:7-70.
- CORRIGAN, Philip, Harvie Ramsey and Derek Sayer
1980 "The State as a Relation of Production". Pp. 1-26 in P. Corrigan (ed.) *Capitalism, State Formation and Marxist Theory.* London: Quartet Books.
- DANAHER, Kevin
1989 "U.S. Food Power in the 1990's". *Race and Class* 30 (3):31-46.
- DEWALT, Billie
1985 "Mexico's Second Green Revolution: Food for Feed" *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos*, 1 (1):29-60.

- EVANS, Peter**
 1985 "Transnational Linkages and the Economic Role of the State: An Analysis of Developing and Industrialized Nations in the Post-World War II Period". Pp. 192-226 in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds.) **Bringing the State Back In.** New York: Cambridge University Press.
- FEDER, Ernst**
 1983 **Perverse Development.** Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies.
- FRIEDMANN, Harriet**
 1982 "The Political Economy of Food: the Rise and Fall of the Postwar International Food Order". **American Journal of Sociology**, 88S:248-286.
- 1987 "Family Farms and International Food Regimes". Pp. 247-58 in T. Shanin (ed.) **Peasants and Peasant Societies.** Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- FRIEDMANN, Harriet and Philip McMichael**
 1989 "Agriculture and the State System. The rise and decline of national agricultures, 1870 to the present". **Sociologia Ruralis**, XXIX (2):93-117
- GEORGE, Susan**
 1984 "Culture, Economics, Politics and Food Systems". Pp. 19-44 in S. George, **III Fares the Land. Essays on Food, Hunger, and Power.** Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies.
- GOLDFRANK, Walter**
 1989 "Harvesting Counterrevolution: Agricultural Exports in Pinochet's Chile". Pp. 189-98 in Terry Boswell (ed.) **Revolution in the World-System.** Westport: Greenwood Press.
- GOLDSTEIN, Carl**
 1988 "Asia's Supermarket". **Far Eastern Economic Review**, December 29:48-49.
- GOODMAN, David, Bernardo Sorj and John Wilkinson**
 1987 **From Farming to Biotechnology: A Theory of Agro-Industrial Development.** Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- GORDON, David**
 1988 "The Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations?" **New Left Review**. 168:24-65.
- GOUVEIA, Lourdes and Kathleen Stanley**
 1990 "Rural Crisis, North and South: the Role of Whear in the United States and Venezuela". Unpublished presentation to the World Congress of Sociology, Madrid.
- HATHAWAY, Dale E.**
 1987 **Agriculture and the GATT: Rewriting the Rules.** Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
- HEWISON, Kevin**
 1989 **Power and Politics in Thailand.** Manila: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers.
- HO KWON, Ping**
 1980 "Profits and Poverty in the Plantations". **Far Eastern Economic Review**, July 11:53-57.
- HOPKINS, Raymond and Donald Puchala**
 1980 **Global Food Interdependence.** New York: Columbia University Press.
- INSEL, Barbara**
 1985 "A World Awash in Grain". **Foreign Affairs**, Spring: 892-911.
- JOHNSTON, B. and P. Kilby**
 1975 **Agriculture and Structural Transformation.** London: Oxford University Press.
- KENNEY, Martin, Linda Lobao, James Curry and W. Richard Goe**
 1989 "Midwestern Agriculture in US Fordism. From the New Deal to Economic Restructuring". **Sociologia Ruralis**, XXIX, (2):131-148.
- LAPPE, Francis Moore, and Joseph Collins**
 1978 **Food First.** San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development.
- LLAMBÍ, Luis**
 1988 "Emergence of Capitalized Family Farms in Latin America". **Comparative Studies in Society and History**, 31:745-774.
- MACKINTOSH, Maureen**
 1989 **Gender, Class and Rural Transition. Agribusiness and the Food Crisis in Senegal.** London: Zed.

- MANN, Michael**
 1980 "State and Society, 1130-1815: An Analysis of English State Finances". Pp. 165-208 in M. Zeitlin (ed.) *Political Power and Social Theory*, 1, Greenwich: JAI Press.
- MAXWELL, Simon, and Adrian Fernando**
 1989 "Cash Crops in Developing Countries: the Issue, the Facts, the Policies". *World Development*, 17, (11):1677-1708.
- McMichael, Philip**
 1985 "Britain's Hegemony in the Nineteenth-Century World Economy". Pp. 117-150 in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and E.H. Stephens (eds.) *States versus Markets in the World-Systems*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- 1987 "State Formation and the Construction of the World Market". Pp. 187-237 in M. Zeitlin (ed.) *Political Power and Social Theory*, 6. Greenwich: JAI Press.
- 1990 "Transitions in the U.S./Pacific Rim Agro-Food System". Pp. 184-191 in *Facing East/Facing West: North America and the Asia/Pacific Region in the 1990s*. Western Michigan University: Office of International Affairs.
- MCMICHAEL, Philip and David Myhre**
 1991 "Global Regulation vs. the Nation State: Agro-Food Systems and the New Politics of Capital". *Capital and Class*, 43:1-18.
- MIGDAL, Joel**
 1988 *Strong Societies and Weak States. State-society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- PETRAS, James**
 1988 "The New Class Basis of Chilean Politics". *New Left Review*, 172:67-82
- PHILLIPS, Anne**
 1977 "The Concept of 'Development'". *Review of African Political Economy*, 8:7-20.
- POLANYI, Karl**
 1957 *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times*. Boston: Beacon.
- PUCHALA, Donald and Raymond F. Hopkins**
 1980 *The Global Political Economy of Food*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- RAIKES, Philip**
 1988 *Modernising Hunger. Famine, Food Surplus and Farm Policy in the EEC and Africa*. London: James Curry.
- RAMA, Ruth**
 1985 "Some effects of the internationalization of agriculture on the Mexican agricultural crisis". Pp. 69-94 in Steven E. Sanderson (ed.) *The Americas in the New International Division of Labor*. New York: Holmes and Meier.
- REYNOLDS, Laura T., David Muire, Philip McMichael, Viviana Carro-Figueroa, and Frederick H. Buttel**
 "The 'New Internationalization of Agriculture': Critique and Reformation". Unpublished manuscript, Field of Development Sociology, Cornell University.
- RUNGE, Carlisle Ford**
 1988 "The Assault on Agricultural Protectionism". *Foreign Affairs*, 67 (1):133-50.
- SANDERSON, Steven E. (ed.)**
 1985 *The Americas in the New International Division of Labor*. New York: Holmes & Meier.
- SANDERSON, Steven E.**
 1986 "The Emergence of the 'World Steer': Internationalization and Foreign Domination in Latin American Cattle Production". Pp. 123-48 in F. Lamond Tullis and W. Ladd Hollist (eds.) *Food, The State, and International Political Economy: Dilemmas of Developing Countries*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- SAYER, Derek**
 1987 *The Violence of Abstraction: The Analytical Foundations of Historical Materialism*. London: Basil Blackwell.
- SHUBERT, James N.**
 1986 "The Social, Developmental, and Political Impacts of Food Aid". Pp. 185-201 in W.P. Browne and D.F. Hadwiger (eds.) *World Food Policies: Toward Agricultural Independence*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

- SCHUH, Edward**
 1987 "The Changing Context of Food and Agricultural Development Policy". Pp. 72-88 in J.P. Gittinger, J. Leslie and C. Hoisington (eds.) *Food Policy: Integrating Supply, Distribution, and Consumption*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- SENGHAAS, Dieter**
 1988 "European Development and the Third World. An Assessment. *Review*, XI (1):3-54
- SHANIN, Teodor**
 1988 "Exploratory Economies: A Political Economy of Margins". *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 1 (1):107-115.
- SORJ, Bernardo, and John Wilkinson**
 1990 "From peasant to citizen: technological change and social transformation in developing countries". *International Social Science Journal*, 124:125-133.
- THOMPSON, Seth**
 1980 "International Organizations and the Improbability of a Global Food Regime" Pp. 191-206 in D.N. Balaam and M.J. Carey (eds.) *Food Politics. The Regional Conflict*. Totowa: Allanheld, Osmun.
- TUBIANA, Laurence**
 1989 "World Trade in Agricultural Products: From Global Regulation to Market Fragmentation". Pp. 23-45 in David Goodman and Michael Redclift (eds.) *The International Farm Crisis*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- VON BRAUNMUHL, Claudia**
 1979 "On the Analysis of the Bourgeois Nation State Within the World Market Context". Pp. 160-177 in J. Holloway and S. Picciotto (eds.) *State and Capital*. London: Arnold.
- WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel**
 1975 "International Inequalities: A Symposium". *Summation*, 1-7.
- WALTON, John, and Charles Ragin**
 1991 "Global and National Sources of Political Protest: Third World Responses to the Debt Crisis? *American Sociological Review*, 55 (6):876-890.
- WATTS, Michael**
 1990 "Peasants under Contract: Agro-Food Complexes in the Third World". Pp. 149-62 in Henry Bernstein, et. al. (eds.) *The Food Question: Profits versus People?*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- YOTOPOULOS, Pan**
 1985 "Middle-Income Classes and Food Crises: The 'New' Food-Feed Competition". *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 33 (2):463-483.

RESUMEN**Alimentos, el Estado y la Economía Mundial**

La creciente literatura sobre la "internacionalización" de los sistemas agrícola y alimentario ha prestado poca atención a la manera como el Estado, no sólo ha sido responsable de dicho proceso, sino que al mismo tiempo, también es cambiado por él. En la mayoría de las consideraciones sobre la internacionalización, el Estado (y el sistema estatal) se asume tal como este se presenta.

Este trabajo analiza el carácter histórico mundial de las relaciones Economía-Estado a través de diferentes períodos del desarrollo capitalista. Su objetivo es resaltar que la actual transnacionalización del Estado es una clave de la internacionalización de los sistemas alimentarios agroindustriales.

Philip McMichael Profesor asociado de Sociología Rural en la Universidad de Cornell. Sus principales investigaciones son en sociología histórica comparada, enfocadas hacia el proceso de construcción del Estado y los sistemas alimentarios, en una perspectiva históricomundial. Su trabajo *Sailors and the Agrarian Question* (Cambridge University Press, 1984) recibió el "Allan Sharlin Memorial Award", que otorga la Asociación de Historia de Ciencias Sociales (EEUU), por su erudito y sobresaliente trabajo, en 1984. Ha publicado o están por publicarse, artículos en *Sociología Ruralis; American Sociological Review, Theory and Society; Capital and Class; Review, y en el Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*.

Alimentos, el Estado y la Economía Mundial

Philip McMichael

La creciente literatura sobre la "internacionalización" de los sistemas agrícola y alimentario ha prestado poca atención a la manera como el Estado, no sólo ha sido responsable de dicho proceso, sino que al mismo tiempo, también es cambiado por él. En la mayoría de las consideraciones sobre la internacionalización, el Estado (y el sistema estatal) se asume tal como este se presenta.

Este trabajo analiza el carácter histórico mundial de las relaciones Economía-Estado a través de diferentes períodos del desarrollo capitalista. Su objetivo es resaltar que la actual transnacionalización del Estado es una clave de la internacionalización de los sistemas alimentarios agroindustriales.

Philip McMichael Profesor asociado de Sociología Rural en la Universidad de Cornell. Sus principales investigaciones son en sociología histórica comparada, enfocadas hacia el proceso de construcción del Estado y los sistemas alimentarios, en una perspectiva histórico mundial. *Surabjaya Sattlers and the Agrarian Question* (Cambridge University Press, 1984) recibió el "Allan Sharlin Memorial Award", que otorga la Asociación de Historia de Ciencias Sociales (EEUU), por su erudito y sobresaliente trabajo, en 1984. Ha publicado o están por publicarse, artículos en *Sociología Ruralis*, *American Sociological Review*, *Theory and Society*, *Capital and Class*, *Review*, y en el *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*.

Introducción

Las últimas tendencias en la organización global de los mercados ha promovido interés en la llamada nueva internacionalización de los sistemas agrícolas y alimentarios (por ej. Sanderson, 1985; Barkin, 1987). En forma general la bibliografía se ha centrado en las dimensiones económico-estructurales de este proceso, prestándole poca atención a teorizar sobre el rol cambiante del Estado en este movimiento. Este trabajo se refiere a ese aspecto ya que: a) El Estado es un punto central en el proceso de internacionalización del capital y b) La forma actual de internacionalización del capital está transformando al Estado. Hay dos aspectos principales. El primero es teórico y se refiere a cómo relacionamos el Estado con el cambio económico global dentro del cual el proceso de internacionalización se produce. El segundo, es más directamente histórico, y concierne al contexto global en el cual el proceso de internacionalización tiene lugar.

La unión entre la interpretación teórica e histórica del Estado se hace a través de una concepción histórica del mismo. Mi propia perspectiva es ver al Estado como eje central para la génesis histórica del capitalismo y su subsecuente forma espacial, regido por un sistema evolutivo de Estado que no es ni uniforme ni estable a través del tiempo. Dentro de este marco

(*) El Autor desea agradecer a Alessandro Bonanno por sus constructivas sugerencias en la preparación de este trabajo.

podemos examinar las cambiantes dimensiones políticas de los sistemas agroalimentarios, siendo la meta comprender adecuadamente las formas actuales de internacionalización. Esta tarea se enuncia en las siguientes proposiciones:

1. Que la internacionalización agroalimentaria debe estar relacionada con el proceso más general de internacionalización del capital.
2. Que teorizar históricamente sobre las relaciones Estado-economía es útil para considerar al Estado como una relación de producción en sí misma.
3. Que los Estados necesitan ser conceptualizados como miembros de un sistema Estatal para proveer un contexto histórico para el Estado moderno.
4. Que es importante distinguir la nación-Estado del Estado como tal para poder asir el carácter político fluido del Estado dentro del desarrollo del capital.

Hacia una visión histórico-mundial de las relaciones Estado-Economía

Los conceptos actuales sobre crisis y reestructuración del capitalismo implican en forma general una concepción no problemática del Estado. Mientras las relaciones y los procesos económicos se reorganizan globalmente, se toma al Estado sustantivamente como un dato. Esto es, el Estado puede organizar nuevos lazos internacionales (Evans, 1985), pero esto se entiende instrumentalmente en vez de verse como un cambio cualitativo del carácter del Estado. Implicita en este punto de vista hay una conjetaura no examinada de que el Estado es una estructura nacional, reproduciendo el capitalismo nacionalmente. (Gordon, 1988). Desde un punto de vista histórico esta suposición es insostenible ya que la nación-estado es una forma reciente y cada vez más frágil de organización política del Estado. Y esta realidad histórica se relaciona con la transformación del capitalismo de una forma nacional a una crecientemente transnacional.

Es importante no confundir aquí Estado con nación-estado, reconociendo que esta última es una forma histórica derivada del movimiento nacional del siglo XIX, y que es la organización del Estado nacional la que está en crisis actualmente. Está en crisis precisamente porque el capital, en todas sus formas, está reorganizando, arriba y abajo, el nivel administrativo de la nación-estado. Está retando directamente las restricciones nacionales tales como las políticas reguladoras en lo social y financiero, que se desarrollaron dentro de la era social-keynesiana. El Estado mismo es todavía crítico para el movimiento del capital, aunque en un sentido transformado. De una revisión histórica rápida podré argumentar que la relación estado/capital está actualmente pasando por una reestructuración; y que este proceso se puede observar a nivel de los sistemas agroalimentarios.

a.- Relaciones Estado-Economía.

El marxismo ortodoxo percibe al Estado como una superestructura político-legal montada sobre una base económica, con movimientos causales desde la base hacia la superestructura, o, más sutilmente, en ambas direcciones, dependiendo de las circunstancias. Esta percepción, sin embargo, refuerza la separación entre economía y política identificada por Marx, y más tarde por Polanyi, como la deficiencia fundamental de la teoría económica liberal. Para Marx, otorgar autonomía a la economía con respecto a sus bases socio-políticas fue la esencia del fetichismo de la mercancía. Esto es, la representación de las relaciones económicas como categorías discretas es un producto histórico del desarrollo capitalista y debe ser entendido como tal. En la era post-feudal las relaciones económicas aparecen formalmente desprovistas de vínculos políticos y sociales, y, sin embargo, sustancialmente están saturadas de relaciones sociales. Para Polanyi, la creencia en un "mercado auto-regulado" da cabida a concepciones ficticias de los requerimientos de la organización social moderna (1957). Como

ambos analistas lo han demostrado, la economía de mercado es una institución histórica que no puede ser entendida separada de sus elementos políticos. Desde este punto de vista, el Estado debe ser entendido, entre otras cosas, como una relación de producción en sí misma (ver Corrigan et. al., 1980)⁽¹⁾.

El siguiente planteamiento intenta ubicar la historia del Estado, y el sistema de Estados, dentro del movimiento global, amplio, del capitalismo.

b.- Orígenes políticos del mercado mundial de capital.

Históricamente, el capitalismo siempre ha sido internacional, teniendo su génesis en la fusión del Estado y el capital comercial. Esta fusión fue simultáneamente una nacionalización e internacionalización del capital, donde el régimen absolutista dependía del mercado mundial (mercantilista) basado en sistemas coloniales rivales (ver Polanyi, 1957:65; Mann, 1980: 176). De esta manera la historia del capital data desde la integración del antiguo capital mercantil dentro de la estructura y funcionamiento (comercio y deuda nacional) de los tempranos Estados modernos. Los mercados organizados políticamente fijaron las condiciones para la acumulación sistemática de capital a través de la regulación de la propiedad privada como forma social que involucra la formación de la fuerza de trabajo, las regulaciones bancarias, la ley de contratos, y así sucesivamente. La organización por los Estados de mercados y la legalización de los derechos de propiedad del capital mueble (inicialmente mercantil), que institucionalizaron la habilidad distintiva del capital para vincular y unificar regiones/sistemas de producción, echaron las bases para el auge de un sistema Estatal (McMichael, 1987:189).

La distinción institucional entre Estado y propiedad privada facilitó el desarrollo acumulativo y recíproco de cada uno, produciendo la división clásica, u oposición, de "Estado" y

"Sociedad". La propiedad privada inevitablemente se impuso sobre el proceso de formación del Estado, a través de una mutua dependencia de gobernantes y comerciantes y el creciente poder de la burguesía (Ver Von Braunmühl, 1979:174). De esta forma, la asociación en la cual entró el temprano Estado moderno con el capital comercial, sentando las bases del mercado mundial de capital, transformó tanto al Estado como al capital. Fue en la era del capital industrial cuando este nexo, arraigado en el comercio mundial, asumió una forma crecientemente nacional, a medida que el movimiento económico y las relaciones políticas del capital penetraron en los mercados e instituciones sedes de los Estados metropolitanos.

El movimiento nacional emanó del desarrollo, organización y regulación del trabajo asalariado en el siglo XIX. El sistema colonial representó el mecanismo principal de generación de excedentes para la economía metropolitana, y de mercados para la manufactura metropolitana. Este proceso global se anticipó y luego coexistió con el trabajo asalariado, tal como la Revolución Industrial anunciaba un nuevo régimen en la historia del capital. Este era nuevo en el sentido de que el capital ahora controlaba más bien que mediaba la producción, y la escala y la productividad del trabajo mejoradas generaban nuevos mercados extracOLONIALES y una forma de auto expansión conducente a la moderación de las regulaciones mercantilistas. Mientras que el trabajo colonial no capitalista era incorporado al régimen industrial junto con los nuevos sistemas de trabajo asalariado y granja familiar, todo trabajo productor de mercancías fue subordinado a los requerimientos competitivos del trabajo asalariado en una verdadera economía global.

c.- Auge y caída del movimiento nacional.

El rasgo distintivo de la economía mundial del siglo XIX fue el movimiento nacional. Mientras que se originaba en el centro metropolitano, este fue proyectado por la

hegemonía británica como un principio político-económico en todo el mundo no colonial y post-colonial (McMichael, 1985). Dentro de esta dinámica, el intento de establecer un mercado (mundial) autorregulado a través del patrón oro, institucionalizó la banca y el constitucionalismo político nacional (Ver Polanyi, 1957). La maquinación global británica para constituirse en el "Taller del mundo", provocó la competencia de los capitalismos nacionalistas rivales basados en la nueva banca central.

Lo que estamos presenciando hoy día es el desenlace de este movimiento nacional del siglo XIX. Aunque ni está totalmente claro ni es inevitable, de todas formas es indiscutiblemente la fuente principal de tensión en la economía política global contemporánea. En resumen, dado que el capital "nacionalmente organizado" del siglo XIX ha sido reemplazado o subordinado por capital conglomerado o "transnacionalmente organizado" en la era de la segunda postguerra, de igual manera, las relaciones estado-economía se han transformado. Para fundamentar este movimiento dentro de nuestra tema, se hace útil delinear los desarrollos asociados dentro de la esfera agroalimentaria. Esto nos ayudará a precisar el papel cambiante del Estado. Un método provechoso para conceptualizar la historia moderna de la agricultura es a través de la idea de "régimen alimentario", derivada del concepto inicial de Friedmann del "régimen alimentario internacional" (1987). El "régimen alimentario" es una relación político-económica que conecta la producción y consumo de alimentos a las formas históricas dominantes de acumulación de capital. Este implica directamente y le da forma al sistema de estado a través del tiempo. De tales regímenes dos han sido identificados (Friedmann y McMichael, 1989).

El primer régimen alimentario: 1870-1914. Se caracterizó por una forma extensiva de acumulación dirigida a disminuir los costos salariales metropolitanos. Aquí, las exportaciones desde las granjas familiares y haciendas del Nuevo

Mundo le proporcionaron al nuevo proletariado europeo productos del renglón alimenticio básico relativamente baratos en forma de granos y carnes. Este régimen comprendía dos movimientos opuestos relacionados.

Primeramente, fue la culminación del colonialismo (por ej., la pelea imperial confusa a finales del siglo XIX, expresando las emergentes rivalidades nacionales (EE.UU., Alemania y Francia contra Gran Bretaña; ésta se repliega hacia sus dominios), y el aseguramiento de productos tropicales para abastecer las dietas de la nueva clase metropolitana (azúcar, cacao, aceites vegetales, bananas) y proveer nuevas materias primas industriales (algodón, caucho, madera, añil, yute, cobre, estaño).

Segundo, representó el auge del sistema nación-estado, dado que los nuevos Estados colonizadores establecieron una organización del sistema alternativo post-colonial de la economía mundial en términos políticos y económicos. Políticamente, los gobiernos representativos regularon las economías nacionales dentro de su jurisdicción (incluyendo los sectores complementarios agrícolas e industriales comercialmente especializados). Económicamente, el comercio competitivo internacional de productos agrícolas de zona templada y manufacturas, reemplazó el comercio colonial complementario de productos tropicales a cambio de bienes manufacturados. Con este movimiento surgió una verdadera división internacional del trabajo, dado que los estados colonizadores duplicaron la agricultura europea y la producción industrial sobre una base más eficiente en términos de costo.

El complejo agroindustrial implícito en esta articulación nacional de los sectores económicos, especialmente en Estados Unidos, se convertiría en la base del segundo régimen alimentario, basado como estuvo en la hegemonía norteamericana. Es decir, los Estados Unidos se convirtieron en el modelo de organización económica nacional -tanto en el esquema de

reconstrucción de Europa como en el Asia Oriental, así como en el mundo post-colonial. Esencialmente el modelo presumió la industrialización de la agricultura y por lo tanto una fluidez de los límites sectoriales. Esto conllevó dos dimensiones espaciales. Desde el punto de vista económico, se dio la subordinación creciente de la agricultura al capital comenzada en el siglo XIX como una tendencia comercializadora -separando inicialmente agricultura e industria dentro de distintos sectores económicos, luego reunificándolos dentro del complejo agroindustrial a medida que la concentración de capital y la industrialización de alimentos avanzaba. El desgaste constante de los límites sectoriales continúa, donde "para 1980 alrededor de las dos terceras partes del total del valor final de la producción agrícola en los Estados Unidos se realizaba "corriente abajo" de la agricultura misma en procesamiento, embalaje, transporte, almacenamiento y distribución. Del tercio remanente para la agricultura, el 80% salía nuevamente fuera de ésta en egresos por insumos, equipos, servicios y pago de deuda" (Raikes, 1988:114).

Desde el punto de vista político hubo la posibilidad creciente de internacionalización en el momento en que la subordinación de la agricultura al capital promovía subsectores especializados, los cuales, como componentes de los procesos industriales, podían ser reubicados o reintegrados globalmente (como cadenas agroalimentarias) en una economía mundial relativamente abierta. Este proceso fragmenta los sectores agrícolas nacionales y promueve las ventajas competitivas internacionales que usualmente redefinen la seguridad alimentaria nacional como el acceso a los productos en el mercado mundial. En resumen, la industrialización de la agricultura conlleva una tensión progresiva entre las fuerzas nacionales e internacionales.

El Segundo régimen alimentario: 1945-73. Se caracterizaba por un proceso de acumulación

dirigido no a abaratarse el consumo sino a incorporar las relaciones de consumo dentro del proceso de acumulación mismo como lo requería el modelo fordista de un contrato de salario/productividad crecientes. Se intensificó la industrialización de la agricultura, produciendo nuevos alimentos duraderos; los cuales se daban a la par del rol de "artículos duraderos" de consumo en la próspera Pax Americana de la postguerra.

Este régimen comprende dos movimientos relacionados y opuestos a la vez. Primero, el sistema de Estado se extendió a las ex-colonias. Esto destruyó la base política para la especialización dentro de los bloques del protegido comercio colonial, expresado en la caída de los mercados para las exportaciones tropicales tales como azúcar y aceites vegetales, como resultado de la sustitución de las importaciones en la metrópoli. Los excedentes de alimentos de la acumulación intensiva en la metrópoli a la vez aprovisionaron a un emergente proletariado del Tercer Mundo -en gran medida a través del Sistema de Ayuda Alimentaria de los Estados Unidos, elaborado para balancear la superproducción agrícola y reemplazar los ahora protegidos mercados europeos por aquellos del mundo post-colonial (Friedmann, 1982).

Segundo, los sectores agrícolas fueron reestructurados transnacionalmente por capitales agroalimentarios. La intensificación de la agricultura metropolitana envolvió, primero, la elaboración de las cadenas alimentarias a través de las fronteras nacionales y, segundo, la conversión creciente de alimentos a partir de productos de uso final de la granja en productos manufacturados, inclusive productos duraderos. Esta reestructuración ocurrió a través de dos nuevos complejos:

a) El complejo intensivo de la carne: que integra a productores separados y especializados de animales y cereales (carbohidratos) y soya (proteínas) a través de las fronteras nacionales, originándose en países capitalistas avanzados y extendiéndose a países socialistas como Hungria

y la Unión Soviética y países de ingresos medios del Tercer Mundo como México, Brasil, Corea, Taiwán y más recientemente Tailandia. Para el complejo intensivo de la carne, tenemos la analogía del "carro del mundo" por la de "buey del mundo", combinando por ejemplo los antibióticos europeos, alimentos norteamericanos y reses mexicanas trasladadas a establos norteamericanos para producir carne de res embalada para los consumidores japoneses (Sanderson, 1986).

b) El complejo de alimentos durable: elaborado alrededor del principio de "sustitucionalismo"; ya sea reducción del producto agrícola a insumo industrial o su reemplazamiento por componentes no agrícolas (Goodman et. al., 1987). Este complejo transformó alimentos a partir de ingredientes locales perecederos en productos manufacturados comercializados mundialmente, congelados, procesados y constituidos con ingredientes tales como edulcorantes y grasas.

d.) Conceptualización de la internacionalización con relación al Estado.

Siguiendo el esquema de las tendencias globales a través de las cuales las economías nacionales están comprometidas en este proceso de integración intra-sectorial transnacional, es posible ahora teorizar la internacionalización como un proceso que implica al Estado. Comienzo con la proposición de que constituyéndose el capital a través de la circulación de dinero y mercancías, es intrínsecamente no nacional en cuanto a sus características. Mientras la circulación de valores en sus diversas formas (dinero, mercancías y trabajo) no coincide con las fronteras geopolíticas y puede tener un alcance subnacional o transnacional, esto no significa que el Estado sea insignificante, sino todo lo contrario. La producción de valores depende de las relaciones de propiedad garantizadas por el Estado, y su relativa movilidad depende de los controles monetarios, comerciales y de inversión

(Bryan, 1987). Desde esta perspectiva, el Estado moderno no es tanto una unidad económica (nacional) manifiesta sino un complejo nacional e institucional gobernando segmentos de los circuitos de valor, algunos de los cuales son internacionales. Mientras que la producción (organización de los mercados y procesos de trabajo) ocurre en un contexto nacional, los procesos asociados de realización y reproducción (compra de medios de producción) pueden ocurrir a nivel nacional o internacional.

En este sentido, la economía interna está constituida por fracciones de capital que tienen intereses políticos y sociales diferentes y a menudo contradictorios. Bryan (1987) ha clasificado estas fracciones dentro de los circuitos del capital en cuatro tipos: el "circuito nacional" (producción y reproducción estimuladas por el Estado que compiten con las importaciones), el "circuito global" (producción para el mercado mundial a través de las transnacionales en diversos países), el "circuito de inversión restringida" (producción para la exportación bajo condiciones especiales garantizadas por el Estado), y el "circuito de mercado restringido" (producción por transnacionales que compiten con las importaciones en uno o más sitios nacionales). Aparte del primer tipo de circuito, la internacionalización puede efectuarse a través de las otras tres formas -individualmente o combinadas. En principio, no existe un patrón ni tendencia común puesto que por razones históricas y estructurales se dan distintas combinaciones que implican diversas formas de regulación estatal.

El Estado es el ámbito para la competencia entre diversas formas, significando que la internacionalización en sí misma posee una dinámica y diversas formas de manifestación en cualquier Estado. Y la heterogeneidad a lo largo del sistema Estatal es también una condición para la fluidez. Por supuesto, en el sistema de Estado aparecen algunas tendencias dominantes en coyunturas determinadas -tales como el

fenómeno de la producción orientada a la exportación en los 70, pero se da una variedad de formas de producción y de reproducción para la exportación. A la vez, es posible ver que el proceso de concentración y centralización del capital ha intensificado el proceso de internacionalización -pero de nuevo, sin que necesariamente tome una determinada forma o dirección el proceso de internacionalización. Por lo tanto, mientras hay tendencias seculares definitivas a ser identificadas, tales como la intensificación de los circuitos de capital transnacional asociados con la banca global y la integración de subsectores de producción especializados a través de las fronteras nacionales, el proceso de internacionalización dentro de los Estados asume una variedad de formas locales. Ahora nos ocuparemos de la experiencia de internacionalización.

Reestructuración actual del Estado y la Economía

El colapso del sistema alimentario de la postguerra se identifica comúnmente con el desmantelamiento del sistema de Bretton Woods a comienzos de los 70. En realidad, este acontecimiento precipitó en general la actual erosión de la nación-Estado en la etapa de intensificación de la internacionalización del capital. Para entender la transformación en curso de los sistemas agroalimentarios se hace útil resumir las tendencias de la economía global durante este período y sus implicaciones para el Estado. La cuestión no es si la internacionalización representa una nueva tendencia dentro de la integración total sino qué tipo de internacionalización se está gestando. El rasgo más evidente de la internacionalización del capital ha sido la velocidad creciente de movilidad del capital dentro de la economía mundial en las últimas décadas. Tanto los cambios institucionales (desmantelamiento de las regulaciones nacionales

a través del patrón dólar-oro con el colapso del sistema de Bretton Woods) como los distributivos (centralización del capital bancario a nivel mundial), expresan la globalización de los mercados, la cual es responsable de las condiciones desestabilizadoras de la política de acumulación nacional (Ver Raynolds et. al.).

El vértice dentro del cual se encuentra actualmente el Estado mismo representa la tensión creciente entre las fuerzas nacionales e internacionales. Los nuevos movimientos sociales presionan a sus gobiernos por seguridad material, incluyendo alimentos (Gouveia y Stanley, 1990; Walton y Ragin, 1990), mientras que el capital y sus agencias financieras imponen políticas de austeridad y esquemas de producción de rubros para la exportación, los cuales insertan a las economías del Tercer Mundo en el mercado mundial. Las políticas de liberalización intentan establecer las regulaciones de mercado a nivel global (administradas por agencias estatales paraglobales tales como el Banco Mundial y el Fondo Monetario Internacional) en vez de las regulaciones políticas de las economías nacionales.

Con la desintegración del Sistema de Bretton Woods emergieron nuevos mecanismos institucionales de control y cooperación en el movimiento total del capital. Resumiendo, los bancos transnacionales mantienen su influencia sobre los prestamistas multilaterales y sobre los diseñadores de políticas de la OCDE.

El préstamo para el Ajuste Estructural indica el cambio resultante en las instituciones financieras multilaterales. El préstamo de ajuste difiere del préstamo tradicional para ajustes de corto plazo en la balanza de pagos (FMI) y de los préstamos para proyectos de desarrollo (Banco Mundial). Los préstamos de ajuste seleccionan y prescriben cambios en la política tales como liberalización del mercado, reestructuración sectorial, privatización y promoción de las exportaciones al servicios del pago de la deuda. Y, a la vez, los cambios de política redistribuyen

el poder dentro del Estado desde los ministerios orientados hacia la programación nacional (por ej., servicios sociales, agricultura, educación) hacia el Banco Central y los Ministerios de Finanzas y Comercio (Canak, 1989; Bienesfield, 1989). Este proceso de "transnacionalización" del Estado incluye el desplazamiento del timón del diseño de políticas del Sur hacia el Norte (Ver McMichael y Myhre, 1991).

En esta coyuntura es difícil saber hasta qué punto el desplazamiento de la política nacional es una tendencia secular, ya sea en el Sur o dentro del Sistema de Estado en general. Los año 80 fueron una década de reestructuración de clases, bajo el efecto de las casi universales políticas neo-liberales que responden a la crisis de la acumulación global. Estos acontecimiento, los cuales comprometen la coherencia nacional, fueron cíclicos, aunque puede ser que el mundo haya entrado a una era de "fin de milenio" o de "crisis permanente" (Shanin, 1988:111). Lo que sí parece claro es que hasta el punto en que el grueso de la desigualdad entre el Norte y el Sur (hablando abiertamente) se refuerza a causa de esto, el significado real o la posibilidad de un proyecto nacional en el Sur está fundamentalmente comprometido a largo plazo. A pesar de todo, el movimiento nacional es posible en una determinada etapa del capitalismo, realizado mayormente dentro del movimiento colonizador descrito anteriormente, y desde allí proyectado como un ideal contradictorio en el mundo de la post-guerra. Desde entonces ha habido una disyunción constante entre la aspiración y la realidad en cuanto al ideal de organización nacional para los Estados.

En la segunda postguerra mundial, la organización nacional del capital estaba a la orden del día, siendo el modelo idealizado del desarrollo norteamericano el que inspiraba tanto la teoría social de entonces como los programas norteamericanos de ayuda exterior. Este modelo era posible hasta tanto el patrón dólar-oro funcionara. Entérminos reales, el patrón imponía

una balanza comercial estable como una condición para las tasas bajas de interés y por ende un ambiente favorable para el capital. Un comercio estable dependía del éxito nacional en el mercado mundial. Y así, las condiciones ideales para el desarrollo eran aquellas elaboradas por la nación-Estado (Pbillips, 1977). El manejo nacional del "desarrollo" surgía del movimiento del siglo XIX, como fue demostrado por Polanyi y fue legitimado por la teoría Keynesiana de la regulación nacional. En otras palabras, el desarrollo capitalista viable (y el desarrollo socialista, bajo tales circunstancias) dependía en última instancia de la nación-Estado. La esencia del modelo nacional era una complementariedad dinámica entre los sectores agrícolas e industrial (Johnston y Kilby, 1975,; Senghaas, 1988). Los Estados del Tercer Mundo trataron de escapar del modelo colonial de agricultura de exportación tropical estimulando al capital y a la tecnología metropolitana a modernizar sus sectores agrícolas, proveyendo así a un creciente sector nacional con excedentes agrícolas y laborales. La Revolución Verde fue una forma de sustitución de importaciones agroalimentarias. Paradójicamente, ésta internacionalizó el modelo norteamericano de agricultura capital-intensiva dirigida a la dieta de la nueva clase, consistente en productos de trigo y proteína animal. Supuestamente un vehículo de la seguridad nacional alimentaria, la Revolución Verde internacionalizó el sistema industrial alimentario (George, 1984). Este矛盾orito resultado proviene de la idealización del modelo norteamericano. Mientras él representó una meta de la articulación nacional de la agricultura con la industria como sectores económicos nacionales, ello fue solamente un ideal. Su gran éxito fue la fundación de la agroindustria internacional (Ver por ej., Burbach y Flynn, 1980), la cual, apoyada por la política global de los Estados Unidos, amenazó la posibilidad de integración intersectorial como un fenómeno incluyente en la mayoría de los países en vías de desarrollo.

Donde los Estados Post-coloniales, por definición, carecieron de una organización nacional coherente (Ver Migdal, 1988), en lugar de desnacionalizar, activamente los sistemas agroalimentarios -fuera de casos excepcionales como el del Sistema Alimentario Mexicano, abandonado en 1982 (Barkin, 1987)-, la internacionalización ha sido, en conjunto, un movimiento absorbente.

El contexto de este movimiento ha sido la asimetría fundamental del sistema Estatal con respecto a la regulación nacional de la agricultura. Niveles de protección de la agricultura separan clara y netamente (en una tendencia declinante) las líneas divisorias entre el Norte y el Sur. Un informe del Banco Mundial de 1985 establece: "los países industrializados han erigido elevadas barreras a las importaciones de productos de zonas templadas de los países en desarrollo y luego han subsidiado sus propias importaciones" (citado en Danaher, 1989:42). Esta asimetría tiene sus raíces en la concentración del capital agroindustrial, inclusive del capital agrícola un proceso reforzado por los Estados metropolitanos a través de los esquemas de apoyo de precios a las mercancías, que promueven la especialización en monocultivos (Bonanno et. al., 1990). El proteccionismo metropolitano a su vez, desestabiliza los mercados mundiales subordinándolos a las políticas de los subsidios agrícolas, a la sobreproducción y a la competencia intensa (Runge, 1988:144). Los precios rebajados resultantes de esta "crisis comercial" (Hathaway, 1987) influyen a su vez en las políticas nacionales de precios de alimentos en el Tercer Mundo, afectando a menudo los esquemas internos de autosuficiencia alimentaria (Barkin, 1987).

Además de la subordinación política-económica de los Estados del Sur dentro del Sistema estatal global, la internacionalización del capital se ha intensificado con la difusión del modelo norteamericano de capital y energía de la agricultura intensiva. La internacionalización ha tomado varias formas. La dependencia tecnológica, inherente a la Revolución Verde,

representó una forma de internacionalización que, siguiendo a Bryan, puede denominarse "el circuito de capital constreñido por el mercado" (producción que compite por el mercado en uno o más sitios nacionales bajo el coauspicio del capital transnacional y del Estado). Esto se ha prolongado a la llamada "segunda Revolución Verde", asociada con la "nueva agricultura" (Feder, 1983; DeWalt, 1985; Rama, 1985), e incorporando dos o tres formas de internacionalización: los "circuitos de capital constreñidos por la inversión" (producción para la exportación bajo condiciones especiales garantizadas por el Estado) y "circuitos de capital global" (producción para el mercado mundial por las transnacionales en diversos sitios nacionales). En estas últimas formas de internacionalización la política estatal ha estimulado el abastecimiento de mercados de altos ingresos en bienes de lujo y componentes agroalimentarios tanto en mercados locales como de exportación.

Asociada con este cambio tecnológico en la agricultura mundial ha estado la proliferación y la integración transnacional de subsectores especializados de producción, surgidos de los procesos de largo plazo de industrialización de la agricultura (Goodman et. al., 1987). El creciente consumo de proteína animal intensifica la competencia del mercado de alimentos para ganado, a medida que países como Brasil, China y Tailandia rivalizan con exportadores tradicionales tales como los Estados ex-colonizadores. Los sustitutos de cereales tales como Yuca, gluten de maíz y sifloras de cítricos se han convertido en rubros claves de exportación en la reestructuración del mercado internacional, puesto que éstas han sido importaciones no protegidas a la Comunidad Económica Europea (Hathaway, 1987:30). Como sustitutos ellas proporcionan nuevas estrategias de acumulación para la agroindustria en un mercado mundial saturado.

Estas tendencias han transformado las relaciones de producción en la agricultura del

Tercer Mundo, dando lugar a nuevas clases agrícolas tales como los cultivadores familiares capitalizados dedicados a cereales, forraje y alimentos para ganado (Byres, 1981; DeWalt, 1985; Llambí, 1989; Barkin et. al.) integración a la agroindustria organizada diversamente por el capital público local privado y transnacional (Watts, 1990; Mackintosh, 1989). Como lo han anotado Sorj y Wilkinson:

"La modernización tecnológica ha sido de hecho la vía principal a través de la cual los campesinos han venido a participar en el (dis)funcionamiento del sistema Estatal vía créditos seguros, subsidios y ayuda técnica. Estos nuevos niveles de integración han sido los causantes de la modificación del universo político-ideológico de los cultivadores familiares tecnificados, conducentes a un cambio en las demandas, de las cuestiones de redistribución de la tierra en los asuntos relacionados con la política agrícola" (1990:131).

Sin embargo, la otra cara de este proceso es la considerable marginalidad del campesinado no integrado, el cual pierde no sólo su tierra sino también su peso político. Dentro de este grupo se encuentra la creciente masa de los trabajadores disponibles para múltiples tareas, cuyas pautas de empleo fragmentado expresan el proceso de integración de la producción intersectorial y de alcance nacional, debilitando aún más sus posibilidades para la acción política.

Así, a través del mercado mundial las dietas de la nueva clase en conjunto con las políticas de ajuste estructural que promueven la agricultura de exportación para pagar la deuda creciente, han reestructurado las relaciones de clases y de producción en la "nueva agricultura" y sus sistemas asociados industriales alimentarios. La "nueva agricultura" es de capital-intensivo, e invariablemente, apoyada por el Estado, ya sea bajo la presión de las instituciones financieras

internacionales, como en el caso de México (Barkin, 1990; McMichael y Myhre, 1991) o sometiéndose a la lógica del mercado global como en Chile (Petras, 1988; Goldfrank, 1989), Senegal (Mackintosh, 1989) y Tailandia. La agroindustria, aún cuando sea dirigida hacia mercados internos, estimula la "sustitución de exportaciones", reemplazando o complementando las importaciones primarias tradicionales o las estrategias de industrialización para la exportación promovidas en el Tercer Mundo desde los años 70. La nueva agroindustria de bienes de lujo para la exportación es el sector de mayor crecimiento, representando (en 1980) el 25% del total de la producción de alimento procesado en el Tercer Mundo, gran parte del cual es mercadeado por un puñado de transnacionales (Ho Kwon, 1980:53).

Por ejemplo, la reciente estrategia de desarrollo dirigido del Estado tailandés, financiada por deuda externa, estimulada por un informe del Banco Mundial en 1978, le ha dado la más alta prioridad al sector agroalimentario. Este cambio en los sectores estratégicos ejemplifica la nueva política de expansión agroalimentaria, donde "mientras se le había dado mucho énfasis a la producción de exportaciones industriales se comprendió pronto que la industrialización orientada a la exportación no era sólo una estrategia para la manufactura industrial y que la importación de alimentos de lujo es una extensión lógica de esa estrategia" (Hewison, 1989:357-87). El desarrollo alimentario desde los años 70 ha llevado a la concentración de la tierra y ha intensificado la agricultura por contrato (Chiengkal, 1983:357-358). Bautizada como el "supermercado de Asia" la industria procesadora de alimentos de Tailandia se ha expandido rápidamente sobre la base de una agricultura por contrato. Las empresas de alimentos de Japón, Taiwán, Estados Unidos y Europa ven a Tailandia como la más promisoria base para la producción orientada a la exportación, especialmente en comparación con competidores como Indonesia, Filipinas o Taiwán" (Gidstein,

1968:48). El Consejo de Inversiones de Tailandia estimuló primero grandes empresas productoras de alimentos para ganado a través de privilegios de promoción de inversiones en 1969, extendiendo a continuación este privilegio a las corporaciones exportadoras de pollos procesados (Chesley, 1985:69-70). El sector avícola intensivo tailandés (aprovisionado por alimentos locales) se ha convertido en una fuente dinámica de exportaciones, el 90% de las cuales suplen el mercado japonés, sobre pasando las exportaciones de pollos norteamericanos a Japón a fines de los años 80 (McMichael, 1990).

En todos estos casos mientras la productividad agrícola se incrementa elevando algunos ingresos rurales, aquellos productores rurales no expulsados de la tierra son inevitablemente incorporados a mercados de mayor valor o mundiales a expensas de la producción de alimentos para el consumo, lo que se expresa, de la forma más dramática, en la sustitución de granos alimenticios por alimentos para ganado (Barkin et. al., 1990). Mientras tanto los desposeídos no pueden comprar los nuevos alimentos (Goldfrank, 1989; Bouis y Haddad, 1989), pero el asunto que se escapa es que mientras los Estados son compelidos directa o indirectamente a ajustar la política agrícola a la lógica del mercado mundial, donde los alimentos industriales de lujo dominan crecientemente las decisiones de inversión, los mercados de alimentos locales, la coherencia nacional (potencial) de los sectores agrícolas, resultan afectados.

Las consecuencias sociales de la mercantilización y de la subordinación de la oferta de alimentos a los mercados mundiales en lugar de los locales, es subrayada dramáticamente por Yotopoulos: "por primera vez la cuestión de si el trigo producido en Australia irá a alimentar a la gente de Bangladesh, a los cerdos de la URSS o las ovejas para ser exportadas a la Comunidad Económica Europea, es una decisión que corresponde al mercado mundial" (1985:447).

Por supuesto, el "mercado mundial" no es una entidad con vida propia, él únicamente asume estas proporciones cuando la fuerza plena de la ventaja de clases en el Estado se disimula tras la apariencia universalista de políticas que los financieros internacionales imponen criterios severos de solvencia sobre los Estados. Bajo tales condiciones es difícil para los gobiernos mantener una política nacional consistente y coherente respecto a asuntos tan básicos como la satisfacción de los derechos consagrados a la obtención de alimentos a precios accesibles y en formas cultural y nutricionalmente apropiadas.

Conclusiones

La supremacía del mercado mundial emana de tres fuerzas claves: 1) La expansión de las transnacionales en la organización de la producción y la circulación de alimentos, especialmente a medida que el sustitucionismo ha mejorado la rentabilidad de la inversión agroalimentaria; 2) La recomposición de clases a escala planetaria, involucrando una concentración del poder social en los Estados por parte de las clases ricas con horizontes globales, la integración transnacional de los circuitos de consumo y el sesgo de los mercados alimentarios; 3) El poder del capital transnacional crecientemente centralizado (Andreff, 1984), institucionalizado en las entidades financieras internacionales y en sus prescripciones económicas para los prestatarios de ajustar y abrir las economías nacionales a los mercados globales.

Al mismo tiempo, los mercados globales de alimentos son políticamente estructurados por la pauta desigual de protección agrícola en el sistema de Estado. El persistente apoyo del Norte a su agricultura ha forzado una división global del trabajo, en la que un abastecimiento disponible de cosechas de bajo valor desde el Norte, impone al Sur la inversión en agricultura de alto valor para el mercado mundial a expensas del sector nacional de granos básicos (Buttel, 1989). Las

exportaciones del Tercer Mundo se expanden para financiar importaciones de alimentos -desde 1970 el crecimiento de la producción para la exportación ha superado en dos veces y media la producción de alimentos básicos (Danaher, 1989:6).

En fin la relación Estado-economía ha sido transformada no sólo en el sentido de que el capital que era de esperar han ganado la supremacía, sino más fundamentalmente, en el sentido de que las estructuras del Estado están sufriendo un proceso de "transnacionalización". En busca de un lenguaje más apropiado para expresar la erosión del movimiento nacional, esto significa que las burocracias políticas del Estado así como sus órganos y políticas económicas están crecientemente dirigidas hacia requerimientos y mercados transnacionales. Así como la internacionalización históricamente vinculó subsectores específicos dentro de los Estados a circuitos globales como una base para la acumulación interna en el proceso de construcción de la nación-Estado, hay ahora, aparentemente, una intensificación de este proceso que contradice la integridad de la organización (la más reciente causa por la cual son draconianos los ajustes impuestos a los Estados endeudados por la comunidad financiera internacional). Por tanto, esta es en definitiva una cuestión política y necesariamente imprecisa.

Vivimos en una era en la que existe un fuerte legado de capacidad de organización nacional que se deriva del papel histórico de la nación-Estado como una fuerza material e ideológica y recientemente institucionalizada en organismos internacionales destinados a la búsqueda de soluciones nacionales. La construcción del Estado en el siglo XX ha incluido la provisión de los derechos sociales, incluida la seguridad alimentaria, organizada a través de sectores agrícolas nacionales montados sobre las ruinas o residuos de las agriculturas locales de subsistencia. Este proceso nunca se completó en el mundo post-colonial y ahora está en decadencia en el

primer mundo. También vivimos en una era en que el capital transnacional, con o sin asistencia de los Estados, está reorganizando el espacio y por ende, la misma nación-estado puede coordinar las actividades de producción y circulación a través de las fronteras nacionales. Donde las corporaciones organizan transnacionalmente complejos agroindustriales, se apropián de los complejos agrícolas nacionales transformando las cosechas específicas en mercancías del mercado mundial. Los Estados ciertamente median este proceso, en parte porque tienen poca opción si desean beneficiarse del intercambio incrementado. Y algunos Estados hacen más que mediar -por ejemplo, Estados Unidos- promoviendo activamente los mercados de exportación para sus productos agrícolas, y los programas de ayuda externa de Japón apoyan la inversión de capital agrícola para resolver el problema de la dependencia alimentaria del país (Berlan, 1989:227).

Los mercados mundiales pueden ser de beneficio neto para una nación -no hay nada inherentemente superior en los mercados locales (aparte de la frescura y la conservación de energía), especialmente cuando la igualdad social y económica no está garantizada. La cuestión es más bien cómo están estructurados los mercados según los privilegios de clase y si son regulados a través del Estado o del sistema Estatal para los propósitos de producción en escala mundial dirigidos a la justicia social y a la seguridad ambiental de largo plazo. En la actualidad es bastante claro que ésta no es la forma como está organizado el mercado mundial. Más aún, su propia organización está erosionando la posibilidad de que una acción nacional o internacional colectiva pueda asegurar tales metas. Este proceso no es de ningún modo apacible ni claramente definitivo puesto que subsisten fuertes residuos de la organización nacional en el orden mundial actual. Sin embargo, somos testigos de crecientes tensiones políticas a medida que se intensifica la contradicción entre la acumulación

privada global y la legitimidad política-nacional de los Estados. Una de las más claras expresiones de este proceso es el movimiento por la seguridad alimentaria que en su nivel más elemental expresa la decadencia de la comunidad y la subordinación del Estado a las fuerzas económicas globales.

Notas:

1). Metodológicamente no podemos apropiarnos del mundo material sin el pensamiento, pero este proceso de abstracción (conceptualización) materializa categorías cuando las acepta en su valor nominal por así decirlo. En otras palabras, la terminología base-superestructura en Marx es una metáfora para el proceso mediante el cual nosotros abstraemos las relaciones sociales reales: la "metáfora base-superestructura se aplica a la relación entre el ser social y la conciencia social, no es de ninguna manera un modelo putativo de 'niveles'" (Sayer., 1977:92).

El Modelo de este apartado metodológico es conceptualizar el Estado como categoría histórica que tiene condiciones tanto ideales como reales. Esto es, el Estado es un logro institucional del desarrollo capitalista ampliamente concebido. Es un ámbito de la acción social en donde la política emerge bajo el condicionamiento mutuo de fuerzas reales (en pocas palabras, estructuras de acumulación) e ideales (en pocas palabras, proyecciones del interés social). El carácter contradictorio del Estado y de la política estatal se debe en gran medida a las considerables discrepancias entre fuerzas ideales y reales en tiempo y espacio (por ej., las políticas que persiguen la prosperidad nacional pueden ser afectadas por movimientos cíclicos o internacionales de capital).

Referencia Bibliográficas

ALEXANDRATOS, Nikos (ed.)

1988 *World Agriculture: Toward 2000. An FAO Study.* New York: NYU Press.

ANDREFF, Wladimir

1984 "The international centralization of capital and the re-ordering of world capitalism" *Capital & Class*, 22:59-80

Barkin, David

1987 "The End to Food Self-Sufficiency in Mexico". *Latin American Perspectives*, 14 (3):271-297

— 1990 *Distorted Development: Mexico in the World Economy.* Boulder: Westview Press.

BARKIN, David, Rosemary Batt, and Bille DeWalt

1990 *Food Crops vs. Feed Crops: The Global Substitution of Grains in Production.* Boulder: Lynne Reiner.

BERLAN, Jean-Pierre

1989 "Capital Accumulation, Transformation of Agriculture and the Agricultural Crisis: A Long-Term Perspective". Pp. 205-224 in A. MacEwan and W.K. Tabb (eds.) *Instability and Change in the World Economy.* New York: Monthly Review.

BIENEFELD, Manfred

1989 "The Lessons of History and the Developing World", *Monthly Review*, 41 (3):9-41.

BONANNO, Alessandro, Donato Fernández and Jere L. Gilles

1990 "Agricultural policies in the US and EC: a comparative analysis". Pp. 227-251 in A. Bonanno (ed.) *Agrarian Policies & Agricultural Systems.* Boulder: Westview Press.

BOUIS, Howard E. and Lawrence J. Haddad

1990 *Effects of Agricultural Commercialization on Land Tenure, Household Resource Allocation, and Nutrition in the Philippines.* Washington D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.

BRYAN, Richard

1987 "The State and the Internationalisation of Capital: An Approach to Analysis". *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 17 (3):253-275.

BURBACH, Roger and Patricia Flynn

1980 *Agribusiness in the America.* New York: Monthly Review.

BUTTEL, Frederick H.

1989 "The U.S. Farm Crisis and the Restructuring of American Agriculture: Domestic and International Dimensions. Pp. 46-83 in D. Goodman and M. Redclift (eds.) *The International Farm Crisis.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

- BYRES, Terry**
 1981 "The new technology, class formation and class action in the Indian countryside". *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 8 (4):405-454
- CANAK, William**
 1989 "Debt, Austerity, and Latin America in the New International Division of Labor". Pp. 9-27 in W. Canak (ed.) *Lost Promises: Debt, Austerity and Development in Latin America*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- CHESLEY, Carol M.**
 1985 "The Demand for Livestock Feed in Thailand". Unpublished MS Thesis., Cornell University.
- CHIENGKAL, Witayakom**
 1983 "The Transformation of the Agrarian Structure of Central Thailand, 1960-1980". *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 13 (3):340-360.
- CLEAVER, Harry**
 1977 "Food, Famine and the International Crisis". *Zerowork*, 2:7-70.
- CORRIGAN, Philip, Harvie Ramsey and Derek Sayer**
 1980 "The State as a Relation of Production". Pp. 1-26 in P. Corrigan (ed.) *Capitalism, State Formation and Marxist Theory*. London: Quartet Books.
- DANAHER, Kevin**
 1989 "U.S. Food Power in the 1990's". *Race and Class* 30 (3):31-46.
- DEWALT, Billie**
 1985 "Mexico's Second Green Revolution: Food for Feed" *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos*, 1 (1):29-60.
- EVANS, Peter**
 1985 "Transnational Linkages and the Economic Role of the State: An Analysis of Developing and Industrialized Nations in the Post-World War II Period". Pp. 192-226 in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds.) *Bringing the State Back In*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- FEDER, Ernst**
 1983 *Perverse Development*. Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies.
- FRIEDMANN, Harriet**
 1982 "The Political Economy of Food: the Rise and Fall of the Postwar International Food Order". *American Journal of Sociology*, 88S:248-286.
- 1987 "Family Farms and International Food Regimes". Pp. 247-58 in T. Shainin (ed.) *Peasants and Peasant Societies*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- FRIEDMANN, Harriet and Philip McMichael**
 1989 "Agriculture and the State System. The rise and decline of national agricultures, 1870 to the present". *Sociologia Ruralis*, XXIX (2):93-117
- GEORGE, Susan**
 1984 "Culture, Economics, Politics and Food Systems". Pp. 19-44 in S. George, *III Fares the Land. Essays on Food, Hunger, and Power*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies.
- GOLDFRANK, Walter**
 1989 "Harvesting Counterrevolution: Agricultural Exports in Pinochet's Chile". Pp. 189-98 in Terry Boswell (ed.) *Revolution in the World-System*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- GOLDSTEIN, Carl**
 1988 "Asia's Supermarket". *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 29:48-49.
- GOODMAN, David, Bernardo Sorj and John Wilkinson**
 1987 *From Farming to Biotechnology: A Theory of Agro-Industrial Development*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- GORDON, David**
 1988 "The Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations?" *New Left Review*, 168:24-65.
- GOUVEIA, Lourdes and Kathleen Stanley**
 1990 "Rural Crisis, North and South: the Role of Wheat in the United States and Venezuela". Unpublished presentation to the World Congress of Sociology, Madrid.
- HATHAWAY, Dale E.**
 1987 *Agriculture and the GATT: Rewriting the Rules*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
- HEWISON, Kevin**
 1989 *Power and Politics in Thailand*. Manila: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers.
- HO KWON, Ping**
 1980 "Profits and Poverty in the Plantations". *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 11:53-57.

- HOPKINS, Raymond and Donald Puchala
 1980 **Global Food Interdependence**. New York: Columbia University Press.
- INSEL, Barbara
 1985 "A World Awash in Grain". *Foreign Affairs*, Spring: 892-911.
- JOHNSTON, B. and P. Kilby
 1975 **Agriculture and Structural Transformation**. London: Oxford University Press.
- KENNEY, Martin, Linda Lobao, James Curry and W. Richard Goe
 1989 "Midwestern Agriculture in US Fordism. From the New Deal to Economic Restructuring". *Sociologia Ruralis*, XXIX, (2):131-148.
- LAPPE, Francis Moore, and Joseph Collins
 1978 **Food First**. San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development.
- LLAMBÍ, Luis
 1988 "Emergence of Capitalized Family Farms in Latin America". *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 31:745-774.
- MACKINTOSH, Maureen
 1989 **Gender, Class and Rural Transition. Agribusiness and the Food Crisis in Senegal**. London: Zed.
- MANN, Michael
 1980 "State and Society, 1130-1815: An Analysis of English State Finances". Pp. 165-208 in M. Zeitlin (ed.) **Political Power and Social Theory**, 1, Greenwich: JAI Press.
- MAXWELL, Simon, and Adrian Fernando
 1989 "Cash Crops in Developing Countries: the Issue, the Facts, the Policies". *World Development*, 17, (11):1677-1708.
- McMichael, Philip
 1985 "Britain's Hegemony in the Nineteenth-Century World Economy". Pp. 117-150 in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and E.H. Stephens (eds.) **States versus Markets in the World-Systems**. Beverly Hills: Sage.
 1987 "State Formation and the Construction of the World Market". Pp. 187-237 in M. Zeitlin (ed.) **Political Power and Social Theory**, 6. Greenwich: JAI Press.
- 1990 "Transitions in the U.S./Pacific Rim Agro-Food System". Pp. 184-191 in **Facing East/Facing West: North America and the Asia/Pacific Region in the 1990**. Western Michigan University: Office of International Affairs.
- MCMICHAEL, Philip and David Myhre
 1991 "Global Regulation vs. the Nation State: Agro-Food Systems and the New Politics of Capital". *Capital and Class*, 43:1-18.
- MIGDAL, Joel
 1988 **Strong Societies and Weak States. State-society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World**. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- PETRAS, James
 1988 "The New Class Basis of Chilean Politics". *New Left Review*, 172:67-82.
- PHILLIPS, Anne
 1977 "The Concept of 'Development'". *Review of African Political Economy*, 8:7-20.
- POLANYI, Karl
 1957 **The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times**. Boston: Beacon.
- PUCHALA, Donald and Raymond F. Hopkins
 1980 **The Global Political Economy of Food**. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- RAIKES, Philip
 1988 **Modernising Hunger. Famine, Food Surplus and Farm Policy in the EEC and Africa**. London: James Curry.
- RAMA, Ruth
 1985 "Some effects of the internationalization of agriculture on the Mexican agricultural crisis". Pp. 69-94 in Steven E. Sanderson (ed.) **The Americas in the New International Division of Labor**. New York: Holmes and Meier.
- RAYNOLDS, Laura T., David Muhre, Philip McMichael, Viviana Carro-Figuerola, and Frederick H. Buttel
 "The 'New Internationalization of Agriculture': Critique and Reformulation". Unpublished manuscript, Field of Development Sociology, Cornell University.

- RUNGE, Carlisle Ford
1988 "The Assault on Agricultural Protectionism".
Foreign Affairs, 67 (1):133-50.
- SANDERSON, Steven E. (ed.)
1985 *The Americas in the New International Division of Labor* New York: Holmes & Meier.
- SANDERSON, Steven E.
1986 "The Emergence of the 'World Steer': Internationalization and Foreign Domination in Latin American Cattle Production". Pp. 123-48 in F. Lamond Tullis and W. Ladd Hollist (eds.) *Food, The State, and International Political Economy: Dilemmas of Developing Countries*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- SAYER, Derek
1987 *The Violence of Abstraction: The Analytical Foundations of Historical Materialism*. London: Basil Blackwell.
- SHUBERT, James N.
1986 "The Social, Developmental, and Political Impacts of Food Aid". Pp. 185-201 in W.P. Browne and D.F. Hadwiger (eds.) *World Food Policies: Toward Agricultural Independence*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- SCHUH, Edward
1987 "The Changing Context of Food and Agricultural Development Policy". Pp. 72-88 in J.P. Gittinger, J. Leslie and C. Hoisington (eds.) *Food Policy: Integrating Supply, Distribution, and Consumption*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- SENGHAAS, Dieter
1988 "European Development and the Third World. An Assessment. *Review*, XI (1):3-54
- SHANIN, Teodor
1988 "Exploratory Economies: A Political Economy of Margins". *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 1 (1):107-115.
- SORJ, Bernardo, and John Wilkinson
1990 "From peasant to citizen: technological change and social transformation in developing countries". *International Social Science Journal*, 124:125-133.
- THOMPSON, Seth
1980 "International Organizations and the Improbability of a Global Food Regime" Pp. 191-206 in D.N. Balaam and M.J. Carey (eds.) *Food Politics. The Regional Conflict*. Totowa: Allanheld, Osmun.
- TUBIANA, Laurence
1989 "World Trade in Agricultural Products: From Global Regulation to Market Fragmentation". Pp. 23-45 in David Goodman and Michael Redclift (eds.) *The International Farm Crisis*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- VON BRAUNMUHL, Claudia
1979 "On the Analysis of the Bourgeois Nation State Within the World Market Context". Pp. 160-177 in J. Holloway and S. Picciotto (eds.) *State and Capital*. London: Arnold.
- WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel
1975 "International Inequalities: A Symposium". *Summation*, 1-7.
- WALTON, John, and Charles Ragin
1991 "Global and National Sources of Political Protest: Third World Responses to the Debt Crisis? *American Sociological Review*, 55 (6):876-890.
- WATTS, Michael
1990 "Peasants under Contract: Agro-Food Complexes in the Third World". Pp. 149-62 in Henry Bernstein, et. al. (eds.) *The Food Question: Profits versus People?*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- YOTOPOULOS, Pan
1985 "Middle-Income Classes and Food Crises: The 'New' Food-Feed Competition". *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 33 (2):463-483.

ABSTRACT

Food, the State, and The World Economy

The growing literature on the "internationalization" of agricultural and food systems has paid too little attention to the way in which the state itself not only sponsors this process, but is changed by it. In most accounts of internationalization, the state (and state system) is taken as a given. This paper attempts to remedy this by offering a sketch of the world historical character of state-economy relations, across different periods of world capitalism. The goal is to stress that currently the transnationalization of the state is a key to the internationalization of agro-industrial food systems.

Philip McMichael is Associate Professor of Rural Sociology at Cornell University. His major research interests are in comparative-historical sociology, with current focus on state-building and food systems in world-historical perspective. *His Settlers and the Agrarian Question* (Cambridge University Press, 1984) received the Allan Sharlin Memorial Award from the Social Science History Association for the outstanding scholarly work of 1984. He has published or forthcoming articles in *Sociologia Ruralis*, *American Sociological Review*, *Theory and Society*, *Capital and Class*, *Review*, and *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*.

Manufacturing Plants: Notes on the Culture of Nature and the Nature of Culture

Lawrence Busch

The terms "culture" and "nature" have ambiguous meanings in most Western societies. Culture is used to denote the totality of socially transmitted customs and behavior patterns of a given society as well as to denote the cultivation of plants or microorganisms in a petri dish. Nature is used to refer to those aspects of the world that are beyond us as well as to that which is taken for granted as "natural" or normal. This ambiguity is particularly well reflected in current debates about plant biotechnology and germplasm conservation.

The thesis of this paper is that the nature/culture distinction has outlived its usefulness. The new biotechnologies illustrate in the most dramatic of ways how we make and remake nature, while the issues surrounding germplasm conservation show that we have been collectively engaged in making nature for thousands of years. Thus, nature is not natural; it is a product of culture. Put another way, nature is always cultured. Similarly, culture is a product of nature; it is natural in its origins if not in its content.

Lawrence Busch is Professor of Sociology at Michigan State University. He has recently coauthored *Plants, Power, and Profit: Social, Economic and Ethical Consequences of the New Biotechnologies* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991). He is currently working on the problems associated with germplasm conservation in several nations and on the formation and technical restructuring of agricultural commodity subsectors.

Galileo separated the essence of the world—number, shape, size, motion—from its appearance. The former he called the primary qualities and the latter secondary. Primary qualities were found in the world, while secondary qualities were found in language. Of course, Galileo was rejecting peripatetic philosophy. He was trying to awaken his contemporaries to the empirical world that was often obscured by virtual worship of the works of Aristotle (Drake, 1978).

This Galilean separation is still with us today even though many philosophers of science would find it inadequate at best. For example, one scientific text divides quality into two sorts: subjective and objective. Subjective quality "is based on the investigator's opinion,... Examples include flavor, odor, color, tactile [sic], or texture" (Gould, 1983:196). In contrast, we learn that "Objective quality evaluation is based on observations that exclude the investigator's attitude. As recognized standard scientific tests, they are applicable to any sample of the product or products without reference to its previous

(*) Paper based on an original paper presented at the Twelfth World Congress of Sociology, Madrid, Spain, July, 1990. The material in this paper is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation and the Cooperative State Research Service (USDA) under grant #BSR-8608719 and the Michigan Agricultural Experiment Station. I would like to thank Alessandro Bonanno and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on a previous draft. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsoring agencies or reviewers.

history or ultimate use. They are representative of modern quality control because the human element is excluded" (1983:197). Similarly, risk analysts distinguish perceived risks, those noted through ordinary experience, from real risks, calculable as statistical probabilities of harm (Zeckhauser and Viscusi, 1990; cf. Thompson, 1990).

This attempt to exclude the human element, and to see nature as it really is, is common to much of the contemporary practice of science and is even shared by some philosophers of science (Nagel, 1979). It is paralleled by a sharp separation between nature and culture. Natural scientists, we are told, study nature, while social scientists study culture. Natural scientists describe a world of facts while social scientists (often) study values that people hold.

The distinction is also manifested in the divisions between and within agriculture and food preparation. Agriculture, we are told, is a rational, scientific enterprise (or at least it ought to be) reserved for males, while home food preparation is an art, and is (largely) the province of women. Agricultural colleges are still staffed largely by men, while colleges of home economics are staffed largely by women (Randolph and Sachs, 1981). Within the Galilean framework, agriculture concerns itself with the primary qualities, the essences of things, while food preparation focuses on appearances, on secondary qualities.

In this paper, I explore the origins and consequences of this division between nature and culture, with special emphasis on food and agriculture. First, I make some observations on the natural sciences. Then, I examine the history of agriculture followed by a parallel history of food. This is followed by a discussion of the problems associated with germplasm conservation. I conclude by asking how food and agriculture might be reunited in a post-Galilean world⁽¹⁾.

Some Thoughts on the Natural Sciences

Science, like all human endeavors, is a social institution. Scientists belong to communities that include not only other scientists but intercessors (Radnitzky, 1973) or clients (Busch and Lacy, 1983). To begin, it is useful to conceptualize science, and especially the agricultural sciences, using an "economic" model of science (Busch et al., 1991).

In this model we note that science has both a supply and a demand, but this supply and demand are not always mediated by a market; indeed, they are more often mediated by negotiations, persuasion, and even coercion (Busch, 1980). Consider the supply first. Scientists, at any given point in time, are able to investigate many aspects of nature. For example, wheat breeders might breed for yield, disease resistance, insect resistance, drought tolerance, grain quality, or earliness, to name just a few possibilities. Being mortal, however, they can never investigate all of the possible paths. They must choose between them. There are several ways that a scientist can choose among these multiple goals. For example, he or she can rely on the work of other scientists, do what is easy to do, do what can be done within a particular time frame, do what he or she finds to be interesting, or listen to (potential) clients. Latour (1983, 1984) has noted that Pasteur specifically chose those topics that appeared likely to permit his laboratory to succeed in its work. In addition, Pasteur insisted that farmers using his new anthrax vaccine restructure their barns to look more like his laboratories. Finally, note that the supply of science, unlike the supply of widgets, is heterogeneous and hypothetical. Only after the science has reached its final stages—after it has become material—can a product be said to exist at all.

At the same time, clients have various things or processes that they desire or need. However,

these are demands for hypothetical products, for things that do not as yet (or may never) exist. These form the "demand" for science and other social changes. Krohn and Schafer (1983) have noted that Justus Liebig developed the entire field of Agricultural Chemistry as a result of societal demands. Agricultural chemistry was to be a chemistry applied to the problems of agriculture, and specifically to the problems of plant nutrition. Of course, not all farmers but only a select few urged the development of agricultural chemistry. The same would doubtless be true of other demands for science as the needs of clients are not (normally) homogeneous. They vary greatly by status, class, ethnicity, region, etc. Moreover, some clients are more articulate than others in expressing their needs or desires. Finally, only a small portion of the needs of clients are addressable through science and technology.

Of course, neither scientists nor their clients are entirely free to make the world over as they please. Both operate within a political economy defined by structures which are themselves subject to negotiation in other contexts. In capitalist societies, as Kautsky noted nearly a century ago, science and business are intimately linked, particularly within the agricultural sector (Banaji, 1980).

In short, nature is literally made or "manufactured" through the efforts of scientists (Knorr-Cetina, 1981) within the structural limitations posed by the larger society. Plants are made shorter or taller, more or less ripe, faster growing, sweeter tasting, more resistant to lodging. Animals are made to produce more milk, to be leaner, to grow faster on a given ration, to be docile when attended by humans. And, raw nature—the wilderness—is made to retreat, is replaced by the manufactured nature that we have produced collectively.

Other creatures also make nature in this way. Birds rearrange dead wood and other objects into nests for their young. Ants build complex underground habitats with miles of tunnels. Bees

build hives. But none of these other creatures appear to do it on the scale or in the enormously diverse and systematic ways that are common to human beings. Nor do they appear to do it knowingly. This suggests that the social production of nature is not a new phenomenon, that it has its roots in—but transcends—biology⁽²⁾. It also makes it clear that it has not grown out of the natural sciences, much less the new biotechnologies. It is as old as human history. Therefore, to understand its origins, we must turn first to the history of plant improvement.

Historical Perspective on Plant Improvement

We may divide the history of plant improvement⁽³⁾ into five more or less distinct periods each building on the previous one. The first period was marked by the creation of agriculture. Probably beginning with the clearing of brush from in front of dwellings, people learned that individual seeds could be planted to yield crops (Rindos, 1980). Over the centuries farmers selected seed from the plants with the largest yields of edible parts for replanting the following year, resulting in the hypertrophy of those parts over the centuries (Bannerot, 1986). These selections were based nearly entirely on appearance, on what Galileo called the secondary qualities. All of the crop plants that we eat today were radically changed by this process. Most have been domesticated in the full sense of the word: they cannot exist without human intervention just as we cannot exist without them. To put it another way, we have co-evolved.

The second phase in plant breeding only began in the eighteenth century when commercial plant breeders began to appear. These persons were the first to separate the occupation of breeding from that of farming. However, the techniques they employed were much like those of farmers. Trial and error was widely employed, supplemented by more careful searches for exotic materials,

something for which most farmers had little time. By the nineteenth century commercial breeding as a separate enterprise was so widespread that Darwin was able to base his theory of natural selection on the domestic selection of breeders (Mulkay, 1979).

The third phase of plant breeding came into being with the so-called rediscovery of Mendel⁽⁴⁾ at the turn of the century. Unlike the centuries of breeding that came before it, the Mendelian approach offered the possibility of theoretically guided experiment. Moreover, Mendelian genetics postulated the existence of "factors" (i.e., genes) that could account for the variation displayed to the senses. Put differently, Mendelian genetics posited the existence of primary qualities invisible to the naked eye that created what appeared. Mendelian genetics speeded up the rate of progress in breeding, but it also took the selection process away from farmers. A turn of the century guide to wheat breeding was still able to argue that any farmer could undertake a breeding program (Carleton, 1900). By the 1930s, this was entirely out of the question.

The fourth phase in plant breeding was the development of double-cross hybrids. These cultivars represented another step toward the displacement of secondary with primary qualities. Moreover, while there is considerable dispute over whether hybrids display heterosis (hybrid vigor), these new seeds were of interest to a segment of the plant improvement community for other reasons (Berlan and Lewontin, 1986). In particular, unlike varieties, hybrids would not breed true so the seed of hybrids could not be planted to obtain a crop in the following year. Seed became an input to be purchased off the farm on an annual basis (Kloppenburg, 1988). In the terms used by Goodman, Sorj and Wilkinson (1987), seed production (at least for hybrid crops) was fully appropriated from the farm.

It is important to note that much of this change in the third and fourth periods occurred in the US in the name of efficiency. The Progressive era of

the early part of the century brought concerns about efficiency, organization, and productivity to the farm (Hays, 1959). The Country Life Commission, headed by leading agricultural scientists of the day, saw the twin goals of organization and efficiency as the clear path through which rural America would keep up with the rest of the nation (Country Life Commission, 1911). And, with Taylorism rampant in the factories of the nation, American scientists were busily attempting to increase the efficiency of the farm. That the very processes then set into motion would transform the values they wished to maintain went unnoticed by the reformers.

The last decade has been marked by the fifth and final phase of plant improvement: the advent of the new biotechnologies. These new technologies hold within them the potential to transform nature in ways far more profound than ever before (Busch et al., 1991). They hold the promise of even ending farm production entirely and its replacement with off-farm production (Rogoff and Rawlins, 1985). These new technologies mark the final step in the socialization of nature, in the transformation of nature into resources, in the transformation of relations between Man and nature into relations between people and the environment.

Consider the consequences. Each stage in the history of plant improvement has been marked by the social construction of nature. But, at the same time, each stage has been marked by a growing awareness of the very fact of social construction itself. Our remote ancestors filled nature with spirits and gods. Nature was to be feared, because it was populated by evil spirits, because it was to be found outside of the boundaries of the known. Yet, the personifications of nature—that made nature known as that which is unknowable—were entirely the product of human imagination.

With the rise of modern science, and the abandoning of secondary for primary qualities, nature was demythologized. The

anthropomorphisms used to describe it were removed. At the same time, the goals of knowledge were gradually transformed from understanding to an explicit recognition of control (Leiss, 1972). Nature was to be made more human by removing human imagery from it. It was to be restructured, reshaped, recreated to meet the needs and desires—not to say whims—of human civilizations. Nature was to be viewed as mere resources, as what Heidegger (1977) called “standing reserve,” there and available for the taking by whosoever had the power to take and transform them. Each stage in the history of plant improvement marks both the increasing ability to make nature in our own image and the increasing inability to find our image in nature. On the brink of obtaining almost Promethean control over the forms that we shall make nature take, at the moment when nature is more than at any moment ours, we find nothing recognizable in nature.

At the same time, nature is itself replaced almost imperceptibly, by the environment. The transformation in language is revealing since we define nature as the essential or constitutive character of the world. We are a fundamental part of nature and it is a part of us. The environment, on the other hand merely surrounds us. Like a cloak it may be removed and even discarded.

Historical Perspective on Food

The other side of agriculture is food. Much of what is grown in the field is transformed into food products. The ingestion of food occupies a peculiar status in human societies since it involves the entry of foreign matter into the body. If nature was once the unknown, then food represents a fundamental way in which we communicated with that unknown. Food consumption in all societies is not merely a matter of ingesting nutrients, but always a matter laden with symbolism and meaning. The imagery of the Last Supper, of bread and wine, the prohibition against pork in Judaism and Islam, against beef in

Hinduism are all part of the complex and varied ways that food permits a communion with nature. Moreover, in non-industrialized societies, food production and consumption are intimately linked; what happens in the fields is inextricably tied to what happens in the kitchen.

Even when it is possible to do so, food is almost never consumed without some sort of transformation. The raw is turned into the cooked not only because cooking aids digestion or makes the food easier to consume, but because cooking removes pollution and enhances purity. What enters the body must first be purified by the ritual of cooking (Levi-Strauss, 1969). Eating, too, required certain rituals to purify further the food and to prepare the body to receive it. Such rituals include washing hands before eating, not using the left hand, saying grace, as so on.

The transformation of food has proceeded alongside that of agriculture, but it has taken several paths. First, agriculture and food have been institutionally separated. Second, certain aspects of food selection and preparation have been removed from the kitchen. Third, the kitchen itself has been transformed so as to make it conform more satisfactorily to the new norms. Let us briefly examine each of these in turn.

Anyone who has ever grown a few vegetables in a small garden and later cooked and eaten them knows the pleasure of eating that which one has produced. Until the eighteenth century virtually everyone had this small pleasure. However, the combined effects of the enclosures, the rapid growth of industry, and the specialization of farmers in the production of just a few commodities began the still ongoing severance of farming and food preparation. It also meant the beginning of the decline of local knowledge of both farming and food preparation. This period should not in any sense be seen as idyllic; nevertheless, it was a time in which craft knowledge was essential. Farmers might be forced to work for others, but the knowledge they had could not be easily appropriated by the ruling

class. Similarly, people might cook for others but the ruling class would not appropriate the knowledge of cooking itself. This situation endured until about two centuries ago when a significant transition began.

Consumers were gradually distanced from the fresh produce they were accustomed to consuming. First, more and more of what people consumed was purchased in the market. This drastically reduced the purchaser's knowledge of the origins of the foods. However, it was still possible to rely on direct observation to discern the quality of the food to be purchased. Later, as canned and frozen foods were introduced, it became much less clear just what was being purchased. Contents labelling replaced visual inspection and although pictures were often printed on the labels, the actual contents frequently was of considerably lower quality than the contents. Government agencies were established to insure that what was in the package was accurately described on the outside, and that minimal health and safety precautions were followed.

However, the ingredients of packages remained relatively comprehensible to consumers. Only a few preservatives whose origin was unknown to consumers were included in processed foods. Thus, food remained both comprehensible—fitted within the generally accepted categories of experience as ingredients—and apprehensible—immediately recognizable as a known substance. A few ingredients did begin to appear that were not apprehensible (e.g., BHT) and probably incomprehensible to most consumers.

The next phase in the transformation of food occurred with the shifting of the grounds of discourse away from ingredients to nutrients. Under the new regime, nutrients were to be listed as to quantity (in the United States always in grams while packages are in English measure) and percent of recommended daily allowances (RDAs). In contrast, ingredients were merely to

be listed on packages in descending order by weight. The introduction of nutrient labelling and the gradual downplaying of ingredients moved the discourse to "things" that are clearly non-apprehensible (e.g., carbohydrates) and perhaps incomprehensible to most consumers. Put differently, the primary qualities were gradually allowed to take precedence over the secondary ones. As a result, instead of choosing foods from a limited number of food groups, consumers were faced with the much more complex (and more mystifying) task of choosing foods based on nutrient content and contribution to RDAs.

The final stage in the transformation of food occurs when the product is reconstituted in such a way that it is no longer comprehensible. This is occurring in two ways that, so to speak, operate from different ends but arrive at a central point where they join together. On the one hand, the creation of fabricated foods treats agricultural products as raw materials to be used in the manufacture of food products. As one proponent of fabricated foods puts it, these foods "differ from conventional foods in that their basic components—proteins, fats, and carbohydrates—may be derived from many sources and combined, along with necessary micronutrients, flavors, and colors, to form an alternative product" (Stanley, 1986:65). Of particular note here is that the products created this way and offered to consumers would not have to resemble, even superficially, existing food products, although for reasons of advertising, companies might well prefer to give them recognizable form. Such recognition would be only superficial, somewhat like the plastic food items displayed in Tokyo restaurant windows. In other words, the appearance would give no clue as to the contents of the product. The Galilean distinction between primary and secondary qualities would finally hold since the secondary qualities would have been rendered truly illusory!

At the same time, the use of biotechnology to

transform plants and animals will make possible the creation of "functional attribute crops" that are particularly amenable to food fabrication. Such crops would be designed by incorporating genetic materials from other organisms (and perhaps eventually wholly new organisms?) so as to maximize or optimize the production of wanted nutrients and chemicals. The two would meet where biotechnology was used to produce new foods that truly are "without reference to ... previous history," and that require little or no transformation after they are grown in order to be sold to consumers. Such foods might even be advertised as "natural."

However, this is only a part of what is happening. Two other phenomena are of great importance here. First, the continued differentiation of food products has led to bewilderment in the supermarket. No consumer, no matter how well educated, can possibly afford the time to make rational choices amongst the 30,000 or more items on supermarket shelves. Moreover, that number is growing daily at a phenomenal rate. Thus, the knowledge of appearances that guided food preparation for millenia is being (not so gradually) eroded by the restructuring of the food industry. At the same time, the local knowledge of secondary qualities that consumers have is being replaced with scientific knowledge of primary qualities in a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy: As the food system becomes more and more complex, local knowledge of taste, texture, color, and flavor become less and less meaningful. The beautiful round red tomato may be all but inedible. No longer can freshness be judged by direct observation; foods in sealed containers can only be judged fresh according to dating systems that are themselves the product of lengthy and continued negotiation. Similarly, no longer can one casually glance at foods and determine something about their nutritional value. Food becomes merely a simulation fabricated by the food companies in the name of nutrition! And, as Baudrillard (1983) has suggested, there may be

nothing at all behind the simulation.

Moreover, the same quest for efficiency and organization that transformed farming, also transformed the kitchen. In particular, the appropriation and substitution that Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson (1987) note on the farm also occurred in the kitchen. Paradigmatic of these changes is the work of Fanny Farmer. Until that and other similar cookbooks were published in the late nineteenth century, cooking proceeded by guesswork and practical experience. A pinch of salt or a dash of pepper, a measure of flour or a spoonful of sugar were the commonly used ingredients in food. Fanny Farmer introduced standard weights and measures into cooking transforming it from an art into a science. This simplified greatly the task of learning to cook, but it also removed the source of knowledge about cooking from older generations to the cookbook writers. Moreover, it required not merely that one follow the recipes but that one reorganize the kitchen around the new recipes. New measuring devices had to be purchased, new rules had to be learned, new procedures had to be employed.

Concomitant with the changes in recipes was the move to create efficiency in the kitchen by redesigning it, by reducing the number of steps one had to walk, by standardizing the heights of countertops, the construction of stoves, the design of tables (Giedion, 1975). The open hearth would be replaced by the wood, coal, and later electric or gas stove.

While it is self-evident that the changes noted above have occurred, it is not yet clear just why they occurred. In order to answer that question, we need to pose two others: We need to know how the world was won and we need to know how the world was (made) one.

How the World was won: Botany and Colonialism

The explorations of Columbus and others in the 15th and 16th century marked a turning point

in world history. Not only were empires built; botanical exchanges of enormous magnitude transformed agriculture and food preparation and even whole ecosystems.

The botanical gardens were the first line of offense in the development of colonial empires (Brockway, 1979). By establishing the gardens, European nation states were able to transfer systematically plant materials from one habitat to another. In the tropical colonies, where most temperate crops did poorly, industrial crops replaced food crops. Rubber was taken from Brazil to establish plantations in Malaya. Tea was taken from China to establish plantations in India and Ceylon. Coffee was removed from Ethiopia to found plantations in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America. Cocoa was introduced in Ghana and the Ivory Coast. Oil palm and coconut palm plantations were established in numerous colonies. In smaller areas spice plantations were established along similar lines. These changes had the combined effect of removing millions of peasants from the direct production of their own subsistence and facilitating or forcing their entry into the global economy. Moreover, it had the simultaneous effect of devaluing the knowledge of farmers (made useless by the change of crops) and splitting the procurement and preparation of food for the household from the process of farming. From that time forward in the tropics, food and agriculture would begin to be divorced.

A different tactic was taken with respect to the temperate colonies. There, cultivated plants and animals from Europe were introduced, replacing much or all of the native ecosystems with European crops. This process was so profound that Crosby (1986) has used the term "neo-Europes" to describe these areas. In these areas, Western farmers developed more and more specialized farms in which production and consumption were fully separated and in which scientific principles triumphed over local knowledge, in which primary qualities appeared

to reveal the inaccuracy and inadequacy of secondary qualitics.

The two strategies had the combined effect of restructuring nature along Western lines. In the Neo-Europes Western crops, livestock, and even weeds and pests replaced the traditional agriculture and even eliminated many wild species. In the tropics where Western crops would not grow, the form of Western agriculture could be introduced. Fields henceforth had straight rows and rectangular shape. Animal traction was introduced where it was not used previously. Monocultures replaced polycultures. Nature would be poured into the mold supplied by the west, and more often than not the locals were poured into that mold as well (Goonatilake, 1982a). For example, a century ago one Belgian agronomist, Edmond Leplae, encouraged the forced growing of cotton in the newly founded colony of Congo. Jules Comet (1965:138), in an apologia for the now defunct Belgian research service, INEAC, quotes Leplae approvingly:

In a very backward country, the temporary use of obligatory crops is often necessary in order to insure for the indigenous population regular and sufficient nourishment and to introduce export crops, which will be the principal sources of prosperity and well-being for the natives (my translation).

Nevertheless, the colonization of the world was not sufficient to create the uniformity that now is a threat to world agriculture. Nor was it sufficient to create the divorce between food and agriculture that is now visible on a world scale. That would await the development of high yielding varieties in the 20th century.

How the World Was (Made) One: High Yielding Varieties

If the colonial restructuring of agriculture won the world for the European powers, it hardly

made the world one. The uniformity it produced involved the increasing dependence on a small number of crops but within each crop great variety existed. However, the changes in the world food order during this century fundamentally changed the within-species variance of planted crops by limiting production to a small number of high-yielding cultivars. This was done first in the US in the 1930s with the development of hybrid corn and then later in the developing nations with the Green Revolution varieties of wheat and rice. The net effect was to reduce variation in the field —among both cultivars and farmers— to a precipitous degree.

The net effects of these changes has been to create two crises: a crisis in the fields as agricultural production is haunted by the twin dangers of genetic vulnerability and genetic uniformity, and a crisis in the kitchen as members of households (now in their relatively new roles as consumers) lose control over what they eat and the meanings associated with it.

Conclusions: Manufacturing Plants

We are now on the verge of yet another set of major changes in the nature of what we grow, what we eat, and consequently who we are. However, unlike the previous changes described above that were introduced without much reflexive thought as to their consequences, we have a set of choices open to us. The new biotechnologies can be used to manufacture plants in manufacturing plants (Rogoff and Rawlins, 1985). Or they can be used to reunite food and agriculture in a new way. Let me note what I am not proposing first: There is no way that biotechnology can provide us with a technical fix, a simple way out of the current dilemmas that confront us. Nor can we say that biotechnology represents technology out of control; technology is only out of control if a factory explodes or a vat leaks. Otherwise, technology is always under the

control of someone or some organization. On the other hand, the new biotechnologies confront us with a rather awesome question: What kind of nature do we want?⁽⁵⁾ If we can answer that question collectively, then we can ask what kind of biotechnologies might be useful in helping us to achieve that kind of nature. But we may go further yet: Since the way that we treat nature is indicative —no, an essential part— of the way in which we treat each other, the nature we want must be one that is humane, caring, and befitting of ourselves as moral beings. This, I submit, we can only accomplish by reuniting food and agriculture once more. Moreover, this cannot be done through some mass return to the land as we have already come too far. It will require instead that we develop new institutional mechanisms to link food and agriculture, institutions that allow us to show our care for each other through our reverence for nature. The need for these institutions is manifested every time that someone looks into a petri dish and sees a new form of culture. The form that culture takes will reveal something about both the cells in the dish and us, for in the final analysis there is no way to separate our cultural evolution from theirs.

In sum, we may need to undo the legacy of Galileo. We may need to recapture the appearances (Barfield, 1965), to revision the world as one in which we co-evolve with other organisms as part of nature. Ironically, this is an old idea that is embedded in many traditional religions around the world. We have spent much of the last 300 years attempting to wipe it from our collective memories. Yet, it still remains in the faces of farmers in the so-called marginal areas of the earth. We need to learn from them what we have forgotten, we need to find and reflect on the appearances (Kass, 1985), because without the appearances, the world begins to lose its meaning and we find ourselves drawn into the abyss. Perhaps Galileo would have done well to

heed the Zen proverb:

For the man who is ignorant, trees are trees, waters are waters and mountains are mountains. When that man gains understanding, then trees are not trees, waters are not waters, mountains are not mountains. And when, at last, he attains wisdom, then once again, trees are trees, waters are waters, and mountains are mountains.

Notes:

1. I do not argue that such a reunification is the "true" way to see the world. In contrast, I do believe that it is a better way. Moreover, as with all positions of this type, its betterness will only be verified by the development of a new consensus.

2. Admittedly, the degree to which other animals make nature is a speculative topic. It appears that making requires some understanding of the significance of what is being made. If so, then it would appear that most other animals have relatively little consciousness and do they do instinctively. However, see Waddington (1971).

3. As the discussion above suggests, what counts as an improvement is itself the subject of negotiation amongst various parties.

4. The discovery of Mendel suggests that many people in the hybrydist camp knew of the relationship that Mendel had so carefully documented. However, they also knew that they only held for certain characters such as those chosen by Mendel for his experiments. Other characters appeared to occur randomly. In addition, Mendel's work shed light on a debate over continuous versus discontinuous variation that did not even exist in 1865 (Brannigan, 1981).

5. This is not to say that we have capability of deciding precisely what kind of nature we want. This, too, would be a naive form of technological utopism. But we can — perhaps, must — decide in what general direction to go, or risk destroying the nature of which we are a part.

References

BANAJI, Jarius

1980 "Summary of selected parts of kautsky's the agrarian question" Pp. 39-82 in Frederick H. Buttell and Howard Newby (eds.) *The Rural Sociology of the Advanced Societies*. Montclair, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun.

BANNEROT, Hubert

1986 "L'Evolution de l'amélioration des variétés de légumes." Pp. 53-64 in Bureau des Ressources Génétiques (ed.) *La Diversité des Plantes Legumierées: Hier, Aujourd'hui et Demain*. Paris: Bureau des Ressources Génétiques.

BARFIELD, Owen

1965 *Saving the Appearances*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.

BAUDRILLARD, Jean

1983 *Simulations*. New York: Semiotext(e).

BERLAN, Jean-Pierre and Richard Lewontin

1986 "Breeders' rights and patenting life forms." *Nature*, 322 (28 August): 785-788.

BRANNIGAN, Augustine

1981 *The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

BROCKWAY, Lucile H

1979 *Science and Colonial Expansion: The Role of the British Royal Botanic Gardens*. New York: Academic Press.

BUSCH, Lawrence

1980 "Structure and negotiation in the agricultural sciences." *Rural Sociology*, Vol. 45 (1):26-48.

BUSCH, Lawrence and William. B. Lacy

1983 *Science, Agriculture, and the Politics of Research*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. (Rural Studies Series of the Rural Sociological Society.)

BUSCH, Lawrence, William B. Lacy, Jeffery. Burkhardt, and Michael Hansen

1991 *Plants, Profits and Power: Social and Ethical Aspects of the New Plant Biotechnologies*. London: Basil Blackwell, forthcoming.

COUNTRY Life Commission

1911 [1909] *Report of the Commission on Country Life*. New York: Sturgis and Walton.

CROSBY, Alfred W.

1986 *Ecological Imperialism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

DRAKE, Stillman

1978 *Galileo at Work: His Scientific Biography*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- GIEDJON, Siegfried**
 1975 **Mechanization Takes Command.** New York:
 W.W. Norton.
- GOODMAN, David; Bernado Sorj; and John Wilkinson**
 1987 **From Farming to Biotechnology: A Theory
 of Agro-Industrial Development.** Oxford:
 Basil Blackwell.
- GOONALILAKE, Susantha**
 1982 **Crippled Minds: An Exploration into
 Colonial Culture.** New Delhi: Vikas Publishing
 House.
- GOULD, Wilbur A**
 1983 **Tomato Production, Processing and Quality
 Evaluation.** Westport, CT: AVI Publishing
 Company, Second Edition.
- HAYS, Samuel P.**
 1959 **Conservation of the Gospel of Efficiency.**
 Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- KASS, Leon R**
 1985 **Toward a More Natural Science.** New York:
 Free Press.
- LEVI-Strauss, Claude**
 1969 **The raw and the cooked.** Translated from the
 French by John and Doreen Weighuman. New
 York, Harper & Row.
- MULKAY, Michael**
 1979 **Science and the Sociology of Knowledge.**
 London: George Allen and Unwin.
- NAGEL, Ernest**
 1979 **Theology revisited and other essays in the
 philosophy and history of science.** New York:
 Columbia University Press.
- RADNITZKY, Gerard**
 1973 **Contemporary Schools of Metascience.**
 Chicago: Henry Regnery, Third edition.
- RANDOLPH, S. R. and Carolyn Sachs**
 1981 "The establishment of applied sciences:
 agriculture and medicine compared." Pp. 83-
 112 in L. Busch(ed.), **Science and Agricultural
 Development.** Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun.
- ROGOFF, Martin H. and Stephen L. Rawlins**
 1985 "Food security: a technological alternative."
BioScience, Vol. 37 (11):800-807.
- STANLEY, D. W**
 1986 "Chemical and structural determinants of texture
 of fabricated foods" **Food Technology**,
 (March): 65-68, 76.
- THOMPSON, Paul**
 1990 "Risk objectivism and risk subjectivism: when
 risks are real." **Risk - Issues in Health and
 Safety** Vol. 1 (Winter):3-22.
- WADDINGTON, Conrad**
 1971 **Biology, Purpose, and Ethics.** Worcester,
 MA: Clark University Press.

RESUMEN**INDUSTRIALIZANDO EL CULTIVO:
*Notas sobre la cultura de la naturaleza
 y la naturaleza de la cultura.***

Los términos "cultura" y "naturaleza" tienen significados ambigüos en la mayoría de las sociedades occidentales. El de Cultura es utilizado para denotar el conjunto de costumbres y patrones de comportamiento que tienen las sociedades. Asimismo, también significa el cultivo de plantas o de microorganismos en una cápsula de Pietri. El de Naturaleza es utilizado para designar aquellos aspectos del mundo que nos rodean, así como también, para dar por sentado lo que es normal o "natural". Esta ambigüedad está particularmente bien reflejada en los actuales debates sobre la siembra biotecnológica y la conservación de plasma germlinal. La tesis de este artículo es que la utilidad de la distinción naturaleza cultura ha terminado. Las nuevas biotecnologías ilustran, a través de las más dramáticas vías, cómo nos apropiamos y re hacemos la naturaleza, mientras miramos los beneficios de la conservación del plasma germlinal comprometiendo colectivamente lo que la naturaleza ha hecho en miles de años. De este modo, la naturaleza ya no es natural; ella es un producto de la cultura. Por otro lado, la naturaleza es también culturizada. Similarmente, la cultura es un producto de la naturaleza; ella es naturaleza en sus orígenes pero no en su contenido.

Lawrence Busch es profesor de Sociología de la Universidad Estatal de Michigan. Es coautor del reciente libro: **Plants, Power, and Profit: Social, Economic and Ethical Consequences of the New Biotechnologies** (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991). Actualmente está trabajando sobre los problemas asociados a la conservación del plasma germlinal en distintas naciones y sobre la reestructuración técnica de los subsectores de la producción agrícola.

Symbolic and Social Aspects in the Working of the Food System

Maria Fonte

This paper wants to shed light on some aspects of the food system which are particularly relevant for the understanding of the consequences of the globalization process. This task is carried out in reference to both the intensification of accumulation in the sphere of preparation and consumption of food in developed countries, and the destruction of local diets and of local social systems in less developed countries. It is argued that these consequences are better understood from the point of view of the social and symbolic relevance of food consumption. This approach advocates the integration at the analytic level of the different segments of the food system: production, distribution, preparation and consumption. The analysis of the social and symbolic significance of food consumption (how we eat and why we eat what we eat) may also create the premises for a revision of the "food security" concept articulated in national and international food aid policies.

Maria Fonte is Professor of Sociology at "Centro di Specializzazione e Ricerche Economico - Agrarie per il Mezzogiorno," Potici, Italy. She has researched various topics including the structure of agriculture and the political economy of food. Dr. Fonte is the author of numerous articles published domestically and internationally and a graduate of the University of Napoli (Italy).

Introduction

In the economic analysis of the food system, two phases are usually completely neglected: the preparation and the consumption of food—"the kitchen" and "the table", as Goody (1982) put it. With them, we lose the non-nutritional and non-economical—i.e. symbolic, cultural and social—meanings of the food system.

With rare exceptions, the preparation and consumption of food are confined to anthropological and psycho-sociological literatures, which traditionally downplay the socio-economic aspects of these issues. This situation reflects the separate dimensions in which the different segments of the food system are located in industrial societies. While the phases of production and distribution are integrated in the domain of the market economy, the phases of food preparation and consumption have long been confined to the family context.

In pre-industrial society, the four spheres are strictly interrelated and often carried out outside the market economy (Goody, 1982:47).

(*)This article is a revised version of the paper "Non nutritional aspects in the working of the food system", by Maria Fonte and Marcello Gorgoni, which was prepared for presentation at the XII World Congress of the International Sociological Association (RC40, Sociology of Agriculture) Madrid, 9-13 July 1990. I wish to acknowledge the contribution of Marcello Gorgoni and to thank Bruno Benvenuti, Alessandro Bonanno, Harriet Friedmann and Phil McMichael for their helpful comments to earlier drafts of this study.

The deepening of market relations modified this situation. In the advanced societies, the spheres of food preparation and consumption are transformed and organized by market mechanisms in a process that is specific of the intensive accumulation⁽¹⁾. Food preparation moves increasingly from the kitchen to the factory (Goody, 1982) and dining from home to public places: cafeterias, restaurants, fast food outlets, food stands in airports or train stations, etc. Food related systems in underdeveloped countries are absorbed into market relations by process of global transnationalization⁽²⁾.

The incorporation of the social significance of food consumption in the socio-economic analysis of food systems is very important for a number of reasons. First of all, it would push in the direction of a greater understanding of the complexity of human behavior in this field, elevating the debate from considerations of food as "an abstract item in accounts" to food as "a concrete item that is 'eaten' rather than 'consumed'" (Barthes, 1979:166). Second, the analysis of motivations which constitute the base of human behavior with respect to food consumption may facilitate the understanding of the mechanisms which tend to manipulate needs and may be useful in the design of more effective and farsighted strategies of food policies.

As the extreme variability of manners of food consumption indicate, nutritional goals only explain a small, even if fundamental, part of consumption motivations. In a different context, analyzing the relations between ethics and economics, Sen (1987) showed how economics may become more productive if a deeper and more explicit attention is given to the different motivations which inform the human behavior. For sociologists and anthropologists as well, the integration of social and cultural aspects with the economical ones is proving very fertile, as the work of Goody (1982) and Lindenbaum (1986) shows.

The overcoming of the separation between socio-economic and socio-anthropological analyses of the food system requires significant empirical and theoretical work. Obviously this work cannot be completed in the length of this

article. Nevertheless, initial steps in this direction can be taken.

The following section of this paper introduces a brief review of some important studies on the cultural and social dimensions of food preparation and consumption. The third proposes an interpretation of the modern food system as an organic part of modern society, pointing to some of the social consequences of the intensification of commodity relations in the advanced societies and the extension of the dominant model of food consumption to less developed countries. Finally, the need for a social critique of "food transfer" as the pillar of food aid and food security policies is advocated.

The social and cultural significance of food consumption

The symbolic value of food.

In primitive societies, food is not like any other good. The rules which govern its exchange are completely specific; indeed, food is often not exchanged at all within the group, as it is the foundation of its identity and solidarity. The groups designated "the other" or "different" are described pejoratively as eaters of food regarded as inedible by the "us" of the group. On the contrary, food that is a taboo for a group may be an item of exchange with other groups:

"Traditional food cannot always be treated as any other thing. Food is a vital element of primarily necessity, often symbolic of hearth and home, if not of the mother. Compared to other things, food is shared more promptly, more from need, while a cloth made of bark or pearls are more suited to the exchange of gifts. Food transactions are a sensitive barometer, almost a ritual declaration of social relationships and food is used as a mechanism for starting, maintaining and distributing sociability. Within a large social sector where money is exchanged with other things, food is protected against monetary (counterfeit) transactions and is often shared, but rarely sold. Food is too much based on use for it to have value for exchange" (Sahlins, in Grendi, 1972).

However, the symbolic value of food is not confined to primitive societies. Even in modern capitalist society, production and consumption are not, by definition, exclusively economic in nature, nor are they without symbolic meaning. "Usefulness" is not a quality of the object, but one of meanings of objective qualities. "The reasons Americans deem dogs inedible and cattle "food" is no more perceptible to the senses than is the price of meat" (Sahlins, 1976: 169). Sahlins himself devotes some excellent passages to food preferences and taboos surrounding domestic animals in western culture today:

"...the productive relation of American society to its own and the world environment is organized by specific valuations of edibility and inedibility, themselves qualitative and in no way justifiable by biological, ecological, or economic advantage. The functional consequences extend from agricultural 'adaptation' to international trade and world political relations. The exploitation of the American environment, the mode of relation to the landscape, depends on the model of a meal that includes a central meat element with the peripheral support of carbohydrates and vegetables ... Hence also a corresponding structure of agricultural production of feed grains, and in turn a specific articulation to world markets - all of which would change overnight if we ate dogs (Sahlins, 1976:171).

Like Levi-Strauss, Sahlins gives to the antinomy edible-non-edible a significance of universal value: the integration of the diverse animal species into human society. It is this symbolic logic which organizes demand and gives different economic value to "better" or "inferior" cuts, for example, according to a logic that would be difficult to defend on the ground of nutritional or economic arguments (Sahlins, 1976:175). However we will not take here into consideration the analyses which aim at underlining structures of universalistic relevance implied in schemes of food consumption. We

would like rather to shed light on the relationship between the symbolic significance of food consumption and the social system, of which it is a part. We would also like to point out that, being the foundation of processes of group solidarity and identification, the symbolic dimension of food consumption follows society's articulation and differentiation.

Food consumption in relation to processes of Nation-State and classes formation.

If the food system is a system of communication, integrated in the social system to which it belongs (Barthes, 1979; Douglas and Isherwood, 1979), the reference of the identification process changes, in relation to the different forms of social organizations and institutions, historically and geographically possible. The cuisine, taken as a "totality of practices relating to food and symbolic value assigned to it" (Gallini, 1987:194), may be analyzed as signifying different national and class cultures and structures.

According to Barthes (1979) in fact, the significance of elements that constitute a food system is specific to its culture. This is true for the meaning of sugar or the concept of "crispy" for the Americans in the United States, or for wine in France. Mary Douglas (1985a:175) "deciphers" the codes of the structure of "the meal" for the English. Meals require a table, ordered places to sit in and restrictions on movement and alternative activities. Knitting at tables is out of the question. Even at Sunday breakfast, taking up the newspaper is a sign that the meal is finished. The meal imposes its structure on the people involved; the rules which limit and direct a type of social interaction are reflected in the rules that govern the internal order of the meal itself. Drinks are for outsiders, acquaintances and the family, meals are for family, intimate friends and esteemed guests. The "great operator" of the system is the line between intimacy and distance.

Similarly, Goody (1982) contrasts cooking in

West Africa with the culinary practices of the major Eurasia societies throughout history, relating the differences in food preparation and consumption to differences in the articulation of their socio-economic structures. Recently, Appadurai (1988) analyzed cookery books with reference to the formation of post-colonial national cultures.

Further, cuisine reproduces and expresses class and hierarchical relations (Goody, 1982). Social differentiation into classes or groups are represented by differences in taste:

The true principle of the differences encountered in the sphere of consumption and, in many other cases is the contrast between luxury tastes (or of freedom) and tastes of necessity. The former are peculiar to individuals who are the products of material conditions of existence which are defined by the distance from need, from freedom or from comfort, which is based on the possession of capital. The second type express the condition of need, of which they are the result (Bourdieu, 1983:185).

And meals are consumed in different ways by different social classes:

The art of eating and drinking remains, undoubtedly, one of the few fields in which the working classes are explicitly opposed to legitimate art of living. To the new ethic of sobriety, associated with the culture of slimness, encountered more frequently as one ascends the social hierarchy, the peasants and above all the workers offer by contrast a moral of good living (Bourdieu, 1983:189).

On a same line, but in a new context, a system of hierarchical opposition is offered by Batstone (1983), in his description of how meals are consumed in the motor industry, by managers and by production line staff.

Service in the directors' dining room reflects and reaffirms the status of director... In the case of the car assembly worker, the mode

of food provision by the employer reflects a tension between the productive necessity of nutritional provision on the one hand and a consideration of cost and time thrift on the other. If breaks are to be kept short, the employer has to devise means by which several thousand workers can obtain food and drink within a short period of time. Hence a variety of tea and hot water points are provided; canteen staff have meals prepared at the appropriate time and they are served at the fastest possible pace. The mode of provision can therefore best be described as functional ... The emphasis is upon meeting the nutritional requirement of a large number of workers in as short a time as possible

Food provision for the car assembly worker and the director reflect and reaffirm contrasting models of different occupational groups. As one moves up the organizational hierarchy, not only status but also employer trust tend to increase. That is, the director occupies a position of high trust or discretion: he is not bound by detailed rules concerning food and drink, in the same way as he is not highly bound by such rules as to what he should do or how he should do it. The car assembly worker, on the other hand, formally enjoys little discretion over his eating and drinking. This reflects the largely pre-planned minutely timed and closely supervised and controlled nature of his work more generally. Eating and drinking, therefore, reflect the fundamental feature of his low trust (Batstone, 1983:47-8 and 50).

Diets and agribusiness. Food as an organic system in the modern society

Batstone's analysis contains one fundamental difference from the preceding others. The meal described is not consumed within a family system, but in the cafeteria of a car factory. The management of food consumption shifts, in this case, from the private sphere (where there is greater scope for exercising individual liberty in working out different forms and models of food

consumption) to the collective one. It is the management of the factory that decides how meals are to be consumed, transferring into the manners of food consumption the models of men on which the organization of work in the factory is also based. This involves the extension of the commodification process to the spheres of food preparation and consumption, i.e. the intensification of fordist accumulation.

The workers may try to defend themselves, bringing their food from home and trying in some way to create a climate of mealtime conviviality denied them by the rules of efficiency. But the autonomy of individual and private planning in food consumption is enormously decreased. Commodification of food preparation involves necessarily the commodification of the time spent in it, but it can also involve a transformation of diets. This, in such cases, does not necessarily come about through a change of taste, but through the integration of food consumption (and of its symbolic meaning) into the market domain. The transformation is not so much one of the structure of the meal within the family (Douglas, 1985b), as it is the placing of the meal in the diverse spheres of collective life. The commodification of the spheres of food preparation and consumption (i.e. their being mainly determined by market laws) is the way through which the main changes in food consumption in western countries are made today.

So, as for pre-industrial societies (Goody, 1982:47), the separation between the spheres of preparation and consumption, previously governed by family norms, and the spheres of production and distribution, governed by market rules, is disappearing. But, in the post-industrial society, the re-unification occurs in the market domain. As a consequence, there is a tendency for meals consumed outside the domestic sphere and for industrial food consumed at home to increase.

¹The purchase of ready-cooked food became much more common with the growth of

industrial food in those societies where husband and wife are both working .. and where collective action (in the sense of getting together, either for consuming food or for entertainment) is minimal. When leisure activities are carried out within the domestic group itself, there is a trend towards convenience foods. Typical of this is the TV dinner, pioneered in the United States. Electronic communication involves the high consumption of goods, a heavy work-load, plus "home entertainment"; except on festival occasions "home cooking" becomes mainly a question of heating up" (Harris, 1985:188).

Most economic analyses of the transformation of diets (Blasford 1985; Sanderson, 1986; Malassis and Padillas, 1982; Green, 1986) do not explicitly take account of these problems. Consequently, an intensification of market relation is often, implicitly or explicitly, presented as an autonomous (i.e. exogenous) shift in demand and in consumers' tastes.

Indeed, in an always more internationalized economic context, agribusiness increases its influence on the variable elements of food consumption. The power of the monopoly to structure the field of choice of the dominated operates at different levels: at the economic level through the destruction of (the same possibility of) autonomous food systems —i.e. food production and distribution (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989), but also food preparation and consumption—and at a cultural level, through the de-specification of the symbolic value of food consumption.

In his description of the eating habits of an English rural family, Newby (1983) shows how the development of agribusiness destroys the possibility of self-sufficiency in the English provinces. Like the urban population, the rural family is obliged to buy food at the supermarket, sometimes even at higher prices.

While food was not treated like "any other thing" (Sahlins, 1972) among primitive peoples, with the industrialization of agriculture, a process

of de-specification and commodification of food was set in motion. Like the automobile or an electrical appliance, food is produced by the multinational company in order to be sold; that is to make profits. "Good to eat" corresponds to "good to sell" (Harris, 1985). Nowadays, the extent of this process is testified by the U.S. refusal to consider food security as a valid justification for protectionist policies.

Commodification of food operates also at — and through the— symbolic and the social level. The emergence of fast food is connected not only to the interests of the soya/com/meat multinational complex, but also to the lifestyle of the typical North American family, composed of the working couple, for whom the occasional suburban barbecue is a typical social event (Harris, 1985). It represents, then, not only an economic, but also a social model, in which the partial elimination of family life as place of socialization becomes the condition for the emergence of new (modern) forms of socialization and communication through food.

The loss of specificity of food itself corresponds to the loss of specificity of the situations it represents and symbolizes. In the global economy there is no legitimization for diversity. Better, diversity is organized through hierarchical lines, going from the most backward to the most modern. The determinant element in the scale of values is not the nutritional or even the economic value of food, but its being "modern", i.e. the attraction of the cultural model it represents. Diet, as any other social system of communication, becomes, generically, the expression of the participation to the modern society:

"energy-giving and light food is experienced as the very sign of, rather than a help toward, participation in modern life. The snack bar not only responds to a new need, it also gives a certain dramatic expression to this need and shows those who frequent it to be modern men, managers who exercise power

and control over the extreme rapidity of modern life.the business lunch emphasizes the gastronomic, and under certain circumstances traditional value of the dishes served and uses this value to stimulate the euphoria needed to facilitate the transaction of business" (Barthes, 1979:172).

If this is true, the problem of transformation of diet cannot be reduced to the simple substitution of one type of foodstuff by another (roots and inferior grains for superior grains and meat). As is already clear from the literature on the transfer of technology, along with the product, a social model (whether of production or consumption) is offered and transferred.

In less developed countries, food consumption becomes one way of representing the participation to the dominant social model. The impact of this model is stronger on the new bourgeois classes. The new elites created, as national states emerged, the "postindustrial and postcolonial middle class (who) is constructing a particular sort of polyglot culture" (Appadurai, 1988:5).

"This spatially mobile class of professionals, along with their more stable class peers in the cities and towns of India, creates a small but important class of consumers characterized by its multiethnic, multicaste, polyglot, and Westernized tastes. This class is linked in particular towns by a network of clubs, social committees, children's schools, cookery classes and residential preferences. They are nationally linked by their tastes in magazines, clothing, film and music, and by their interpersonal networks in many cities" (Appadurai, 1988:5).

This impact is not confined to food consumption, but extends to other spheres of domestic life; taste in the home, furnishing, clothing, etc. (Goody, 1982). Besides being important on particular classes, the impact is strongest in particular spheres; the public spheres, for example, more than in the private:

"While cuisine and manners have remained substantially intact at the domestic level, ... , at the public level this is not the case. For formal occasions, defined in the context of the new life, people will repair to restaurants, the more elaborate of which will offer "European cuisine", though some will serve Ghanaian food as well. Formal occasions require formal food, which tend to be defined as European" (Goody, 1982:178).

The success (or the refusal) of the dominant model of food consumption, of which the fast food⁽³⁾ is one preeminent feature, depends, then, not so much on some inexplicable change of tastes, but mainly on the attraction of the cultural model it represents and signifies, which is publicized not only by the competitive strategies of the multinational companies, but also by the demonstrated effect of the films, television programmes and literature of the dominant culture (Jenkins, 1988).

One recent example of this phenomenon can be brought: the enthusiasm raised by the opening of a McDonald's outlet in Moscow. "McDonald's opens: Moscow goes wild" was a headline in Italy's most widely read newspaper" (*la Repubblica*, 28/29 gennaio 1990). A television news feature reported the comments of Moscow's inhabitants who, three weeks after the opening, continued to form long queues (where did the fast service disappear to?) to eat a McDonald's hamburger while complaining of the high prices (what happened to competitive prices?): "An interesting experience. Restaurants like this have only been seen here in the cinema". At the same time, McDonald's in Moscow means, as the television feature pointed out, technical assistance and various responses to the need of the multinational: courses on cattle rearing and potato seed imports from the US (TG1, News at 13.30; Thursday, February 22nd 1990).

In the same way, the response to the fast food, the slow food movement, founded in Italy a few years ago and itself on the way to

internationalization, is not exclusively or even mainly based on economic or nutritional considerations, but is of a cultural nature. This way of preparing and consuming food is thought to act not only against "anxiety-charged rhythms", but also against the "virus of fast life". The search for lost recipes and for the custom-made lunch is in opposition to fast food and, doubly so, to chemical-ridden agriculture and to a lifestyle that makes of speed a virtue (From the Slow Food movement manifesto).

It is not by chance that Italy is leading the opposition to fast food. Here, it is alleged, the survival of local culinary tradition is so strong—and the tradition of national state so weak—as to hinder for a long time the establishment of either a national cuisine or even a high cuisine. "In Italy at least until very recently, it appears impossible to speak of a high, transregional cuisine" (Appadurai, 1988:4; see also Gallini, 1987).

Conclusión

The consequences of the industrialization of food systems go beyond the nutritional and economic spheres, which are mainly analyzed in the current literature, affecting phenomena of social and symbolic relevance. In the advanced capitalist societies, the partial elimination of food preparation and consumption from the private settings and their commodification are essential and powerful elements through which the process of intensive accumulation promote new forms of re-socialization of people and restructuring of need. To understand these phenomena we need to abandon the claim of traditional economic theory that tastes are exogenous and strictly individualistic. Consumption and production are both part of the same circular process, and both have profound social relevance (Douglas and Isherwood, 1979).

As far as Third World countries are concerned, it would be necessary, at the theoretical level, to apply to the "transfer of food" the same critique

that has been developed for the past twenty years in discussing the transfer of technology. This means evaluating the social and economic impact of a model of food consumption that is largely developed at the center and spreads outward to the periphery, reflecting the availability of resources in rich contexts. As the abundant literature on the subject has already shown (cfr. Friedmann and McMichael, 1989; Singer et al., 1987; Mellor, 1984), food aid has caused a profound transformation in models of consumption and production, after resulting in the disappearance of local products and diets. Although the social effects on domestic organization, food preparation and "table manners" have probably been considerable and relevant to the countries capacity to guarantee food security, these have scarcely been documented until now.

Notes

1. This refers to a regime in which capital organizes not only production, but also the mode of consumption, and in which commodity relations prevail over traditional ones in daily life. See Friedmann (1987) for a description of the international food regime established after WWII and which unifies the extensive and intensive modes of accumulation.

2. While some anthropologists studied the effects of commodification and industrialization on the food systems of some peripheral countries (eg. Godoy, 1982; Appadurai, 1988; Lindenbaum, 1986), sociologist and economists have been reluctant to extend their analyses to both the food preparation and consumption phases and the social significance of food as symbolic and communicative systems.

3. For some people fast food is no longer sufficiently fast. In the US some restaurants have competitions to serve their clients more quickly. "Some have eliminated seating, others are substituting waiters with computers to save time on orders. Even pizza has not been spared in the era of 'zap food'. In Burlington Vermont, a firm has marketed a machine that prepares and cooks a pizza in three minutes. Even preparing a sandwich is becoming too time-consuming. As a result, there is a boom in sales of hamburgers and frozen rolls, which can be rendered edible in 90 seconds with a micro-waves oven" (*La Repubblica*, 10/11 dicembre 1989). Furthermore, an entire industry of frozen pre-prepared

complete meals has already emerged. Now it is possible to have a complete "hot" meal in just a few seconds. The sections of supermarkets devoted to this kind of food are expanding very rapidly.

References

- APPADURAI, Arjun
 1988 "How to Make a National Cuisine: Cookbooks in Contemporary India." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 30 (1):3-24.
- ATKINSON, Paul
 1983 "Eating virtue." in Ann Murcott (ed.), *The Sociology of Food and Eating. Essays on the Sociological Significance of Food*. Gower International Library of Research and Practice.
- ATKINSON, Paul
 1980 "The symbolic significance of health foods." in M. Turner (ed.), *Nutrition and Lifestyles*. London: Applied Science Publisher.
- BARTHES, Roland
 1979 "Toward a psychosociology of contemporary food consumption." Pp 166-173 in Robert Foster and Orest Ranum (ed.), *Food and Drinks in History*. (Selection from the Annals), vol 5 London and Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- BATSTONE, Eric
 1983 "The hierarchy of maintenance and the maintenance of hierarchy: notes on food and industry." Pp. 45-53 in Ann Murcott (ed.), *The Sociology of Food and Eating. Essays on the Sociological Significance of Food*. Gower International Library of Research and Practice
- BLANDFORD, David
 1984 "Changes in food consumption patterns in the OECD area." *European Review of Agricultural Economics*, Vol. 11 (1):43-64.
- BOURDIEU, Pierre
 1983 *La distinzione. Critica sociale del gusto*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- CHANG, K. C. (ed.)
 1977 *Food in Chinese Culture: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives*. Binghamton, N.Y.: Yale University Press.

- CHENG, Wei-Yuan**
 1989 "Testing the food-first hypothesis: a cross-national study of dependency, sectoral growth and food intake in less developed countries." *World Development*, Vol. 17 (1):17-27.
- DOUGLAS, Mary**
 1985a "Decifrare un pasto." Pp.165-191 in *Mary Douglas, Antropologia e Simbolismo*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
 —
 1985b "Il cibo come sistema di comunicazione." Pp. 193-229 in *Mary Douglas, Antropologia e Simbolismo*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- DOUGLAS, Mary and Baron Isherwood**
 1979 *The world of Goods*. New York, Basic Books.
- FRIEDMANN, Harriet**
 1987 "The family farm and international food regimes" in Teodor Shanin (ed.), *Peasants and Peasant Societies*. Oxford: Blackwell.
 —
 1990 "Agro-food industry and export agriculture." Toronto University, Department of Sociology, working paper n.212.
- FRIEDMANN, Harriet and Philip McMichael**
 1989 "Agriculture and the state system. The rise and decline of national agriculture, 1870 to the present." *Sociologia Ruralis*, Vol. 29 (2): 93-117.
- GALLINI, Clara**
 1987 "Il mangia maccheroni e la regina Margherita." *Problemi del Socialismo*, Maggio-Giugno: 26-38.
- GOODY, Jack**
 1982 *Cooking, Cuisine and Class. A Study in comparative Sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- GREEN, Raul H.**
 1986 "Modes de consommation et changes alimentaires en Amerique Latine: Bresil, Mexique et Venezuela." *Problèmes D'Amerique Latine*, 81:23-40.
- HARPER, Laura Jane and Maryellen Spencer**
 1987 "An approach to the study of food in culture." *Food and Nutrition*, Vol. 13 (1):51-57.
- HARRIS, Marvin**
 1985 *Good to Eat: Riddles of Food and Culture*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- JENKINS, Rhys**
 1988 "Transnational corporations and third world consumption: implications of competitive strategies." *World Development*, Vol. 16 (11): 1363-1370.
- KHARE, R. S. and M.S.A. Rao (eds.)**
 1986 *Aspects in South Asian Food Systems: Food, Society, and Culture*. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
- LAPPE' Frances Moore**
 1976 *Diet for a Small Planet*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- LAPPE', Frances Moore & Joseph Collins**
 1984 *Food First. Beyond the Myth of Scarcity*. New York: Ballantine Books.
 —
 1980 *Aid as Obstacle: Twenty Questions About Our Foreign Aid and the Hungry*. San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy.
- LINDENBAUM, Shirley**
 1986 "Rice and wheat: the meaning of food in Bangladesh." Pp. 253-275 in R. S. Khare and M.S.A. Rao (eds.), *Aspects in South Asian Food Systems: Food, Society, and Culture*. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
- MALASSIS, L. and Padilla M.**
 1982 *Typologie Mondiale des Modeles Agro-Nutritionnels*. INRA Montpellier: Etudes et Recherches, n. 72.
- MELLOR, John W.**
 1988 "Global food balances and food security." *World Development*, Vol. 16 (9):997-1011.
- MELLOR, John W.**
 1984 "Food aid: reflection on a decade of action." *Food and Nutrition*, Vol 10 (1):91-104.
- MENNELL, Stephen**
 1985 *All Manners of Food: Eating and Taste in England and France from the Middle Ages to the Present*. Oxford: Blackwell.

MURCOTT, Anne (ed.)

1983 *The Sociology of Food and Eating. Essays on the Sociological Significance of Food.* Gower International Library of Research and Practice.

NAIKEN, L. and J. Perisse

1985 "FAO fifth world food survey: a note on the results." *Food and Nutrition*, Vol. 11 (2):54-58.

NEWBY, Howard

1983 "Living from hand to mouth: the farmworker, food and agribusiness." Pp. 31-44 in Ann Murcott (ed.), *The Sociology of Food and Eating. Essays on the Sociological Significance of Food.* Gower International Library of Research and Practice.

ROTBERG, Robert I. and Theodore K. Rabb, (eds.)

1985 *Hunger and History: The Impact of Changing Food Production and Consumption Patterns on Society.*

Sahlins, Marshall

1976 *Culture and Practical Reason.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

1972 "La sociologia dello scambio primitivo." Pp. 145-168 in E. Grandi (a cura di), *L'Antropologia Economica.* Torino: Einaudi.

SEN, Amartya

1981 *Poverty and Famines. An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

1987 *On Ethics and Economics.* Oxford: Blackwell.

SINHA, R.

1976 *Food and Poverty.* London: Croom Helm.

SINGER

1987 *Food Aid: the Challenge and the Opportunity.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

TURNER, M. (ed.)

1980 *Nutrition and Lifestyles.* London: Applied Science Publisher.

RESUMEN***Aspectos Simbólicos y Sociales en el Funcionamiento del Sistema Alimentario***

Este artículo quiere arrojar luz sobre algunos aspectos del sistema alimentario que son particularmente relevantes para entender las consecuencias del proceso de globalización. Este trabajo hace referencia a la vez, a la intensificación de la acumulación en la esfera de la producción y consumo de alimentos en los países en desarrollo, así como, de la destrucción de las dietas locales y los sistemas sociales en países de menor desarrollo.

En ese sentido, se argumenta que tales consecuencias son mejor entendidas desde el punto de vista de aspectos sociales y simbólicos pertinentes al consumo de alimentos. Este acercamiento defiende la integración, a nivel analítico, de los diferentes segmentos del sistema alimentario: producción, distribución, preparación y consumo. El análisis de la significación social y simbólica del consumo de alimentos (¿cómo comemos?, ¿qué comemos?, y ¿por qué comemos?) puede también crear premisas para la revisión del concepto de "seguridad alimentaria", articulado a las políticas de ayuda alimentaria nacionales e internacionales.

María Fonte es Profesora de Sociología en el Centro de Especialización e Investigaciones Económicas y Agrarias para el Mezzogiorno, en Portici, Italia. La Dra. Fonte es autora de numerosas publicaciones nacionales e internacionales, graduada en la Universidad de Nápoles (Italia).

The Global Poultry Agro/Food Complex

Douglas H. Constance and William D. Heffernan

The globalization of the food system is a topic of growing concern as various nation/states try to obtain food security. This analysis test the hypothesis of the existence of a poultry agro/food complex being constructed by transnational corporations. We focus on the concept of "global sourcing" and argue that the rise in economic power of transnational corporations limits the abilities of individual nation/states to direct their agricultural policies toward national ends. We also argue that with the increasing transnational character of the large corporations the usefulness of individual nation/states or individual commodities as units of analysis decreases. We conclude that U.S., European, and Japanese transnational corporations are indeed creating a global poultry agro/food complex based on the concept of "global sourcing". Our findings also suggest that these same transnational corporations are very active in several other commodity sectors.

Douglas H. Constance is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Rural Sociology at the University of Missouri-Columbia. He has recently coauthored the chapter "Agrarian Policies and Agricultural Systems in the United States" which appears in A. Bonanno (ed.), *Agrarian Policies and Agricultural Systems* (1990). He is currently working on the social impacts of the globalization of the U.S. food system. William D. Heffernan is Professor of Rural Sociology at the University of Missouri-Columbia. He has researched the causes and consequences of structural changes in farming and the concentration of control in agriculture. Dr. Heffernan is the author of several journal articles and is currently working on the social impacts of the globalization of the U.S. food system.

Introduction:

This analysis is another step in a continuing project which tracks the rationalization of the global food system. First we tracked the U.S. poultry industry as it was transformed from a system of many independent producers into a totally integrated industrial style production system (Heffernan, 1972; 1984). Next we traced the integration of the rest of the U.S. commodity sectors and found a structural oligopoly where a few firms had dominant market positions across many commodity sectors (Heffernan, 1989; Constance and Heffernan, 1989; Constance et al., 1990). Now we turn our focus to a portion of the global food system (Heffernan, 1990)⁽¹⁾.

This analysis investigates the existence of a poultry meat agro/food complex based on the concept of global sourcing by transnational corporations (TNCs). Drawing upon the work of Aglietta (1979), Friedmann and McMichael (1989) argue that different "food regimes" requiring different international divisions of labor link different historical periods of capitalist accumulation with international relations of food production and consumption.

Friedmann and McMichael use Sanderson's (1985; 1986) concepts of the growing

(*) Adaptation of the paper presented at the Twelfth World Congress of Sociology, Madrid, Spain, July, 1990. We would like to thank Lori Ware and Rob Floyd for their research assistance. We would also like to thank Alessandro Bonanno and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on a previous draft.

internationalization of capital and global sourcing to describe the emerging "food regime". The new food regime leads to a restructuring of agricultures in most countries as TNCs increasingly rely on global sourcing. Global sourcing refers to the opportunity to obtain the same commodity from different parts of the world. By sourcing globally the TNCs diversify the countries from which they obtain inputs, thereby reducing uncertainty related to commodity procurement. In addition to reducing uncertainty, TNCs can also play one country or region against another. This undercuts the opportunities countries have to direct their agricultural policy toward "national ends" (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989:95).

We start with Friedmann and McMichael's (1989) description of the global meat agro/food complex created by U.S. TNCs. Focusing on the poultry industry, we hypothesize that we can document significant U.S. TNC activities, and the activities of other TNCs, in countries where comparative advantage dictates. By focusing on the major U.S. TNCs' formations of feed and poultry industries globally, we should also be able to determine whether or not a global poultry agro/food complex is beginning to evolve.

Our task is to identify the global locations which have comparative advantage for poultry production as well as poultry consumption, i.e. the best global poultry production sites and markets. Then we need to document the major poultry and feed TNCs' international activities in creating or maintaining feed and/or poultry operations, both for domestic/local production and consumption and for export. If our hypothesis is correct it logically follows that the major poultry TNCs' activities will be in countries that have comparative advantages for poultry production and consumption.

We choose to concentrate on the poultry⁽²⁾ industry because it was the first animal production industry to be rationalized and transformed from

agricultural production into industrial production. Poultry production technologies are also easily transferable to most of the globe. We think that poultry meat production, as it represents one of the cheapest forms of meat protein production, is a logical starting point to investigate the global integration and rationalization of the larger feed grains/protein sources complex (Heffernan, 1990).

By focusing on the poultry industry we utilize the "commodity analysis" approach pioneered by Freidland et al. (1981). However, we expand this form of analysis based on the unique production characteristics of particular commodities to what we call "cross commodity conglomerate analysis" to facilitate a better conception of the big picture⁽³⁾. Our method has shown that using commodities as units of analysis is too limiting. Often the same firm has dominant market positions across many commodity sectors (Heffernan and Constance, forthcoming), often in more than one country (Heffernan, 1989; 1990). For these reasons we have shifted our units of analysis from commodities and countries to individual firms within an increasingly global market. Many of the firms are TNCs. This paper covers TNC activities in poultry and poultry feed production from January of 1987 to June of 1990.

Two sets of data are utilized. First, the major poultry producing countries with their respective comparative advantages are determined. Also the major consuming countries are established. We rely heavily on the work of Bishop et al. (1990) to inform this investigation. Second, the global activities of the major poultry trading companies, including their feed industry activities, are documented. Feed industries are included because they "anchor" livestock production operations, i.e. they are the first step in the process of rationalization and integration. We limit our discussion to the activities of three major U.S. companies, one major EC company,

and five major Japanese companies. These firms accounted for the vast majority of global activities in poultry and feed operations.

Data Section A: Major Poultry Producers and Consumers

We begin by summarizing data on the major poultry producing and consuming countries. Next we discuss comparative advantage of various producing countries focusing on the the global production locations which provide the cheapest labor, ample supplies of affordable feed, limited government restrictions, and low environmental pollution problems. Also, we examine the global sites where consumption is high and expanding which will indicate where global sourcing for domestic consumption should be located.

Major Poultry Producing and Exporting Countries:

The production of poultry, and the feed industry which supports it, can be divided into four categories (Table 1): 1) Domestic production for domestic consumption, 2) Domestic production for international consumption-exports, 3) International production for domestic consumption, and 4) International production for international consumption-exports.

Quadrant 1 in Table 1 shows in rank order the world poultry meat producers as of 1989. The U.S. is the largest global poultry producer, followed by the USSR, China, the EC⁽⁴⁾, Brazil, Japan, Thailand and Hungary. Most production is consumed domestically. Only the USSR and Japan are not exporters. (see also Tables 2 and 4 in Appendix).

In Quadrant 2 the exporting nations are listed in order of ranking, with the importing countries/areas listed in rank order after the exporting country. Notice that the EC is the largest exporter followed by the U.S., Hungary, Brazil, Thailand

and China (see also Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix).

Quadrant 3 lists countries in which the U.S., EC, and Japanese TNCs are producing poultry, or feed, for domestic/local consumption outside their home countries, e.g. U.S. based firms with operations in Brazil producing primarily for consumption in Brazil. These activities indicate global sourcing for domestic/local markets versus export markets, i.e. businesses set up to take advantage of growing domestic/local consumption.

Quadrant 3 is divided into poultry and feed production. The data shows U.S. firms produce poultry for domestic/local consumption in nine countries. The U.S. firms also have one joint venture in the USSR designed to increase feed conversion in poultry operations. The U.S. firms listed have feed operations in thirteen countries. The EC firm has no global poultry industries that we could find but does have feed industries established in at least fifteen countries plus some in Africa and the Middle East. Japanese firms produce poultry meat for domestic/local consumption in four foreign countries.

Quadrant 4 lists the countries which produce internationally for export, e.g. an ECTNC setting up operations in Brazil to export to Japan. These are the locations that should correspond to the concept of global sourcing for export production. U.S. firms produce poultry in Thailand and Mexico that is specifically targeted for exports. Japanese firms have operations in Brazil, Thailand, Mexico, and Malaysia targeted for Japanese markets.

Major Poultry Consuming and Importing Countries:

Poultry consumption is highest in the U.S., followed by the USSR, Japan, and Brazil (see Table 6 in Appendix). Table 7 shows that Japan

Table 1: Summary of Major Poultry Trading Countries' Activities**CONSUMER COUNTRIES**

		Domestic	International
P r o d u c e r	Domestic	(in rank order)	(in rank order)
		US USSR* China EC Brazil Japan* Thailand Hungary	EC—Middle East, Africa, Far East, Caribbean US—Far East, Caribbean, Africa, Middle East Hungary—USSR, Eastern Europe, EC Brazil—Middle East, Far East, Africa, EC Thailand—Far East China—Far East
C o u n t r i e s	International	1	2
		US—Brazil, Argentina, Mexico Spain, Portugal, Puerto Rico England, Canada, Thailand, Malaysia (f), Thailand (f), Taiwan (f), Phillipines(f), South Korea (f), Japan (f), Spain (f), Portugal (f), Puerto Rico (f), England (f), Canada (f), China (f), USRR (f), Mexico (f) EC—USSR (f), Hungary (f), China (f), Italy (f) Yugoslavia (f), Poland (f), France (f), The Netherlands (f), Portugal (f), Puerto Rico (f), Trinidad (f), Japan (f), Taiwan (f), South Korea (f), Africa (f), Middle East (f)	3 4 US—Thailand, Mexico Japan—Brazil, Thailand, Mexico, Malaysia
* USSR & Japan are not exporters			
(f) = Feed industry		Japan — Brazil, Thailand, Mexico Malaysia	

is the leading poultry meat importer, followed by West Germany and the USSR (see Tables 3, 4 and 5 in the Appendix).

Consumption has increased the most in Hong Kong, followed by Thailand, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Hungary, Japan, West Germany, the

USSR, The Netherlands, and France. The expanding markets are in the Far East, the Middle East, the EC, Brazil, the USSR, and North America. The fastest growing markets are in the Far East, especially Hong Kong and Japan (Tables 6, 7 and 8).

Table 7: Importing Countries with Rank Order of Supplier Countries - 1987

Japan—US, Thailand, Brazil, EC
West Germany—EC
USSR—Hungary, EC, US
Hong Kong—US, EC, Brazil, Thailand
Saudi Arabia—EC, Brazil, Hungary, US
Gulf States—EC, Brazil
Sub-Saharan Africa—EC, Brazil
Egypt & Iraq—Brazil, US

Source: Compiled from Table 5.

TABLE 8: Importing Countries — Changes in Domestic Production and Imports - 1985-1989

Country	Change in Production (percent)	Change in Imports (percent)
Japan	+ 7	+ 183
West Germany	+ 15	+ 18
Saudi Arabia	+ 40	Decline
USSR	+ 17	+ 15
Hong Kong	+ 0	+ 48

Source: Compiled from tables 2 and 4.

Comparative Advantages of Major Poultry Trading Countries:

Table 9 provides a summary of the major exporting countries' comparative advantages. The U.S. and the EC both have relatively high labor costs. Both also have high government subsidies to facilitate exports. The U.S. has some advantage in feed costs and availability but the EC has some advantage in processing technologies and inspection requirements (Broiler Industry, 1987:98-100; Amey, 1989:42). Both producers

have medium or high environmental costs.

Brazil and Thailand are characterized by low labor costs, adequate feed supplies, low government subsidies, and low environmental costs. China has low labor costs but an inefficient feed industry, medium levels of government subsidies, and low environmental costs. Hungary has medium priced labor, poor to adequate feed supplies, and medium levels of government subsidies.

TABLE 9: Major Exporting Countries Comparative Advantages

Environ-Country	Labor	Feed	Government	
	Costs	Availability	Subsidies	ment
United States	Hi	+	Hi	Med
EC:				
France	Med-Hi	=*	Hi	Med
Netherlands	Hi	-*	Hi	Hi
Brazil	Low	+	Low	Low
Thailand	Low	+	Low	Low
China	Low	-**	Med	Low
Hungary	Med-Low	=	Med	N/A

N/A = Not available.
* = Dependent on soybean imports
** = Inefficient feed technology
(+) = Ample feed availability
(=) = Some imports required
(-) = Dependent on imports or low feed quality

Source: Bishop et al., 1990; van de Ven, 1987.

Summary of Data Section A:

Table 1 quadrant 3 shows us that the U.S. firms have an extensive global presence in the poultry and feed industries, especially where poultry demand is relatively high and/or increasing, i.e. the Far East and Europe. The major EC firm we tracked has no determinable global poultry operations but has extensive global feed operations, also located in areas where poultry consumption is high and/or increasing.

Both the U.S. and the EC firms have several new operations, mostly in the forms of joint ventures in feed in the socialist countries. Japan has firms with operations in Brazil, Thailand, Mexico, and Malaysia for both domestic and export production. Table 1 quadrant 4 shows that there are six examples of international firms producing for export markets, two of these are U.S. operations and four are Japanese. These operations are located in Thailand, Brazil, Malaysia, and Mexico.

These findings correspond with the summary of comparative advantages in Table 8 showing that the best global production sites are Brazil and Thailand. Combined these tables seem to paint a picture of TNC investment targeted for export production in countries with low labor costs and high feed availability, combined with low government intervention and low environmental costs, i.e. countries like Brazil and Thailand. Significant TNC activities targeted for domestic/local consumption were also found, especially in high consumption and growth markets like the Far East, Brazil, and the socialist countries. Now lets look at some of the individual TNCs and their international activities.

Data Section B: Activities of Major Poultry Trading TNCs

Our analysis of the data indicates four major firms have emerged. These four firms, plus the

five Japanese firms, represent the vast majority of TNC activities in poultry and feed. They are Tyson Foods, Inc., the largest broiler and hog producer in the United States (Tyson, 1990) and ConAgra, Inc., the largest U.S. turkey and second largest broiler producer and processor with dominant market shares in several other commodities (ConAgra, 1990; Heffernan, 1989; Heffernan and Constance, forthcoming). The third firm is Cargill, Inc., the largest grain trading firm in the world and the largest privately held corporation in the U.S. with leading market shares across many commodities (Cargill, 1990; Heffernan and Constance, 1990).

The fourth firm is Ferruzzi of Italy, one of Europe's largest agricultural and chemical firms. It is the third largest feed dealer in Europe and European leader in sugar, rice, and oils (Ferruzzi, 1990). Ferruzzi is one of the top soybean processors in the world and its subsidiary, Central Soya, is the second largest feed dealer in the U.S. (Feedstuffs, 1988:1). Ferruzzi was by far the most active European firm.

In this section we summarize the activities of these four TNCs, plus a few activities of five Japanese firms. Table 10 shows the equivalent of Table 1 quadrant 3 but provides the TNC's name. It is divided into poultry and feed sections.

Poultry:

Tyson Foods has two global operations (Canada and Mexico) targeted for at least some domestic consumption. In 1988 Tyson bought controlling interest in Agrimont, Inc. of Canada, an integrated poultry company operating six processing plants in Canada (Broiler Industry, 1988:10). Tyson also has a joint venture in Mexico to produce and process broilers there (Tuten and Amy, 1989).

ConAgra has three international poultry operations producing for local consumption (Spain, Portugal, and Puerto Rico). ConAgra Europe owns Bioter, S.A. and Saprogal, S.A. in Spain and in Portugal it has majority interest in Sopropor, S.A.R.I. (ConAgra, 1990). ConAgra also has a joint venture with the USSR to work on

**TABLE 10: Summary of Major Trading Firms Activities by Country
(J/V = joint venture)**

POULTRY

- Tyson—Mexico, Canada
- ConAgra—Puerto Rico, Portugal, Spain, J/V Soviet Union
- Cargill—Argentina, Brazil, England, Thailand
- Mitsui and Co.—Malaysia
- C.Itoh—Mexico
- Mitsubishi—Brazil, Brazil
- Ajinomoto—Brazil
- Nippon Meat Packers—Thailand

FEED

- Tyson—Japan, Canada
- ConAgra—Portugal, Spain, J/V Soviet Union
- Cargill—Canada, Brazil, Japan, Spain, Malaysia, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, Philippines, J/V China
- Ferruzzi/Central Soya—France, The Netherlands, Taiwan, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Thailand, J/V Yugoslavia, J/V USSR, J/V Hungary, J/V Poland, J/V China

poultry productivity (Feedstuffs, 1990a:5).

Cargill has poultry industries in Argentina, Brazil, Thailand, and England which are at least partially targeted for domestic markets. Cargill Agricola has operated in Brazil since 1948 (Feedstuffs, 1989a:8). In 1989 Cargill started large scale intensive operations in Argentina (Broiler Industry, 1989b:14).

We found no global poultry operations for Ferruzzi. Several Japanese firms have recently invested in and/or formed poultry operations around the world which include production for local consumption as well as exports back to Japan. These include Mitsui and Co. in Malaysia, C. Itoh in Mexico, Mitsubishi and Ajinomoto in Brazil, and Nippon Meat Packers in Thailand.

Feed:

Tyson has three feed operations outside the U.S. located in Canada, Mexico and Japan. ConAgra has feed operations in Spain, Portugal, and Puerto Rico and a joint venture in poultry feed manufacturing in the USSR (Feedstuffs, 1990a:5). Cargill has feed operations in Canada, Thailand, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, and Spain. In 1988 Cargill formed a joint venture to produce poultry feed in China. (Smith, 1988a:1).

Ferruzzi has feed operations in Italy, France, Taiwan, The Netherlands, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Trinidad, Japan, South Korea, Africa, and the Middle East. In 1986, Central Soya (not yet owned by Ferruzzi) formed a joint venture with Marubeni Shiryo Co. of Japan, a large feed manufacturer, and in early 1987 with Cheil Sugar and Co., another large feed manufacturer in South Korea (Feedstuffs, 1987:88). Also in 1987, Central Soya acquired a feed mill in France (Smith, 1987:11). In late 1987 Central Soya formed a joint venture with Great Wall Enterprises, a leading feed manufacturer in Taiwan (Feedstuffs, 1987:88).

In 1988 Central Soya formed a joint venture with the China Export Bases Development Corporation, which is China's largest broiler producer, to manufacture livestock feeds (Smith,

1988b:1). According to Thomas G. Hauenstein, vice president for international feed operations, "we are pleased to secure a position during this early stage of the development of the Chinese commercial feed industry" as this will "anchor" Central Soya's presence in China (Smith, 1988b:39).

In 1989 Central Soya purchased one of the largest marketers of feed premixes in France (Feedstuffs, 1989d:10). In 1989 Ferruzzi entered into an agreement with the USSR to work with livestock producers to improve feed efficiencies (Spear, 1989:4). In 1990 Central Soya formed a joint venture with the second largest Hungarian feed company, Agard, to produce animal feeds in Europe. In 1989 Central Soya entered into a similar agreement with a Polish cooperative to manufacture animal feed concentrates (Feedstuffs, 1990b:8). In 1990 Central Soya formed a joint venture with Yugoslavian firm to build a soybean concentrates plant (Feedstuffs, 1990c:11).

Next we turn to a review of the TNC's activities geared for international export markets (Table 11). Tyson and Cargill have recently established poultry operations especially designed for export production. Five Japanese firms, C. Itoh, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Co., and Ajinomoto, and Nippon Meat Packers have also invested in existing operations and/or set up new operations for poultry export production, mostly back to Japan.

- In 1989 C. Itoh of Japan, Banco Nacional de Mexico and Tyson Foods formed a joint venture called Citra with Empresas Provemex S.A. (brand name of Trasgo), the second largest broiler producer in Mexico, to market deboned poultry products in Japan and other Far East countries. Citra, a totally new production facility, will process and market broilers produced in Mexico and also those grown by Tyson in the U.S. The broilers grown in Mexico will go to the Mexican domestic market while those produced by Tyson in the U.S. will be shipped to Mexico, further processed by Citra and exported to Japan (Tuten and Amey, 1989:28).

**TABLE 11:Summary of Major TNCs' Activities for Export
by Country and Destination
(J/V = joint venture)**

Tyson:	J/V C.Itoh, Trasgo in Mexico to Japan
Cargill:	J/V Nippon Meat Packers in Thailand to Japan
Mitsubishi:	J/V Perdigao in Brazil to Japan
Mitsui:	J/V Malayan Flour Co. in Malaysia to Japan
Ajinomoto:	J/V d'Osato Ajinomoto Alimentos S.A. in Brazil to Japan
Nippon Meat Packers:	J/V Cargill in Thailand to Japan

In late 1989 Cargill announced a joint venture with Nippon Meat Packers, one of Japan's largest, to grow and process poultry in Thailand for export to Japanese markets. Cargill will coordinate the operation and construct all facilities while Nippon will sell the processed meats in Japan and non-US markets. (*Feedstuffs*, 1989b:7; *Broiler Industry*, 1990a).

Besides Thailand and Mexico, Japanese firms are also setting up operations in Brazil and Malaysia. One Brazilian operation is partially owned by Mitsubishi while another Japanese firm, Ajinomoto, owns 50% of a new Brazilian poultry operation (*Broiler Industry*, 1990b:12). Mitsui and Co. also has a joint venture with Malayan Flour Mills Bhd. of Malaysia to produce broilers in Malaysia for the Japanese market (*Broiler Industry*, 1989a:106).

Analysis:

Data in Section A suggests that comparative advantage dictates that TNC activities targeted for exports should be located in countries such as

Brazil and Thailand. TNC activities targeted for domestic/local production and consumption should be located in strong consumer markets such as U.S., Japan, USSR, Brazil, and Hong Kong. This is in keeping with the hypothesis that suggests looking for the lowest cost production sites and the best consumer markets. The lowest cost production sites are at the developing countries with cheap labor, ample grain, low government intervention, and low environmental constraints, sites like Brazil and Thailand, and maybe Malaysia. Looking at Table 12, we see that Thailand has the highest percent increase in exports but Brazil has a decrease. This downward trend in poultry exports in Brazil can be attributed to several factors: (1) increasing domestic demand, (2) red meat shortages leading to a government imposed restriction of poultry exports, and (3) increased competition from the EC and the US whose export subsidy programs captured much of Brazil's Middle East markets (see Table 5) (Ahmed, 1988:30; Mills, 1988:60; Bishop et al., 1990:16).

**Table 12: Exporting Countries - Changes in Production;
Exports as a Percent of Production;
and Percent Increase in Exports -
1985 - 1989**

Increase Country Exports	Percent Increase in Production	Changes in Exports as Percent of Production		Percent in
		1985	1989	
US	+25	2.6	3.0	+54.5
Brazil	+25	17.7	9.0	-34.0
Thailand	+22	10.4	17.0	+51.0
France	+12	23.9	26.0	+23.4
The Netherlands	+18	40.0	52.0	+27.4
Hungary	+24	39.5	48.0	+40.5

Source: Compiled from Tables 2 and 4

Data from Section B shows that the selected firms exhibited investment in domestic production in several sites identified in Data Section A as major consuming countries, including Japan, China, the EC and the USSR. Many of these activities are feed operations. Joint ventures in China by Ferruzzi and Cargill positioned these companies for that growing market. Joint ventures by Ferruzzi and ConAgra in the Soviet Union and Ferruzzi's joint ventures in Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia favorably position these firms in the socialist countries.

Tyson, Cargill, and Ferruzzi have feed operations in Japan to service that expanding market. ConAgra has feed interests in Europe and Cargill has extensive feed operations in the Far East, Southeast Asia, Spain and England. Ferruzzi has extensive feed interests in Europe and several operations in the Far East, the Middle East, and Africa. As well, all have substantial operations in the U.S., the largest market for poultry meat.

The hottest market area, the Far East, has significant TNC activity. The opening of the socialist world to TNCs solely through the use of joint ventures to increase livestock productivity is another interesting point. These activities

coincide with the concept that the TNCs should be positioning themselves where domestic/local consumption is increasing and/or can be expected to increase.

Data from Section B also shows that we did not find very many activities in global sourcing targeted especially for export production. The ones that we found fit the comparative advantage established in Data Section A relatively well, including low labor costs, available feed, low government intervention, and low environmental constraints. Government intervention by the Brazilian State in the late 1980s to maintain an inexpensive meat protein source domestically highlights the reason TNCs feel they need alternative global sources to reduce supply uncertainties. This could be a reason for Mitsubishi's recent investment in Malaysia, i.e. to provide it with an alternative source to Brazil. Obviously, Data in Section B shows that the Japanese TNCs are very active.

Cargill's and Nippon Meat Packer's joint venture in Thailand and Mitsubishi's and Ajinomoto's investments in Brazil support our hypothesis that TNC's are globally creating and sourcing a poultry agro/food complex. While not defined as sites with comparative advantages to

attract global sourcing, both Tyson's and C. Itoh's operation in Mexico and Mitsubishi's operation in Malaysia partially supports this thesis. Cheap labor is present but at least some feed supplies would need to be imported. It would seem that for Tyson, the Citraoperation in Mexico is a way of "sourcing" nearby cheap labor to further process its products en route to Japan. The most interesting part of the global poultry agro/food complex is the backward integration exhibited by the large Japanese firms as they "source" to meet rising demand in Japan and the Far East.

Conclusion:

This analysis supports the hypothesis by documenting the existence of significant activity in the global poultry agro/food complex by U.S. and other TNCs. Our investigation shows that TNC's are locating their global poultry and feed operations where domestic consumption is expanding and global production is cheapest. The comparative advantages for producer and consumer nations generally match the activities of TNCs. Some firms have several global sites from which to "source".

The more important point here is that the cost of labor becomes a key factor in the location of production. Firms like Cargill and Tyson are looking outside the U.S. for cheaper labor to process deboned products for the Far East. It is cheaper for Tyson to ship its slaughtered poultry to Mexico and process it there than pay the higher priced labor in the U.S. Several Japanese firms are doing the same. TNCs have taken advantage of Thailand's low labor costs to increase production. As a consequence the exports of poultry from Thailand have increased while poultry exports from the U.S. have declined (see Table 5). This is an example of what Sanderson (1986) refers to as "the new international division of labor". The recent internationalization of capital and the "turn-key" transferability of poultry production makes it possible for TNCs to make such decisions and source "globally". By so doing the TNCs are able to avoid restrictive policies of individual nation/states which are designed to protect or improve the quality of life of the citizens of those countries.

While the poultry agro/food complex is a logical starting point for the investigation of a world food system or feed grains/protein source complex controlled by TNC's, a complete analysis must be expanded to include other commodities used as feed or food crops. By concentrating on single commodities one misses the "cross commodity" aspect of the emerging food system. This is why we added the feed aspect to this paper. By adding the feed system to our analysis we can predict where expected future TNC poultry operations will occur.

A fuller analysis of the poultry meat complex would require analyzing the involvement of the TNCs highlighted above in the production of other commodities and in other stages of the food system from agricultural chemical production to food processing. In example Cargill has beef operations in Brazil, Honduras, Canada, and the U.S. (Cargill, 1990). ConAgra has beef operations in the U.S. and Australia (Feedstuffs, 1990d). This is the classic example of global sourcing that Sanderson (1985) refers to as the "world steer". In 1990 ConAgra bought Beatrice to become one of the largest food firms in the world (Smith, 1990:1). ConAgra has several other joint ventures around the world (Heffernan, 1990).

Ferruzzi is the largest fruit and vegetable processor in Brazil and has several million acres in farming operations in Europe, South America, and North America (Leidahl, 1987:33). In 1989 Central Soya and Mitsubishi formed a joint venture in hog production in the U.S. (Feedstuffs, 1989c:6). These are just a few examples of these TNC's global reach.

The examples cited give an indication of the increasing global reach of the TNCs. Many questions are raised concerning the social impact of these changes. One of the major questions focuses on the usefulness of individual countries as a unit of analysis when focusing on the global movement of food. The recent GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) discussions have focused exclusively on countries and their agricultural and trade policies. The emerging food trade issues must be concerned with the policies of the TNCs. In fact the growing question is whether any country or set of countries can truly control their own food system in light of the shifting power relationships in the emerging global system.

**Table 2: Global broiler production in major trading countries
(1000 metric tons (mt))**

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Exporters					
United States	7865	8262	9105	9473	9820
Brazil	1530	1680	1865	1860	1900
France	1287	1328	1408	1434	1440
Thailand	470	507	540	556	575
Hungary	400	445	478	490	498
Netherlands	425	442	471	485	500
Importers					
USSR	2816	2988	312	3200	3300
Japan	1395	1421	1465	1480	1495
West Germany	357	377	389	411	420
Saudi Arabia	186	196	236	249	261
Hong Kong	38	42	40	39	38

Source: FAO, USDA, ZMP, Dutch Poultry & Egg Board

Table 3: European Community Poultry Meat Production (1000 mt)

Country	1970	1980	1985	1986	1987	1988	1970-88 % change
France	637	1,122	1,272	1,325	1,393	1,434	125
U.K.	592	754	875	922	999	1,056	78
Italy	648	953	929	940	982	996.54	
Spain	499	762	810	759	790	829	66
Netherlands	292	377	425	442	471	485	66
West Germany	258	374	357	376	389	411	59
Portugal	153	164	159	162	197	205	287
Belgium & Luxembourg	116	134	159	169	172	186	60
Greece	67	144	146	146	148	150	124
Denmark	79	97	115	115	113	117	48
Ireland	30	50	54	57	58	59	97
EC-12	3,271	4,931	5,301	5,413	5,712	5,928	81

Portugal and Spain added to EC total prior to their entry in 1986.

Source: For. Agri. Service., U.S. Dept. Agri.

Table 4: Major trading countries of poultry meat (1,000 mt)

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Exporters					
United States	211	276	363	382	326
France	308	345	345	381	380
Netherlands	204	214	235	257	260
Hungary	158	182	207	218	222
Brazil	272	236	214	200	180
Thailand	49	42	40	39	38
Importers					
Japan	106	180	204	281	300
Saudi Arabia	152	163	190	196	150
USSR	142	175	169	170	170
Hong Kong	113	123	148	162	167

Source: FAO, USDA, ZMP, Dutch Poultry & Egg Board

Table 6: Global Poultry Consumption 1985-1989 (1,000 mt)

Country	Consumption		Percent Change	Imports as % Consumption	
	1985	1989		1985	1989
US	7744	9494	+22		
Brazil	1458	1720	+20		
France	979	1060	+8		
Thailand	421	527	+25		
Hungary	242	276	+20		
The Netherlands	221	240	+14		
USSR	2958	3470	+17	5	5
Japan	1501	1795	+20	8	20
West Germany	573	675	+18	60	61
Saudi Arabia	338	411	+22	82	57
Hong Kong	114	243	+113	297	439

Source: Compiled from Table 2 and 4.

**Table 5: International Trade Flow of Poultry Meat for Major Exporting and Importing Countries
(1,000 mt).**

Exporting Countries	Importing Countries									Others	Total
	Saudi Arabia	Gulf States	Iraq	Egypt	Sub-Saharan Africa	USSR	EC	Caribbeans	Hong Kong		
U.S.	1964	3.6	2.3	0	8.3	1.4	0	7.9	45.7	58.2	33.9
	1965	3.1	1.9	0	10.1	0.3	0	6	45.9	47.4	42.8
	1966	2.5	1.5	0	29.7	0.3	0	12.4	52.8	78.8	37.1
	1967	2.4	1.1	58.4	27.4	0.8	0	14.6	50.8	80.1	57.3
EC	1964	119.9	105.6	0.3	8.5	43.3	0.5	[375.6]	20.7	2.1	6.5
	1965	98.4	91.5	0.4	2.1	50.3	2.4	[398.1]	20.1	2.8	8.4
	1966	82.5	75.8	0.2	4.5	55.7	22.3	[467.9]	17.2	3.5	7.8
	1967	103.7	46.2	4.8	6.7	85.1	0	[464.2]	3.7	2.9	13.4
Brazil	1964	92.8	31.7	47.5	63.3	2.5	0	13	0	10.5	0.4
	1965	86	35.2	65.6	50.5	2	0	18.2	0	15.3	2.5
	1966	92.9	43	25	5.5	5.5	0	17.7	0	17.2	2.2
	1967	92.3	40.6	13.4	0.3	10.8	0	8.7	0	22.1	4.8
Hungary	1964	15.6	2.7	0	5	5	60.7	19	5	0	0.6
	1965	8.8	2	0	5	5.5	63.8	35	5.5	0	0.8
	1966	2.5	1	0	2.4	0	101	31	0	0	0
	1967	2.4	1.9	0	4.2	0	110	36	0	0	0
Thailand	1964	0	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	31.2	0.1
	1965	0	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	33.2	0.6
	1966	0	0.6	0	0	0	0	0.9	0	67.6	1.8
	1967	0	0.5	0	0	0	0	0.7	0	79.9	1.3
Total	1964	232.1	142.8	47.8	83.1	52.2	61.2	39.9	71.4	96.9	41.5
	1965	196.3	130.9	66	67.7	56.1	66.2	59.2	71.5	96.7	55.1
	1966	180.4	121.9	25.2	42.1	61.5	123.3	62	70	157.1	48.9
	1967	200.8	90.3	76.6	38.6	96.5	110	60	54.5	186	76.8

[] Denotes EC intertrade 1/ Preliminary data

2/ Estimates represent mostly unboned meat

Source: Ahmed, 1988:26.

Notes:

1. This paper is a shortened version of a book chapter length manuscript (Constance and Heffernan, forthcoming).
2. For the purposes of the paper, poultry refers to broiler meat production. Turkey is also a form of poultry meat.
3. Our method is to regularly review numerous agribusiness trade journals, annual reports of major firms, USDA bulletins, popular press articles, and other sources. Our data begins in 1980, with a few important 1970s entries, and proceeds to the present.
4. See table 3 in the Appendix for a breakdown of EC production by country.

References:

- AGLIETTA, M.**
1979 **A Theory of Capitalist Regulation.** London: New Left Books.
- AHMED, Hassan F**
1988 "A market share analysis of U.S. poultry exports." **Broiler Industry** Vol. 88 (9):20-30.
- AMEY, David**
1989 "European processing: an overview", **Broiler Industry**, Vol. 89 (3):40-44.
- BISHOP, Robert V., Lee A. Christensen, Stephanie Mercier, and Larry Witucki**
1990 "The world poultry market - government intervention and multilateral policy reform." **USDA, Economic Research Service, Commodity Economics Division.**
- BROILER Industry**
1987 "U.S. potential for international trade." August 87:98-109.

1988 "Tyson targets Canadian Firm." November 88:10.

1989a "Malayan company eyes Japan." December 89:106.

1989b "Cargill selling in Argentina." January 89:14.
- 1990a "Cargill, Nippon joint venture." march 90:9.
— 1990b "Brazil increases parts exports." June 90:12.
- CARGILL**
1990 **The World of Cargill.**
- CONAGRA**
1990 **ConAgra, Inc.: Fiscal 1990 Annual Report.** ConAgra.
- CONSTANCE, Douglas, Jere Gilles, and William D. Heffernan**
1990 "Agrarian policies and agricultural systems in the United States": Pp. 9-75 in A. Bonanno (ed.), **Agrarian Policies and Agricultural Systems**, Boulder, Co: Westview Press.
- CONSTANCE, Douglas H. and William D. Heffernan**
1989 The rise of oligopoly in agricultural markets: the demise of the family farm." Paper presented at the Agriculture, Food, and Human Values Society Meeting, Little Rock, Ark., Nov.

forthcoming "The globalization of the poultry industry" **Agricultura y Sociedad**.
- Feedstuffs**
1987 "Central Soya continues growth in Asian Markets." 12-14-87:88.

1988 "Central Soya to build pork plant." 11-7:1,25.

1989a "Cargill to build corn plant in Brazil." 2-20-89:8.

1989b "Cargill, Nippon form joint venture in Thailand." 12-18-89:7.

1989c "Central Soya, Mitsubishi join forces to build Indiana pork processing plant." 10-2-89:10.

1989d "Central Soya to purchase French premixer." 5-8-89:10.

- 1990a "ConAgra, USSR to cooperate on livestock venture." 6-4-90:5.
- 1990b "Central Soya forms venture with feed company in Hungary." 1-29:8.
- 1990c "Central Soya joins Yugoslavian company in protein joint venture." 5-14:11.
- Feedstuffs**
- 1990d "ConAgra forms Australian venture." 4-16:10.
- FERRUZZI**
- 1990 **Ferruzzi and the Global Market.**
- FREIDLAND, William H., Amy.H. Barton and Robert.J. Thomas**
- 1981 **Manufacturing Green Gold**, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- FRIEDMANN, Harriet and Philip McMichael**
- 1989 "Agriculture and the state system: the rise and decline of national agricultures, 1870 to the present." *Sociologia Ruralis*, Vol. 29 (2):93-117.
- HEFFERNAN, William D.**
- 1972 "Sociological dimensions of agriculture structures in the United States." *Sociologia Ruralis*, Vol. 12 (3/4):481-499.
- 1984 "Constraints in the US poultry industry." Pp. 237-260 in H. Schwarzweller (ed.), **Research in Rural Sociology and Development**. Greenwich: Jay Press.
- 1989 "Confidence and courage in the next fifty years." *Rural Sociology*, Vol. 54 (2):149-168.
- 1990 "The internationalization of the poultry industry." Paper presented at World Congress Spciology. Madrid, Spain. July 9-13.
- HEFFERNAN, William D. and Douglas H. Constance**
- 1990 "Concentration of agricultural markets: September 1990." Technical Paper, Department of Rural Sociology, University of Missouri.
- LIEDAHL, Roy**
- 1987 "Ferruzzi agrees to buy Central Soya." *Feedstuffs*, 8-21-87:1,33.
- Mills, William J.**
- 1988 "Impact of export enhancement program." *Broiler Industry*, 8-88.
- SANDERSON, S.E.**
- 1985 "The emergence of the 'world steer': industrialization and foreign domination in Latin American cattle production." Pp. 123-148 in F.L. Tullis & W.L. Hollist (eds.), **Food, the State and International Political Economy**. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- (ed.)
- 1986 **The Americas in the New International Division of Labor**. New York: Holmes and Meier.
- SMITH, Rod**
- 1987 "Central Soya begins expansion in French markets." *Feedstuffs*, 4-27-87:11,90.
-
- 1988a "Cargill to build plant in China; begin growth there." *Feedstuffs*, 2-8-88:1,8.
-
- 1988b "Central Soya to enter Chinese market". *Feedstuffs*, 5-23-88:1,39.
-
- 1990 "ConAgra reaches terms to buy Beatrice", *Feedstuffs*, 6-11-90:1,31.
- SPEAR, Joe**
- 1989 "Ferruzzi group enters into deal with Soviet Union." *Feedstuffs*, 12-11-89:4.
- TUTEN, Robert and David Amey**
- 1989 "Reaching for the rising sun" *Broiler Industry*, 6-89:28-34.
- Tyson**
- 1990 Tyson Foods, Inc.: Annual Report 1989.
- Van de Ven, A.D.M.**
- 1987 "Production of poultry meat." *Broiler Industry*, 10-87:84.

RESUMEN

El Complejo Global Agroalimentario Avícola

La globalización del sistema alimentario constituye un aspecto que crecientemente concierne a varios estados/nación para lograr una verdadera seguridad alimentaria. El análisis parte de la hipótesis de la existencia de un sistema agroalimentario avícola, el cual ha sido construido por las corporaciones transnacionales. Nuestro foco de atención es el concepto de "recurso global", argumentando que el aumento del poder económico de las corporaciones transnacionales limita las posibilidades individuales de los estados/nación y apunta hacia el final de sus políticas agrícolas nacionales. Igualmente, que con el crecimiento del carácter transnacional de las grandes corporaciones existe una menor utilidad de los estados/nación o de las mercancías, individualmente consideradas, y están perdiendo valor como unidades de análisis. Concluimos que las corporaciones transnacionales norteamericanas, europeas y japonesas están creando un verdadero complejo agroalimentario avícola, el cual está basado en el concepto de "recurso global". Nosotros encontramos sugerencias de que estas mismas corporaciones transnacionales también son muy activas en otros importantes sectores de mercancías agrícolas.

*Douglas H. Constance es candidato a doctor en el Departamento de Sociología Rural de la Universidad de Missouri-Columbia. Es coautor del capítulo "Agrarian policies and agricultural systems in United States" del recientemente editado libro: A. Bonanno (Ed.) *Agrarian Policies and Agricultural Systems* (1990). Actualmente está trabajando sobre el impacto social de la globalización del sistema alimentario de los EEUU.*

William D. Heffernan es profesor de Sociología Rural en la Universidad de Missouri-Columbia. El ha investigado las causas y consecuencias de los cambios estructurales en la explotación y en la concentración del control en la agricultura. El Dr. Heffernan es autor de diversos artículos y actualmente se encuentra trabajando sobre el impacto social de la globalización del sistema alimentario de EEUU.

World Market and Agrarian Transformation: The Case of Neo-Liberal Chile

Sergio Gomez and W.L. Goldfrank

The recent Chilean agrarian transformation is analyzed, with special focus on the export boom in fresh fruit. The expansion and diversification of the sector are explored, and its structural characteristics explicated as "semi-peripheral." Changing consumption patterns in the advanced countries and technological improvements in storage and transport are credited with facilitating growth. Increases in national basic foodstuff production are explained as a departure from neo-liberal practice. The heterogeneous composition of both the owning and the producing classes is outlined.

Sergio Gomez is Professor of Sociology at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Santiago, Chile). He is the author (with Jorge Echenique) of *La Agricultura Chilena* (1988) and numerous book and articles on Latin American rural social organizations.

W.L. Goldfrank is Professor of Sociology at the University of California Santa Cruz. He is the author of *The World System of Capitalism* (1979) and numerous articles on comparative development and revolution.

Introducción

The increasing amount of scholarly attention recently attracted by the rapidly expanding Chilean fresh fruit export sector—with over \$US 1 billion annually, Chile is second worldwide to an Italy which as part of the EC is not exactly an exporter(1)—has derived from a number of complementary, competing, intersecting, and overlapping angles of vision. This export boom has been part of a larger transformation in which rural Chile has passed from domination by the hacienda to domination by the agroindustrial complex (CAI). In this article we summarize the results of investigations into these changes, including our own.

Sociology of Development

From the standpoint of development sociology, Chile is the leading current Latin American exemplar of the shift from import-substituting industrialization (ISI) to export-oriented industrialization (EOI). While military governments elsewhere in the region engaged in what Garretón (1989) calls the "reactive" socio-political project of anti-socialist, anti-union, anti-Marxist institutional and cultural repression, only in Chile did the regime engage in what he calls an extensive "foundational" project of constructing a politico-economic order hospitable to expanded accumulation based on near-total integration into the world market on the terms of that market.

Many scholars have described and explicated the institutional features, policy choices, and agrarian consequences of this neo-liberal model (c.g., de Janvry 1985, Jarvis 1985, Gómez & Echenique 1988).

Seen from this angle, the fruit export boom at first appears an unalloyed success, one for which the regime and its spokesmen typically claim all the credit even though CORFO (the state development corporation) laid the groundwork for it during the Frei and Allende regimes (1964-73). Along with forest and fishery products, fruit is one of the so-called "non-traditional" exports which have considerably lessened the country's historic reliance on copper (now about 45%) for foreign exchange. Not only have the orchards and vineyards proved an important source of foreign exchange: along with the packing sheds, they employ almost half a million workers, not to mention the upstream stimulus to the production of containers (including refrigerated ones for air shipping asparagus, cherries, and raspberries) and the downstream linkages to the transportation sector.

Linkages to other national sectors of the Chilean economy are not the only ways in which the produce sector can be shown to have positive developmental effects. Granted, most of the science and technology behind the fruit boom has been developed in California, and some large grower-shippers receive advice telephonically from consultants at the renowned agricultural campus at Davis. But much technology transfer has occurred under the aegis of the Fundación Chile, a joint venture of the Chilean government and the ITT corporation, and much via locally organized GTTs (Groups for Technology Transfer). Chilean agronomists make independent scientific and technical contributions to horticulture. Local universities offer advanced training in relevant fields. A recent technical report complained of the lack of a Chilean computer industry to develop and market appropriate software, a complaint which speaks

volumes about what has already been accomplished. Further, with regard to ownership, two of the five largest exporters are nationally owned and controlled, including the very largest, which has twelve staff agronomists and publishes a quarterly magazine (see Goldfrank 1989, 1990; Gómez & Echenique 1988). And a significant portion of the exported produce is carried by Chilean-owned ships.

The patterns, then, are not those typical of the primary product enclaves of the periphery, disarticulated, isolated from the rest of the national economy and designed, owned, and controlled by foreign capital. But given the high degree of foreign participation and innovation, and the extreme dependence on external markets, neither are they typical of the core. Cardoso and Faletto's concept of "associated dependent development," a sub-type of Wallerstein's "semi-periphery," captures this intermediate position well; the language of both terms suggests a "semiarticulated" national economy.

Is the produce boom then "development" or "underdevelopment"? It is capitalization, and some profit reinvested locally ("national" accumulation), and some upgrading of Chilean technical and organizational capacity. It is also immiseration and chemical endangering of rural workers, including thousands of town- and city-dwelling seasonal temporaries (Lago & Olavarria 1980, Campana 1985, Cruz 1986, Falabella 1989). It is a sector which may soon face both upper limits on its northern hemisphere markets and debilitating competition from two alternative sources of supply: extended growing and/or storage seasons in the north, and new producing zones in the south (Klingenbergs & Narea 1985, Gómez 1987). It is a sector peculiarly dependent on the U.S. market, which while not yet saturated with off-season fruit, no longer offers the growth potential of the early part of the 1980s. Thus in terms of the sociology of development, the answer to the question of development versus underdevelopment is: "both" and "neither," an

old story in semi-peripheral countries which must run very fast in order to stand still in relation to the core.

So-called development models such as ISI (populism) and EOI (neo-liberalism) do not evolve organically from their local socio-economic roots so much as they represent discontinuous responses by bourgeoisies, bureaucrats, and other social forces: responses to crises and to the changing conjunctures and opportunity structures of the world-economy. But discontinuity hurts. The Chilean transition from protectionist and statist populism to neo-liberalism was brutal, rapid, and thorough, entailing privation as well as privatization. This privation was principally borne by the peasantry, the working class, and state-dependent sectors of the middle class. So successful was the military in reconstructing an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie that many of the latter are now quite confidently supporting the political withdrawal of the former in the current transition to democracy.

However, one must ask, can the produce exporters who pay the lowest wages (and, with their core markets, supply the most affluent consumers) among this bourgeoisie afford democratization, with the likelihood of unionization and taxation for social services raising their costs? If they cannot, the developmental promise of this sector will shrink. Already in the 1985-1990 period, the total cost of labor has more than doubled as prices in the USA have fallen. If the cyanide scare of 1989 was not enough (it cost Chile an estimated \$300 million), Winter 1990 afforded two further glimpses of Chilean vulnerability, as (1) the US invasion of Panama halted canal traffic sufficiently to cause a fall in prices when oversupply resulted from the canal's reopening, and (2) a fruit fly infestation at the peak of the harvest led to higher processing costs and lowered product quality, further reducing prices. This has sharply reduced profit margins and left less surplus for redeployment. But for the present, there is optimism about long-

term expansion; about diversification into other counter-seasonal produce such as berries, avocados, and artichokes; about commercialization of exotics such as cherimoyas; about increasing the industrial processing of sub-export grade produce by canning, freezing, juicing, and/or jam and jelly making; about upgrading the skills and increasing the specialization and training of workers; about streamlining the commercialization process—the 1988-89 season marked the first time retail supermarket chains from core countries sent agents to Chile to buy directly from growers-shippers; and about augmenting sales in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

Sociology of Agriculture

As implied in the optimistic projects and projections of the sector's cutting edge, from the standpoint of the new sociology of agriculture, the Chilean case exemplifies many of the processes an international community of scholars has begun to explore. The direct producers on the land are becoming dwarfed in importance from two sides: (1) by multinational corporate suppliers of seed, root stock, fertilizers, pesticides, fungicides, and machinery; and (2) by packers, processors, shippers, middlemen, and marketers. Striking technological advances in fumigation and transportation have insured product quality and reduced shipping time and costs; similar developments in irrigation (in this case Israeli) have enabled Chilean producers at the edge of the northern desert to ship grapes for the lucrative North American holiday season in December. Computerized tracking systems follow produce from the farm to the distributor.

Paralleling and in part impelling this internationalization of production and distribution has come a homogenization and "yuppification" of taste among the affluent consumers of the core countries. For example, Chilean marketers have pioneered the introduction of seedless table grape

varieties both into Japan, where for years slipskin grapes dominated the market so that consumers must be persuaded not to peel the Perlette, Thompson, and Flame; and into the United Kingdom, where California seedless producers had no luck until the Chileans made converts during recent winters (H. Schacht, "State Sows the Seeds for a New Grape Market," *S.F. Chronicle*, 6/23/90, p. D1). With an assist from Mintz's (1985) calling attention to the role of taste and promotion in the staple-ization of sugar in the 18th century, we have emphasized the roles of health consciousness, aesthetics, and aggressive advertising—especially by supermarket chains—in the acceptance of Chilean grapes and stone fruit in the USA and Canada. Notably, this acceptance easily weathered the storm caused by the cyanide scare of early 1989, as 1990 proved by setting new records in volume. But Chile is heavily dependent on the North American market; the duration and cost of transport to Europe and Asia are at least 50% higher, and those affluent zones may well develop alternative sources of supply (South Africa already accounts for 11% of global table grape exports, Australia about one and one-half percent).

Another major issue, one shared between agricultural and development sociology, is the competition for land between the food needs of the local population and the profit opportunities of capitalist growers for export. Nothing in Chile approximates the disaster of the Sahel in the 1970s, where the expansion of peanut cultivation and cattle grazing drastically reduced millet and sorghum production and led to drought and famine (Franke & Chasin 1980). Although some croplands have been replanted with orchards and vineyards, the nutritional deficiencies of the Chilean poor—estimates put them at 30% to 45% of the population—have more to do with the extreme skewness of income distribution than with insufficient land to devote to food crops. It is an unusual story, because the military government originally opened Chile wide to agricultural imports, principally from the USA.

Prices fell, and per capita wheat production fell to nineteenth century levels. Protesting dairymen were dismissively told to eat their cows. But the 1982 economic crisis led to a significant departure from the neo-liberal model in agriculture, with the introduction of price supports and other protective measures. These in turn sparked the adoption of green revolution techniques and rapid surges in productivity on the medium- and large-scale farms. Domestic production as a proportion of consumption had risen by 1986 to 91% in wheat, 97% in sugar, 99% in dairy (much now owned by a New Zealand firm), 94% in corn, 78% in rice, and 60% in vegetable oils. Ought we call this phenomenon ISA, import-substituting agriculturization? Its current limits are precisely those that led to the crisis of ISI: a restricted internal market due to highly unequal income distribution, and high costs of imported inputs. Thus it is an odd mix of export orientation in produce and import substitution in foodstuffs that has produced the current agricultural dynamism.

It is worth emphasizing that in three ways, then, the success of the agricultural sector is due to departures from the ideology of the neo-liberal model: the state planning for export diversification under Frei and Allende; the state subsidies in infrastructure, tax breaks, and commercial promotion under Pinochet; and the introduction of price supports after the 1982 crisis. At the same time it is crucial to recognize that agriculture as such is rapidly being replaced by the agro-industrial complex (CAI) in basic foodstuffs as well as—if more slowly than—in export production. Central Chile's geographical resemblance to California has long been noted; now the leadership of the agrarian sector aims to replicate California economically as well.

Class Structure & Organization

Development scholars and sociologists of agriculture converge around the importance of rural class structure, both as an object of study and as a causal force in agricultural transformation

(or stagnation, for that matter). In the Chilean case, the last twenty-five years have witnessed a process of doubly discontinuous change that renders Zeitlin & Ratcliff's (1988, pp. 154-155; see also pp. 191-192) characterization of the mid-1960s utterly obsolete: "the dominion of the large landed estate...was still relatively secure." Dividing the recent past into four periods will help to make these changes clearer. (For more detail on what follows, see Gómez 1988.)

In the prehistory (1930-1960), many large estates began departing from long-standing hacienda practices by cultivating a greater range of crops to supply an infant agro-industrial sector, by starting to mechanize, and by employing an increasing proportion of afuerinos (non-estate laborers) to inquilinos (resident laborers with small plots for auto-consumption). Urban migration of displaced workers and land-poor peasants grew in importance. During the reform decade (1964-1973), the state expropriated many (especially the less modernized) estates, dividing them into smallholdings, some of which were cooperativized. Other estates were divided by their owners to avoid the reform. Unionization of workers and organization of peasants picked up steam, as the parties of the left joined the Christian Democrats in competing for the allegiance and votes of the rural population. The decade of counter-reform (1974-1983) accelerated the commercialization of land and proletarianization of labor; it also utterly reversed the redistribution of land and organization of labor. Of the less than half of the reform beneficiaries who were allowed to keep their parcels, many were soon forced into crippling debt and then into distress sales; virtually all were systematically denied credits and technical assistance, in part due to their politics, in part to the regime's idea that large farms were more efficient than small.

The full-on boom period (since 1983) has witnessed state-supported processes of property consolidation and concentration, of large investments by national and multinational

corporate enterprises, and of multiple polarizations: among producers, between large and small, with the peasant sector further marginalized; between growers and workers; and between regions.

In the present conjuncture and for the foreseeable future, both the dominant class and the working class strike the observer as extraordinarily heterogeneous. Excluding limiting cases such as the handful of traditional estate owners and the few industrial corporations which own agricultural land as a sideline, the owning class can be typologized into the following:

- a) primary production only
- b) primary production + supplemental processing
- c) balanced primary production + processing
- d) mostly processing with some primary production
- e) processing only

In terms of origins, these five can be classified into three basic types:

- a) national & rural
- b) national & mixed rural/urban
- c) international

The first two of these can then be further subdivided into those who have long engaged in agriculture and can be expected to remain, and those recently attracted by the conjunctural opportunities and might withdraw. A recent survey (Gómez & Echenique 1986) of a sample of medium and large scale fruit-exporting enterprises in central Chile began to explore these dimensions. With regard to entrepreneurial origins, it found that 50% had always been growers, 40% came from the liberal professions or commerce, and 10% had risen from rural wage work. With regard to the enterprises themselves, 24% had been inherited, 36% inherited and

augmented by purchase, and 40% bought on the market. Some enterprises include their own post-harvest packing and/or cold storage facilities, some have investments in canning and/or freezing, some in transportation. In general, the largest and most modern ones, including here the multinationals, tend to emphasize the post-harvest processes while controlling sufficient acreage to profit while minimizing risk in years of slack demand. The large enterprises also employ technical, supervisory, and administrative personnel who are coming to constitute a new middle stratum in the countryside.

The entrepreneurial class is marked by a high level of political organization, for the purpose of representing its interests both in sectoral struggles over conditions of employment and in national politics. Its ultimately successful battle against agrarian reform did not, as suggested earlier, prevent that reform from greatly altering the conditions under which rural accumulation would proceed. But while the major organization (the SNA—Sociedad Nacional de Agricultura) has defended class interests within the sector, the main propulsive force behind technical and commercial modernization has come from cooperatives of medium-sized producers and above all from specialized producer associations like that of the fruit exporters. This organization has direct links with North American groups like the Chilean Winter Fruit Association, the Delaware River Port Authority, and the International Longshoremen's Association, as well as collaborating with the Chilean state in market-expanding strategies. So the upper class promotes its interests abroad as well as at home, in spite of its heterogeneity.

The rural working class (about 20% of the country's paid labor force) is also extremely heterogeneous, except for its poverty and insecurity. Some four-fifths of the rural proletariat work seasonally, many of them described by Cruz's (1986) title —from estate residents to temporaries. Other seasonal workers are the

urban unemployed and/or youth, many—especially in the packing sheds— women, as in California, which is also a model for the migratory stream that follows the grape harvest, except that in Chile it runs from north to south. In an inventory of workers, one ought also include the semi-proletarianized peasantry, whose households require waged employment at least some of the year from some of its members in order to survive (Rivera 1988). Seasonality is highly pronounced: the largest grower-shipper has a year round work force of 500; his rolls reach 5,000 at the peak harvest moment and include about 13,000 different individuals in the course of a year. The labor force is unstable from year to year, and very difficult to organize, although residence-based organizing around collective consumption issues has had some success in Santa María (Falabella 1989). Petras (1988) has optimistically suggested a number of factors which, with somewhat lessened repression thanks to quasi-democratized conditions, "will converge to detonate working-class organization" (p. 73): residence-based organizing, the peculiar vulnerability of potentially spoiling crops to quite limited labor actions, and the way concentrated sites of agitation may affect adjacent areas. It is perhaps tempting to some analysts to read too much into the household and neighborhood survival strategies that have been the major emphasis of organizing among the impoverished sectors of the working class in recent years. The desperate emphasis on family and community survival was echoed on a national scale in the remarkable cross-class, across-the-political-spectrum response to the US embargo on Chilean grapes after the March 1989 cyanide scare, a generalized defense of the produce export sector as essential to the nation's livelihood. Further, the general scheme developed by Paige (1975) leads to a prediction of "wages and working conditions" unionization among agricultural workers in highly capitalized enterprises, should rural social movements arise at all. And the

present center-left government promises to begin a process of increasing public health and social service benefits for the poorest third of the population. In sum, then, given the structural conditions of the sector and the political conjuncture, a lengthy and incomplete process of relatively apolitical unionization seems considerably more likely than the "detonation" envisioned by Petras.

Concluding Note

Considering the recent trajectory of Chilean agriculture leads one to ask comparative questions about other Latin American semi-peripheral countries in which the agro-industrial complex increasingly characterizes both dynamic export sectors and advanced foodstuff producers for the national market, while coexisting impatiently but symbiotically with a peasant sector whose household strategies include the flexible supply of labor (and, in the Mexican case, sometimes land) to the CAI. The long historical process of primitive accumulation is far from over, but both the Chilean and Mexican cases suggest that agrarian reform, however radically intended, is likely to be absorbed into that process by counter-reform or by demographic pressures and economic uncompetitiveness. Not only agrarian reform, but peasant revolution as well may turn out to be 20th century phenomena. A feasible progressive agenda for the early 21st century is to create a modicum of social democracy in the countryside, as a counterpoise and corrective to the powerful thrust of contemporary agricultural capitalism.

Notes

1. Chile accounts for about 10% of global exports of non-citrus, non-tropical fruits according to ODEPA (Gómez and Echenique, 1988), and about 3% of all world fruit exports. But Chile accounts for 86% of global table grape exports, by far the most fragile and vulnerable such commodity.

References

- CRUZ, María Elena
 1986 "De inquilinos a temporeros, de la hacienda al poblado rural." *Documentos de Trabajo*, No.21, GIA, Santiago.
- DE JANVRY, Alan
 1985 *Latin American Agriculture from Import Substitution to Debt Crisis*. Berkeley: California AES.
- DIAZ, Harry and Rigoberto Rivera.
 1986 "Notas sobre la estructura agraria en Chile." *Documentos de Trabajo*, No.20. Santiago: GIA.
- ELIZALDE, Pedro
 1986 "El desarrollo frutícola en Chile y sus transformaciones sociales." Pp. 5-130 in *El Desarrollo Frutícola y Forestal en Chile y Sus Derivaciones Sociales*. Santiago: CEPAL/FAO.
- FALABELLA, Gonzalo
 1989 *La Casa del Temporero*. Santiago: SUR.
- FOXLEY, Alejandro
 1983 *Latin American Experiments in Neo-Conservative Economics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- FRANKE, Richard W. and Barbara H. Chasin
 1980 *Seeds of Famine*. Totowa NJ: Rowman & Allanheld.
- GARRETON, Manuel A.
 1989 *The Chilean Political Process*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- GOLDFRANK, Walter
 1989 "Harvesting counter-revolution: agricultural exports in Pinochet's Chile." Pp. 189-198 in T. Boswell (ed.), *Revolution in the World-System*. Westport: Greenwood.
- 1990 "State, market, & agriculture in Pinochet's Chile." Pp. 69-77 in W. Martin (ed.), *Semi-peripheral States and the World-Economy*. Westport: Greenwood.

GOMEZ, Sergio

1988 "Nuevos sectores dominantes en la agricultura latinoamericana." FLACSO Doc. de Trabajo #379, Santiago.

1987 "Dinamismo y vulnerabilidad de la exportación de fruta chilena." *Cono Sur*, Vol. 6 (3):16-20.

GOMEZ, Sergio

1986 "Rasgos predominantes de la nueva estructura agraria en Chile." *Boletín del GEA*, (18): 7-18.

GOMEZ, Sergio and Jorge Echenique

1988 *La Agricultura Chilena: Las Dos Caras de la Modernización*. Santiago: FLACSO/Agraria.

1986 "Nuevos empresarios y empresas agrícolas en Chile." FLACSO Doc. de Trabajo #277, Santiago.

JARVIS, Lovell

1985 *Chilean Agriculture Under Military Rule*. Berkeley : Institute for International Studies.

KLINGENBERG, Gunther and David Narea

1985 "Dimensionamiento y perspectivas del mercado de exportaciones horto-frutícolas para Chile." *Materiales para Discusión* #81. Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo. Santiago.

MINTZ, Sidney

1985 *Sweetness and Power*. New York: Viking.

PAIGE, Jeffery

1975 *Agrarian Revolution*. New York: Free Press.

PETRAS, James

1988 "The new class basis of Chilean politics." *New Left Review*, (172):7-81.

RIVERA, Rigoberto

1988 *Los Campesinos Chilenos*. Santiago: GIA.

RIVERA, Rigoberto and María Elena Cruz

1984 *Pobladores Rurales*. Santiago: GIA.

ZEITLIN, Maurice and Richard Ratcliff

1988 *Landlords and Capitalists: The Dominant Class of Chile*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

RESUMEN***Mercado Mundial y Transformación Agraria: El caso del Neoliberalismo en Chile***

Lareciente transformación agraria chilena es analizada haciendo especial énfasis en el boom de las exportaciones de frutas frescas. Se explora la expansión y diversificación de este sector y su característica estructural es explicada como "semiperiférica". El cambio en los patrones de consumo de los países avanzados y el perfeccionamiento tecnológico en el transporte y almacenamiento son facilidades que posibilitan su crecimiento. El incremento de la producción básica alimentaria nacional es explicado como consecuencia de la apertura hacia prácticas neoliberales. Como consecuencia de ello, la composición heterogénea tanto de las clases productoras como poseedoras se está terminando...

*Sergio Gómez es Profesor de Sociología en la Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) en Chile. Es autor junto con Jorge Echenique de *La Agricultura Chilena* (1988) y de numerosos libros y artículos sobre las organizaciones sociales rurales latinoamericanas.*

*W. L. Goldfrank es profesor de Sociología de la Universidad de California, Santa Cruz. Es autor del libro *The World System of Capitalism* (1979) así como de artículos sobre revoluciones y desarrollo comparativo.*

Two Crises or One? Persistence and Disappearance of Simple Commodity Production in Tobacco in Turkey and Canada

Mustafa Koc

Through a comparison of the conditions of tobacco production in Turkey and in Canada, this study aims to bring an understanding to the conditions of persistence and disappearance of simple commodity production in agriculture. It is argued that the variations in the scale of production and in labor—and capital—intensity between these two cases reflect two different tendencies in the decomposition and transformation of simple commodity production.

Mustafa Koc (Ph. D. Sociology, University of Toronto, Canada) teaches at the Comparative Development Studies Program at Trent University, Canada. He has researched topics including sociology of agriculture and food, change and development, and policy analysis. Dr. Koc current research interests include simple commodity production, commodity market, international trade and water resource management. He is the author of various journal articles.

Introduction

Through a comparison of the conditions of tobacco production in Turkey and in Canada, this paper aims to bring an understanding to the conditions of persistence and disappearance of simple commodity production (SCP) in agriculture. It is argued that the variations in the scale of production and in labour- and capital-intensity between these two cases reflect two different tendencies in the decomposition and transformation of simple commodity production. The Turkish case presents an example for the resiliency of a small scale and highly labour intensive pattern of simple commodity production based on use of family labour. The Canadian case in contrast, is an example of the so-called "modern family farm"; large scale, specialized, mechanized and capitalized.

The paper argues that the differences in the organization of production among simple commodity producers have to be examined within the context of unique patterns of transformation of agriculture in both countries, differences in natural imperatives of flue-cured and oriental tobacco production, markets and state policies. After examining the historical dynamics that have led to the emergence of these two variants of SCP, the paper attempts to examine the conditions

(*) An earlier version of this paper was presented at the XXIIth World Congress of Sociology in Madrid. I am grateful to Goran Djurfeldt, Philip McMichael, Sedef Arat-Koc and Alessandro Bonanno for their comments.

that threaten the survival of SCP in agriculture by comparing the effects of recent crises in the tobacco market.

Persistence as a Historically Specific Possibility

The question of the persistence of non-capitalist forms of production in agriculture has been the focus of an extensive debate in recent years. Much of this debate focuses on the conceptualization of SCP as a distinct form and its conditions of reproduction (Friedmann, 1980; Gibbon and Neocosmos, 1985; Bernstein, 1986). Most of these studies agree that SCP, rather than being an anomaly, is a product of capitalist relations dominating the economy. Explanations for the persistence of SCP vary. While some argue that SCP has been preserved by capital because of its functionality for the accumulation process (Vergopoulos, 1978), others point out the role of various obstacles to the expansion of capitalist forms in certain branches of agriculture for the persistence of SCP (Mann, 1990; Goodman and Redclift, 1985). Most of these studies also agree on the point that the internal dynamics of household production give simple commodity producers a competitive edge under certain historical circumstances (Friedmann 1978b; Koc, 1989; Reinhardt and Barlett, 1989). In fact, Mooney (1988) points out the "substantive rationality" of family farmers to explain the maintenance of SCP in agriculture. Finally, emphasizing the historical specificity of SCP, several studies underline the peculiarities of the labour market and the role of state policies in persistence of SCP (Bonanno, 1987; Koc, 1990).

Another important question has to do with the wide variations simple commodity producers present in terms of organization of production. Identification of both modern, capitalized family farms, as well as small-scale, labour intensive units as SCP, created challenges for its conceptualization (Friedmann, 1978 a; Koc,

1989). A solution to the variations that SCP presents is offered by Gibbon and Neocosmos (1985). Conceiving SCP as a "phenomenal category of capitalism", they argue that the "relative equilibrium" between the "side of capital" and "side of labour" within the simple commodity producing unit is only one of the possibilities. Shifts in either direction, then, also have to be seen as possibilities under the laws of capitalist competition, accumulation and concentration (Bernstein, 1988: 263; Gibbon and Neocosmos, 1985: 178-80). Semi-proletarian and capitalized farmers, in this sense, can be seen as variations of the contradictory unity between labour and capital within SCP which are not completely transformed into capitalist or proletarian categories (Koc, 1990)⁽¹⁾.

I will argue that tendencies towards capitalization or proletarianization need to be examined not within the realm of the individual enterprise but in the context of its relations with other enterprises engaging in production, distribution and finance within the agri-food system. In the post-World War II era, family farmers have been increasingly subordinated to financial and productive capital (Friedmann & McMichael, 1989, Friedmann, 1990). They have turned into buyers of chemical, mechanical, and biological inputs and sellers of raw materials for the manufacturing industry. Production under these conditions has also required increasing dependence on credit agencies which in their turn subordinated farmers to the financial capital and the movements of money markets (Friedmann, 1990: 20). Under these conditions, modernization of the production process implied intensification of commodity relations. Depending on the characteristics of specific commodity markets, state policies which applied to particular branches of agriculture, and the historical dynamics under which such transformation occurred, simple commodity producers have responded to commodity pressures differently.

The following comparison of the conditions

of tobacco production in the Aegean region of Turkey and in Ontario, Canada will help bringing insights in different patterns of transformation of simple commodity production by emphasizing variations in historical dynamics, natural imperatives of production, characteristics of the markets, and state policies. Canadian and Turkish cases offer us a valuable comparison in terms of identifying variations of responses of commodity producers to different patterns of commodity pressures. Canada represents a typical example for the so-called "American path" without a significant peasant past. Farmers have been involved in commodity production to a certain degree from the early days of settlement on. Transformation of agriculture have led to significant degree of concentration, centralization, and capitalization. In contrast, Turkey represents a typical case of the "transformed peasant path" where commodity production was introduced through state involvement and assistance. Transformation of agrarian economy from mostly subsistence based peasant production to SCP, has led to the consolidation of small-holder farming rather than large scale capitalized forms (See Table 1). Comparison of the Turkish and

Canadian cases also help us to examine the significance of variations in production imperatives and marketing arrangements of different tobacco varieties.

Crises of Tobacco Farming in Turkey and Canada

Since the 1960s, increasing information on the health risks of smoking and a determined anti-smoking campaign have been threatening the future of the tobacco industry. Nevertheless, until early 1980s tobacco production has remained as a viable enterprise and millions of families around the world kept on producing it in ever increasing quantities.

Tobacco producers in Canada and Turkey entered the 1990s in an atmosphere of pessimism facing doubts about the future of the industry. During the last decade number of tobacco producers declined from 2,566 (in 1980) to about 1,000 (at present) in Canada. Although the decline in the number of producers was less drastic in Turkey (from 255,000 in 1980 to 230,000 in

Table 1. Tobacco Farms Classified According to Size (hectares)

Aegean Region		S. Ontario	
Farm size (hectares)	%	Farm size (hectares)	%
> 2	28.7	> 36.5	18.0
2.1-5	50.0	36.6-61	65.0
5+	21.3	61+	17.0
Total	100.0		100.0
Average Tobacco area	1.14		20.6

Source: Derived from (Agmaz, 1978, Table 1., and Klosler, 1980)

1990) sharp downturn in real prices since late 1970s has worsened their economic conditions. In Canada, tobacco farmers are suing the federal and provincial governments for deliberately aiming to destroy tobacco farming through over taxation of tobacco products. There were hundreds of farm bankruptcies and several reported suicides due to adverse market conditions. In Turkey, tens of thousands of tobacco producers, protesting recent structural changes in the marketing of tobacco, and the low prices for their crops rioted in February 1990. In the following section I will examine the conditions which led to the survival and demise of tobacco producers in Canada and Turkey in the post World War II era.

Conditions of flue-cured tobacco production in Ontario, Canada

Different from their counterparts in the Old World, farmers in Canada do not have a peasant past⁽²⁾. Settler farming has, from the beginning, presented less resistance to pressures of commoditization. Nevertheless, until the 1940s, and particularly during the Depression years, Canadian farmers combined a highly diversified labour-intensive pattern of farming with self sufficiency in domestic consumption. This was a strategy to get some protection against unpredictable price fluctuations, natural hazards, and the vulnerability which results from dependence on a single commodity. However, the low productivity of these units, increasing labour-supply problems and, most importantly, the cost-price pressures progressively undermined the viability of diversified farming and pushed farmers towards specialization in the post WWII era (Hedley 1976, 418).

The rise in farm wages due to labour shortages in the early war years, and the cost-price pressures that have been pushing farmers towards greater efficiency stimulated the use of agricultural machinery, a process which had already gotten underway in the 1920s. Between 1941 and 1951

alone, tractors more than doubled, motor trucks tripled, and combines almost quadrupled in quantity (Winson, 1985: 425). Long term credit provided by the state for the purposes of expanding operations and increasing volume of production was also instrumental in the early phases of this expansion. Farmers expanded their assets by purchasing more land, agricultural machinery, livestock and other inputs. The average value of assets on Canadian farms rose to \$ 420,336 in 1981, from \$ 5,788 in 1941 (Ghorayshi, 1986:147).

The process of expansion has not been a uniform one, however. Concentration and centralization of productive wealth accompanied the processes of specialization, mechanization and capitalization of production. While thousands of dispossessed families moved to other branches of the economy in the post-war era, a small number of farms have gained control of much of the productive wealth in agriculture. Simple commodity producers in Canada have always been subordinate to capital (Fowke 1946). Farming in Canada, as in the U.S., has evolved without a peasant past, and been integrated into the commodity markets without significant resistance. The subordination of simple commodity producers has been maintained through the vertical integration of capital in agricultural input (Knutilla and McCrorie, 1980), marketing and processing (Mitchell 1975; Wignock 1988), and by the dependence of farmers on financial capital for credit (Bernier 1976). Increasing indebtedness and the oligopolistic behaviour of agribusiness have caused farmers to experience continuous cost-price pressures and have increased their vulnerability. Farm foreclosures, auctions and bankruptcies have become common scenes in the post-war era. In four decades, the number of farms has declined by almost 57 percent, from its peak of 733,000 in 1941 to 318,000 in 1981 (Census figures).

Canadian farmers did little collectively in resisting the existing structure of the commodity

markets. While those who could no longer survive on land were forced to move out, others tried to secure their position by expanding, often benefiting from the demise of their losing neighbours. When there was organized opposition, this was usually directed against the state and mostly in the form of demands for subsidies to avert general crisis of reproduction. Even marketing boards and supply management schemes were mechanisms to secure the position of already privileged units and had little to do with major structural changes. Defending the status quo was a losing battle and the post-World War II era witnessed hundreds of thousands of casualties. The real winners in this pseudo-competitive rationalization process have been agribusiness and the banks⁽³⁾.

The reasons for mechanization, specialization and capitalization has been especially more compelling for tobacco producers. Tobacco production in Ontario has been regulated by a quota system since 1934. While the quota system has been effective in controlling supply and protecting farmers from a cut-throat competition among themselves, it has made entry into the sector quite difficult. To buy a tobacco farm and a quota and the necessary equipment, a farmer needed to make a big investment. This has meant dependence on credit agencies. Paying back the mortgage on the farm required a significant cash flow which could not be maintained without large-scale specialized tobacco production.

Tobacco production has been an extremely labour intensive process, and without sufficient supply of wage labour, large-scale production could not be possible. Finding a cheap supply of wage labour, however, has increasingly become a major problem in the post-World War II era. One of the causes of labour shortage has been the success of modern farming itself. As concentration and centralization became the dominant feature of Canadian agriculture, families who lost their access to land moved to the cities where they could get higher wages and more steady jobs.

Unemployment insurance and other welfare measures, on the other hand, reduced the desperation of urban and rural poor to accept arduous jobs in the tobacco farms. By late 1970s, finding farm workers during the harvesting season became so difficult that the state had to get into seasonal labour arrangements with Mexico and the Caribbean countries⁽⁴⁾.

Under these circumstances, farmers were forced to resort to using labour saving technology, such as bulk curing kilns, mechanical harvesters, and transplanters, to lower their labour costs. Tendency towards mechanization, however, has meant increasing indebtedness to credit agencies and, in return, created even more pressure for expansion of production. This tendency, however, cannot be understood without examining the characteristics of the tobacco market.

The Flue-cured Tobacco Market

As mentioned earlier, tobacco production in Ontario has been regulated with a quota system since 1934. From 1957 on, the Ontario Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers' Marketing Board, the regulatory agency representing all flue-cured tobacco producers in Ontario, has been in charge of operation of the quota system and orderly marketing of leaf tobacco. Each year, representatives of the marketing board and tobacco manufacturers meet and set the allowable production limit for the coming growing season. Although both sides are equally represented, in practice, tobacco manufacturers have had the final say in determining price and quota levels (Tait, 1968).

The strength of manufacturers come from their oligopsonistic control of the tobacco market. At present, subsidiaries of three multinational firms, Rothmans and Benson and Hedges of Canada (a subsidiary of Rothmans Inc.), RJR-Macdonald (a subsidiary of RJR Nabisco), and Imperial Tobacco Limited (a subsidiary of IMASCO which in turn is a subsidiary of B.A.T.

Industries) and four leaf processors are each acting for a multinational control of the tobacco trade and cigarette manufacturing industry. These companies do not only control tobacco industry but also have large investments in other branches of the agri-food chain (Clairmonte, 1979). With widespread and diversified business practices throughout the world, these multinationals have the ability to move flexibly from one market to another, often manipulating the prices to their advantage.

Crisis of the Modern Farm

Until the late seventies tobacco producers were among the most prosperous farmers in Canada. Production continued to rise despite declining numbers of farmers. This situation changed dramatically in the early 1980s. Probably the most widely accepted reason for the crisis in the tobacco production is the decline in cigarette smoking in Canada. After its peak in 1981, between 1982 and 1987, cigarette and fine-cut tobacco sales declined by 14.4 percent. This was partly due to a major campaign against smoking. Smoking was banned in public places, in federal and provincial government offices. Restrictions were set for cigarette advertisement. Both federal and provincial governments kept on increasing cigarette taxes. Between 1980 and 1987, taxes on a package of 25 cigarettes rose from 63 cents to 1.82 cents. Manufacturers have contributed to the decline in demand for leaf tobacco in an indirect way as well. To satisfy health conscious smokers, they introduced new low-tar, low-nicotine varieties. The easiest way of reducing tar and nicotine could be achieved by lowering the amount of tobacco in each cigarette. In king size cigarettes of Imperial Tobacco, for example, amount of tobacco was reduced from 1.13 grams in 1974 to 0.86 grams in 1984 (Lipovenko, 1984). Using reconstituted tobacco also allowed manufacturers to reduce the tar and nicotine content by using lower quality leafs and tobacco

waste. While "healthy cigarettes" allowed manufacturers to reap higher profits, they meant lower business for the tobacco producers.

The decline in demand for leaf tobacco hit particularly those farmers who got into debt in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Looking for reliable customers in an era of high interest rates, Canadian banks played a significant role in actively encouraging borrowing among tobacco farmers. Farmers who would go to a bank to ask for a \$10,000 loan were leaving with a \$100,000 loan with the insistence of the bank managers. After all, there were no signs of a declining market and encouragement of the bankers were also an indication of trust in the tobacco market. Young farmers who wanted to make an entry, as well as older farmers who wanted to expand their farms or modernize their equipment were the major borrowers.

The bottom fell after a drastic cut in tobacco purchases by the manufacturers in 1984. Realizing that the future of the tobacco industry was in danger, bankers rushed to salvage whatever they could get from the tobacco farmers. Their attempt to clear "risky accounts" resulted in large numbers of farm bankruptcies. Unable to pay back the loans in short notice, hundreds of farmers lost their land, quota and even houses. For the survivors, the situation was not any better. The decline in demand reduced the value of their quota and land. The quota for a kilogram of tobacco, once worth of \$7.50 Cdn., was selling for as low as 80 cents. Farm machinery used for tobacco production and kilns could not even find buyers.

Getting out of tobacco farming in dignity and without major losses proved to be impossible for the tobacco farmers. In desperation, they asked for government assistance. After all, the federal and provincial governments had been making billions of dollars out of tobacco sales and could easily solve the problems of nearly 1,500 farmers. However, subsidizing tobacco farmers was not a popular decision for the politicians given public

concerns about smoking. Tax revenues coming from cigarette sales could be collected from cigarettes made with imported tobacco as well. Furthermore, 1,500 farmers even with their dependents, were not a significant enough electoral force for political parties to pay attention to.

Through the Tobacco Assistance Program (TAP), the state offered some help for those who wanted to quit tobacco production. But the total amount which was around \$30,000,000 was only one tenth of what farmers thought to be a realistic sum. The TAP was in a way a slow death verdict for the tobacco farmers. Money was given to farmers with the condition that they would quit tobacco farming by selling their quota on an agreed rate (25 percent had to be sold individually at the going market rate).

Conditions of Oriental Tobacco Production in the Aegean Region of Turkey

The Turkish Republic, which was founded in 1923, inherited a war-torn country and an almost totally bankrupt economy. The development strategy of the Turkish state was based on the introduction of commodity relations in agriculture—with state aid in supplying credit, means of production, and distribution—aiming to accelerate the accumulation process in the countryside, a process that would parallel and supplement the development of the urban industrial sector.

One of the most important changes in the agrarian sector was the replacement of the in-kind tithe tax with new cash taxes. This decision played an important role in the intensification of commodity relations by forcing peasants to enter into the commodity market. Another significant change was the new Civil Code which gave full legal recognition to private property rights on land which had an ambiguous status in the

previous Ottoman state. Paralleling these measures were low interest credits which were given through the state owned Agricultural Bank, a limited land distribution and resettlement scheme, construction of railroads and highways throughout the country, and establishment of agricultural schools. These measures were further extended in the 1950s, supported by a limited land distribution scheme and the introduction of mechanization in agriculture.

With over 35 percent share of Turkey's total export revenues, tobacco production could not be ignored by the state. The foreign controlled tobacco monopoly (Regie) was purchased by the Turkish state in 1925 and transformed into the Turkish State Monopolies. The state monopoly was responsible for purchasing tobacco for domestic consumption, and manufacturing and selling cigarettes and other tobacco products. Private capital was allowed to buy and process tobacco only for export purposes.

The attempts of the state to encourage commodity relations in agriculture have proven to be effective. However, they have also increased the vulnerability of producers to market forces and to natural disasters. Producers were relieved from the burden of the tithe. But they now had to pay taxes in-cash rather than in-kind. Subsidized credit saved the producers from usurers (at least partly), but it also led to increasing indebtedness and, more importantly, it made indebtedness a routine. Recognition of private property rights that was applauded by the propertied, prevented the access of landless families to land. While they could open up a farmstead on state property in the Ottoman era, they could now gain access to land only by tenancy or by ownership. Despite increasing vulnerability of the small peasantry, the relative shortage of farm labour and the decline in world tobacco market during the Great Depression and the following war years in the 1930s and 1940s, prevented a possible emergence of landlord capitalism in Turkey. Sharecropping proved to be the best solution for both the landlords

and the poor peasants. Those large landowners who could not find sharecroppers, on the other hand, sold part of their properties in installments to peasant families.

The vulnerability of commodity producers to adverse market conditions meant that the state had to find means to avoid major crises that would seriously disrupt agricultural production and decelerate expansion of commodity relations in the countryside. Especially after the Great Depression, the state was actively involved in regulating agricultural commodity markets (through support buying and pricing policies) and distribution of credit. Since 1946, the State Monopoly was authorized to carry out support purchasing of tobacco crop exceeding domestic consumption and exporting capacity.

Transformation of agriculture continued with great momentum in the post-World War II era, as commodity relations became firmly established in the countryside. This process, however, did not result in a significant degree of polarization among rural producers. In fact, the post-World War II era in Turkey was characterized with the transformation of peasant agriculture into simple commodity production and small ownership. In 1980, units with less than 100 decares of land constituted 82.3 percent of the total, and operated 41.4 percent of all the land used. While the figures representing the weight of small units remained more or less the same during these three decades, large units lost ground significantly. In 1980, units over 500 decares, made up only 0.8 percent of the total and controlled 9 percent of the land used, a major decline from the 1952 figures of 1.51 percent and 24.81 percent, respectively.

Tobacco producers have presented an even more extreme case of the preponderance of small units in agriculture, in the Aegean region. Tobacco producing units operating on less than 50 decares of land constituted

over 73 percent of all tobacco producing units in 1980 (SIS, 1980:222).

Imperatives of Oriental Tobacco Production in Setting Limits to Expansion

Production of oriental tobacco is an extremely labour intensive process. Because the leaves are primed one by one manually as they mature, harvesting extends through a three month period with varying intensity of labour requirements. There are, on the other hand, significant limitations to the application of labour-saving and productivity-raising technology. The small leaf size and the high field density of oriental tobacco makes it highly perishable and restricts the use of labour saving devices during cultivation and harvesting of the plant. Use of chemical fertilizers and artificial irrigation, which could raise the yield per deacre have been restricted by the quality requirements imposed by the market and reinforced by law. These restrictions, while reducing the yield, also lower the cost of inputs, allowing those who do not have enough capital to remain in production. The most significant difference between the oriental and flue-cured varieties in terms of cost of production, however, is due to the differences in curing techniques of the leaves. Oriental tobacco is cured under the sun without the costly expenses of building curing barns and heating.

The price advantage of tobacco in comparison to other crops grown in the Aegean region, its lower costs of production, and the possibility to respond to production requirements of oriental tobacco with minimum use of wage labour, have allowed small producers to survive on land. Under these conditions, for those who integrated commodity production in their cycle of reproduction, and had limited access to land and other means of production, tobacco production has become a necessity rather than a choice. Despite the relative success of small-scale family

farming, however, thousands of others who could not gain access to land and basic implements have left the countryside in search of better job opportunities in urban centers or abroad.

For the larger units, expansion of tobacco production by using wage labour continued to be an unprofitable venture. Instead, they switched to alternative crops which could offer better returns for large-scale mechanized producers in an expanding market. If they ever produced tobacco, the amount they produced was limited to a scale which could be achieved using mostly family labour. Other large landowners, on the other hand, left agriculture completely with the hope of getting better returns in the rapidly flourishing urban sector.

The Oriental Tobacco Market

Given its unique labour requirements, probably the most important obstacle to the expansion of large scale capitalized farming in oriental tobacco production has been the oligopsonistic market conditions and interventions of the state monopoly agencies into the production process. Since the introduction of state monopoly on tobacco, the production and marketing of tobacco in Turkey has been regulated by law. Although there have been subsequent changes over the years, the core principles have remained the same. According to these regulations, The Turkish State Monopoly (Tekel) was given the monopoly for purchasing and processing tobacco for domestic consumption, manufacturing and selling of cigarettes and engaging in matters pertaining to tobacco. Local and foreign buyers have been allowed to purchase and process tobacco only for export purposes. The state monopoly has been responsible for annually setting the prices for different quality categories. Private exporters, in contrast, have been operating as the middle men for the multinational cigarette manufacturers. The competition among oriental tobacco producing

countries and the global trade strategies of multinational corporations have forced the exporters to accept the prices dictated by foreign buyers.

The interference of the State Monopoly in the organization of production has been another important reason for capital to shun away from tobacco production. Concerns about standardizing the quality of the commodity and preventing loss of revenues due to contraband have led the state to define the ways in which production, handling and marketing of tobacco should take place. The areas where tobacco production can take place, the proper ways of the preparation of seedlings, planting, picking, drying and storing the leaves have all been defined by law. Monopoly representatives have had the right to inspect tobacco fields and storage places regularly to check for any irregularities. Such strict controls over the production process have reduced producers' flexibility in applying labour-saving and productivity-raising technology and negatively effected the profitability of capitalist farming.

Role of State Policies in the Persistence of Small Producers:

From the beginning the Turkish state has played a very active role in the intensification of commodity relations in the countryside. State subsidies have aimed to prevent a major crisis of reproduction among producers by helping them to cope with unfavorable production and market conditions. The major concern for the state has been the revenues coming from taxation of tobacco sales and exports rather than the welfare of producers. Tekel revenues from tobacco sales within the country in the 1960s and 1970s consisted of 6 to 7 percent of the total budget revenues. Exports, on the other hand, despite a gradual decline, have played a significant role in bringing in the vitally needed foreign exchange⁽⁹⁾. The significance of export revenues, also implied

that the state policies had to pay attention to the concerns of private exporters.

Motives behind state subsidies can not always be reduced to accumulation concerns, however. After the introduction of the multi-party regime in the post-World War II era, with the possible exception of periods of military rule, governments have more or less been receptive to electoral pressures (Erguder, 1981). Different from the Canadian case, tobacco producing families have constituted a significant electoral block in Turkey. During the 1960s and 1970s tobacco producers tried to influence the governments with their voting preferences.

Crisis of small-ownership

Tobacco producers in Turkey have never enjoyed a similar degree of affluence as their counterparts in Canada. Nevertheless, they have managed to maintain themselves despite their limited resources in a commodity economy. However, over the years, as the pressures on land increased, fragmentalization reduced the size of productive units, and prices received by the producers declined in real terms, the possibility of survival on land has become a limited possibility particularly for the younger generations. As their situation continued to deteriorate, tobacco producers have become even more determined in expanding production within the maximum capacity of their family labour power, while at the same time using electoral pressures to guarantee higher support prices. In the long run, this has led to a piling up of tobacco stocks in the warehouses of the state monopoly. Unable to cope with the cost of keeping these stocks, Tekel has had to sell them to foreign buyers at discount prices or destroy them. By the mid-1970s, especially after the oil-crisis, the farm support policies began to be considered as undesirable financial burdens for the state.

The state monopoly, Tekel, was also paralysed as a result of clientelist appointments in the

1970s. Despite the idle capacity of the state owned cigarette industry, despite construction of new factories, Tekel could not respond to the increasing domestic demand. By the late 1970s smuggling of American brand cigarettes became a lucrative business. Although the taste was different and the price was higher, they were at least available, of better quality, and more fashionable. All these developments paralleled a campaign by the private sector representatives who tried to abolish the state monopoly on cigarette production in Turkey. It was argued that joint ventures between Turkish investors and foreign multinationals would not only bring in foreign investment, but also improve the quality of tobacco in the domestic market and expand Turkey's export potential abroad.

After the military coup in 1980, the Turkish state adopted a politically coercive and economically liberal regime. Measures were taken to reduce state intervention in the economy, allowing market forces to operate with lesser restrictions. High support prices that tobacco producers received during the mid-1960s and throughout most of the 1970s, declined drastically in the 1980s⁽⁶⁾. Another important development that took place in the 1980s was the legalization of sale of foreign brand cigarettes in Turkey. The Tekel agreed to import and market foreign brand cigarettes. Sale of American blend cigarettes increased rapidly beyond the expectations of proponents who claimed that the foreign varieties would not be a threat to the sale of domestic varieties. Between 1984 and 1987 alone, the amount of imported cigarettes rose 477 percent while domestic production declined 5.6 percent.

Finally, in 1986, the government introduced a major package of structural changes in the tobacco sector. The new regime turned Tekel into a state economic enterprise, requiring it to become a profitable venture while abolishing the state monopoly on cigarette production. It also brought new restrictions in support purchasing and pricing policies. Previous policy that the Tekel would

buy all tobacco "to the last leaf", was replaced by a new one which was summarized as "good price for good tobacco".

It is argued that declining significance of export revenues from tobacco sales within Turkey's balance of payments and the fiscal burden of support policies lead the state to adopt these changes. The restrictions in democratic rights in the post-1980 military-civilian regime also made the passage of such drastic measures easier. Another important factor in the restructuring of the tobacco sector was the pressures of foreign multinationals. In fact, some observers even claimed that the organizational failure of the Tekel during the late 1970s was a conspiracy (Bag, 1984:17). Whether this was true or not, the abolition of state monopolies and domination of multinational firms in the production and marketing of tobacco products has been the trend observed in many Southern European as well as the Third World countries. It was argued that this trend was a reaction of multinational cigarette companies to the decline in cigarette consumption in the West⁷. (Muller, 1978; Taylor, 1984).

Expansion of foreign brand cigarettes in the Turkish market implied a decline in demand for oriental tobacco, which constitutes only a small percentage (up to 20) of the new brands. Attempt to grow flue-cured and Burley tobacco varieties have been largely unsuccessful due to climatic factors and the inability of small scale family farmers affording such a costly transformation. As demand rose for the foreign brands (16 percent of the market in 1987), even the Tekel began importing flue-cured tobacco to produce new cigarette varieties in an attempt to compete against foreign manufacturers. The decline in demand and the changes in state support policies have worsened the conditions of small-scale tobacco producers. The riots of February 1990 was a demonstration of their disapproval of the changes in the tobacco market as well as their fears for the future.

Conclusion

The Turkish and Canadian cases present two variations of the simple commodity production in agriculture. The tobacco producers in these countries differ from each other by the variety of tobacco they produce, by their degree of mechanization, capitalization and use of wage labour. These differences, in turn create variations in the conditions of reproduction of simple commodity producers in agriculture. The differences between the production imperatives of oriental and flue-cured tobacco varieties, however, are not sufficient by themselves to explain these variations.

As Bernstein (1988) and Gibbon and Neocosmos (1985) point out, conditions for the reproduction of SCP are constantly "created" and "destroyed" under the laws of capitalist competition, accumulation and concentration. While certain factors such as, natural and technical imperatives of production, family labour strategies, conditions of the market, and state policies may lead to the persistence of SCP, the contradictory unity may also shift in opposite directions leading to capitalist or proletarian forms. The possibilities of expansion of production, capitalization, specialization, use of wage labour may depend on the unique combinations of these factors.

In the case of oriental tobacco production, family labour was able to satisfy the production requirements of a small-scale, highly labour intensive operation. This could, however, be possible due to the dualistic nature of the market in which producers faced not only merchant capital but also a state monopoly that was trying to regulate the market with support pricing and purchasing policies. The initial success of smallholder farming has also meant that the tobacco producing families could use their electoral strength to pressure the state monopoly to continue with its support policies to the advantage of small

producers. Restructuring of the market and dismantling of the state monopoly and its support policies, became possible only under the military rule in the 1980s. Such a revision was partly due to the fiscal crisis of the Turkish state and its attempt to scrap costly subsidies in agriculture. The other reason, however, was the pressures of multinational cigarette manufacturers who were searching for alternative markets in response to declining consumption in the West.

In contrast, flue-cured tobacco production required large-scale, capitalized, mechanized farming, within a market in which entry was restricted with a quota system, and the subsidiaries of the multinational manufacturers were the major buyers. Although a marketing board was regulating the marketing of tobacco, it had very limited power against the oligopsonistic cartel of the manufacturers. Given tobacco's relative insignificance for the accumulation process within Canada (as opposed to wheat for example), the state did little in interfering the market. Under these conditions, competitive pressures has lead to concentration and capitalization reducing the rank of tobacco farmers, further diminishing their electoral importance for the governing parties for taking measures in support of tobacco producers. When the final crisis hit the tobacco sector, less than two thousand tobacco farmers, producing a publicly undesirable crop, were left alone to the mercy of the marketplace.

Neither capitalization and wage labour use, nor dispossession of property and sale of wage labour necessarily imply a complete transformation of SCP. Transformation should rather be conceived not as a quantitative process but a definitive qualitative change in the relations of production within the unit of production. Depending on the socio-historical conditions within which commodity producers are located, simple commodity producers may present variations in terms of use and sale of wage labour, degrees of capitalization, and scale of production. These variations are results of the contradictory

unity within the simple commodity producing unit and have to be conceived within the context of strategies of reproduction of the family and the enterprise. Such a perception does not deny the possibility of dissolution of the conflict between labour and capital within the unit of production and transformation of these units into pure categories of labour and capital.

While examining unique paths of transformation in different social formations, we also need to pay attention to increasing globalization of the conditions of production and circulation of commodities. Commodity producers, whether capitalist, simple commodity producer or else, are completely subordinated to capital which now operates with little restrictions by national boundaries. In this sense, producers and consumers in the agri-food system have become vulnerable to changes in completely different parts of the world. Decline in smoking in advanced capitalist countries, for example, has led multinational cigarette manufacturers to move to new locations of production and markets in the Third World causing crises in the conditions of tobacco farming and redefining the conditions of existence or disappearance for the producers.

While globalization of production and distribution erodes the boundaries of the nation state, ironically, it also increases the dependence of producers on state subsidies and gives legitimacy to state intervention. Depending on the political conjuncture, these policies may lead to the survival of simple commodity producers or may work against them. In the pre-1980 Turkey, using their electoral power, Turkish tobacco producers managed to gain state support (although they later lost it under the new-regime created by the army). In contrast, in Canada, lacking such a strength, the fate of tobacco farmers was left to the verdict of the market.

Our review demonstrates that despite differences in organization of production, the conditions of reproduction of farmers in different parts of the world are interlinked through the

global trade practices of agribusiness. Despite differences in the patterns and conditions of their existence or demise, neither the modern, capitalized nor labour-intensive, small-scale family farmers are immune to the effects of the markets. This vulnerability also shows us the superficiality of those arguments about the viability of different forms of farming based on explanations on the internal organization of the unit of production.

Notes

1. Transformation is conceived as a qualitative change that results in a complete restructuring of the relations of production within the enterprise.
2. Seigneurial regime in Quebec can be seen as an exception.
3. Producers of agricultural implements have also become the victims of their own success. While increasing "rationalization" and "modernization" meant better sales at the beginning, accompanying trends of centralization and concentration reduced their market sharply resulting in bankruptcies of several domestic farm implement producers such as Massey Fergusson.
4. As of 1989, there were 12,224 foreign farm workers employed by 1708 employers in Canada. 92 per cent of these workers (11,288) were employed in Ontario.
5. In 1957, for example, revenues from tobacco exports constituted as high as 50 per cent of the total export earnings.
6. Throughout the 1980s tobacco prices fluctuated around half of their mid-1970 levels in real terms.
7. Another reaction of the multinational cigarette producers to the decline in consumption was diversification of production into other branches of agri-food chain.

References:

- BAG, Davut
1984 "Tekel, kasıtlı olarak 'Tekel Bu İşi Yapamıyor' dедирмистir." *Yankı*, No. 675.

- AGMAZ, Ahmet
1978 *Cumaovası Bulgarca Koyu Tutun İşletmelerinden Seçilmiş Bir Grubun İşletme Organizasyonu ve Yıllık Faaliyet Sonuçlarının Analizi*, (mimeo), Izmir: Tutun Araştırma ve Eğitim Enstitüsü.
- BERNIER, Bernard
1976 "The penetration of capitalism in Quebec agriculture." *Review of Canadian Sociology and Anthropology*, Vol. 13 (4): 421-434.
- BERNSTEIN, Henry
1988 "Capitalism and petty-bourgeois production: class relations and divisions of labour." *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 15 (2): 258-271.
- 1986 "Capitalism and petty commodity production." *Social Analysis*, (20): 11-28.
- BONANNO, Alessandro
1987 *Small Farms: Persistence with Legitimation*. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press.
- CLAIRMONTE, Frederick, H.
1979 "World tobacco: the dynamics of oligopolistic annexation." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Vol. 9 (3): 255-273.
- ERGUDER, Ustun
1981 *Turkiye'de Tarım Flyat Destek Siyasasi ve Siyaset*. Istanbul: Bogazici Üniversitesi.
- FISHER, G. A.
1983 *The Economics of Producing Flue-Cured Tobacco in Ontario*. Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Economics Branch.
- FOWKE, Vernon C.
1946 *Canadian Agricultural Policy: The Historical Pattern*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- FRIEDMANN, Harriet
1990 "Agri-Food Complexes and Export Agriculture: Changes in the International Division of Labour." Research Paper. Toronto: University of Toronto, Department of Sociology.
- 1980 "Household production and the national economy: concepts for the analysis of agrarian formations." *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 7 (2): 158-184.

- 1978a "Simple commodity production and wage labour in the american plains." *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol. 6 (1): 71-100.
- 1978b "World market, state, and family farm: social bases of household production in an era of wage labour." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 20 (4): 545-586.
- FRIEDMANN, Harriet and Philip McMichael
1989 "Agriculture and the state system. The rise and decline of national agricultures, 1870 to the present." *Sociologia Ruralis*, Vol. 29 (2): 93-117.
- GIBBON, Peter and Michael Neocosmos
1985 "Some problems in the political economy of 'African Socialism'." Pp. 153-206 in Henry Bernstein and Bonnie K. Campbell (eds.), *Contradictions of Accumulation in Africa*. Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage.
- GHORAYSHI, Parvin
1986 "The identification of capitalist farms: theoretical and methodological considerations." *Sociologia Ruralis*, Vol. 26 (2):146-159.
- GREEN, Gary
1987 "The political economy of flue-cured tobacco production." *Rural Sociology*, Vol. 52 (2): 221-241.
- HEDLEY, Max
1976 "Independent commodity production and the dynamics of tradition." *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, Vol. 13(4):413-421.
- KLOSSER, George
1980 Hydro Report. TE/ER-80-0002
- KOC, Mustafa
1990 "Understanding state policies in agriculture." *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, Vol. 10 (3): 22-40.
- 1989 "Persistence as an historically specific possibility." *Sociologia Ruralis*, Vol. 29 (3/4): 280-293.
- KNUTILLA, K. M. and J. N. McCrorie
1980 "National policy and canadian agrarian development: a reassessment" *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, Vol. 17 (3): 263-272.
- LIPOVENKO, Dorothy
1984 "Growers face financial setback as firms cut tobacco in cigarettes." *Globe and Mail*, July 6.
- MANN, Susan A.
1990 *Agrarian Capitalism in Theory and Practice*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- MITCHELL, Don
1975 *The Politics of Food*. Toronto: James Lorimer.
- MOONEY, Patrick H.
1988 *My Own Boss? Class, Rationality and the Family Farm*. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press.
- MULLER, Mike
1978 *Tobacco and the Third World: Tomorrow's Epidemic?* London: War on Want.
- SIS (State Institute of Statistics)
1980 *Agricultural Structure and Production*. Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü.
- STATISTICS CANADA
Census of Canada. (Serial). Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.
- TAIT, Lya
1968 *Tobacco in Canada*. Tillsonburg: T.H. Best Printing.
- TAYLOR, Peter
1984 *The Smoke Ring: Tobacco, Money and Multinational Politics*. London: Sphere Books.
- WARNOCK, John
1988 *Free Trade and the New Right Agenda*. Vancouver: New Star Books.
- WINSON, Anthony
1985 "The uneven development of canadian agriculture: farming in the Maritimes and Ontario." *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 10 (4): 411-438.

RESUMEN

¿Una o Dos? Persistencia y Desaparición de la Producción Simple de Tabaco en Turquía y Canadá

A partir de la comparación de las condiciones de producción de tabaco en Turquía y Canadá, este estudio apunta a poner de manifiesto y a entender las condiciones de persistencia y desaparición de las producción simple de mercancías en la agricultura. Para ello se argumenta que las variaciones en las escalas de producción, así como, de la intensidad en el uso del trabajo y el capital en estos dos casos, refleja igualmente, dos tendencias diferentes en la descomposición y transformación de la producción simple de mercancías.

Mustafa Koc, Phd. en Sociología en la Universidad de Toronto, Canadá. Es profesor del Programa Estudios de Desarrollo Comparativo en la Universidad de Trent, Canadá. Ha investigado en el campo de la sociología sobre agricultura y alimentos, y en el análisis de las políticas para el cambio y el desarrollo. Los intereses actuales de investigación del Dr. Koc, incluyen la producción y el mercado simple de mercancía, los tratados internacionales y el manejo de los recursos hídricos. Es autor de artículos para diversas revistas.

“Agricultura y Desarrollo. Las Instituciones de Cooperación y Ayuda hacia América Latina y El Caribe. Una Evaluación Histórica”

Nelson Prato Barbosa

El objetivo central del proyecto es tratar de conocer las tendencias históricas de los programas de cooperación y ayuda hacia América Latina y el Caribe que tienen las instituciones gubernamentales y privadas de los países desarrollados, así como de las agencias multinacionales. Se trata de establecer el modo cómo la imagen que históricamente se ha tenido sobre América Latina y el Caribe, ha afectado los criterios que utilizan dichas instituciones para evaluar los problemas y salidas hacia el futuro de la Región, así como, en la formulación de sus políticas de cooperación y asistencia internacional.

El Proyecto de Investigación pretende, a posteriori, hacer comparaciones sobre los tipos y carácter de las instituciones existentes en los países altamente industrializados y organismos internacionales para el desarrollo (FAO, PNUD, etc) para la cooperación y asistencia a los países de América Latina y el Caribe en diferentes ámbitos de la agricultura.

Nelson Prato Barbosa es Profesor-Investigador del Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo de la Universidad Central de Venezuela. Ha sido Jefe del Área Sociohistórica y Director de Publicaciones de dicho Centro. Es autor y coautor de varios libros y artículos publicados nacional e internacionalmente. Entre otras publicaciones están: *Agricultura y desarrollo capitalista* (1988); *Las transformaciones de la agricultura venezolana. De la agroexportación a la agroindustria* (1990); *Las relaciones de producción en la agricultura venezolana. Aspectos teórico-metodológicos* (en prensa).

Problemática de la investigación

Quinientos años después de los viajes de Cristóbal Colón al Nuevo Mundo, que han significado la conformación del llamado Third World System (Wallerstein), y el inicio del Proceso de Implantación de las nuevas sociedades americanas (Área Sociohistórica del CENDES) no han servido para modificar los estereotipos, prejuicios y falsas apreciaciones que sobre América Latina y el Caribe existen, y siguen imperando. Las imágenes de exotismo, riqueza de fácil explotación, pobreza, violencia, etc., que todavía prevalecen, así como, las ideas de predominio y superioridad de los países más avanzados industrialmente siguen afectando las relaciones de cooperación y ayuda hacia nuestros países. Varios son los grupos de investigación y de variada militancia social que han criticado las intenciones de la celebración del Quinto Centenario del Descubrimiento y la Evangelización del continente americano. Se ha propuesto como una salida diplomática el nombre de Encuentro de Dos Mundos, para hacer énfasis en la presencia de sociedades y culturas diferentes a las europeas que preexistían en el momento del contacto, cuya mayoría fue destruida por efecto de la conquista y colonización del Continente. Aún así, esta fecha, a nuestro juicio, puede ser

(*) Esta propuesta es una versión revisada de la ponencia presentada con el mismo nombre en el XII Congreso Mundial de Sociología (RC-40, Sociología de la Agricultura en Madrid, 9-13 de Julio de 1990.

una buena oportunidad para hacer un balance, conocer y despejar, al menos en parte, cuáles son las imágenes que existen de la conciencia social mundial sobre América Latina y el Caribe.

Valc la pena recordar, que entre las prioridades que ha fijado la UNESCO para el desarrollo de las ciencias sociales de la región, durante la década de los noventa, está la de avanzar en la formulación de nuevas propuestas de intercambio y cooperación internacional más solidarios e igualitarios.

Las mutuas desconfianzas existentes hasta ahora entre los que dan las ayudas y los que la solicitan, testimonian, como lo señaló la socióloga venezolana Jeannette Abouhamad "...la común enajenación en la que estamos inmersos por la fabricación de representaciones imaginarias de las relaciones sociales que, reproduciendo determinado orden simbólico, eliden la historia y disipan misticamente lo real..." (1968:136). En efecto, los países de América Latina y el Caribe ingresan a la "historia", no por un proceso propio de encuentro y de superación endógena, sino como consecuencia del descubrimiento, conquista y colonización por parte de los europeos. El modo como históricamente se establece ese contacto marca la propia "identidad" societaria de América Latina y el Caribe, consecuencia de relaciones entre sociedades cualitativamente diferentes que presfiguran siempre la presencia del "otro sociológico" de una manera determinante. El nexo colonial, la base indígena preexistente y la expansión del sistema capitalista a nivel mundial conjugan factores que definen los rasgos de la implantación de las sociedades que comienzan a desarrollarse de este lado del Atlántico. "La implantación de formas idénticas a las metropolitanas recubren las inéditas autóctonas, hallazgos de los colonizadores y, luego, los recursos y los modos importados del África; emerge después la crisis y la ruptura de la sociedad implantada que desemboca en la gesta de independencia; se constituye posteriormente el Estado nacional por la incorporación plena al

mercado mundial y hoy se presenta al 'intercambio' universal en su condición particular de subdesarrollo..." (Abouhamad:137; cfr: Área Sociohistórica, 1982).

El desconocimiento de las determinaciones sociales e históricas de los procesos constitutivos de las diversas sociedades, de sus identidades culturales, de sus "autonomías", pasan por la aceptación crítica de un orden simbólico ya dado, que cristaliza en formas de "incomunicación" (Castilla del Pino, 1970) que desconocen los códigos de los diferentes ethos culturales que se determinan sociohistóricamente. La reproducción del "patrimonio cultural" (Bourdieu, 1972) está definida por la disposición a repetir estereotipos incorporados inconscientemente que reproducen relaciones de dominador/dominado. La necesidad de construir un conocimiento comprendido sociohistóricamente para innovar en las formas de admisibilidad del "otro", para debilitar resistencias ideológicas y generar rupturas creadoras, pasa también por modificar aquellas "disposiciones" para contribuir a transformar parte de las relaciones de sentido (Chacón, 1979), y provocar un desarrollo efectivo de las relaciones de cooperación más solidarias e igualitarias entre ellos.

La búsqueda de "otro desarrollo" (Hammarskjold, 1975), en ese sentido, debe pasar por conocer más cabalmente lo que sabe y piensa el resto del mundo sobre nuestra realidad, con el objeto de ayudar a modificar la imagen y la conciencia que de América Latina y el Caribe se tiene. En nuestra perspectiva analítica, en el futuro cercano, vale decir, los umbrales del siglo XXI, las políticas y programas de colaboración y ayuda internacional deberán apoyarse en una modificación y en el mejoramiento del "orden simbólico" establecido. Una evaluación de las diversas formas de conciencia social existente nos parece fundamental para "descubrir" las bases socioculturales sobre las cuales se han establecido y se establecen las diversas formas de

"cooperación" e "intercambio", que ayude a reestructurar creativamente un nuevo orden internacional. No olvidemos, que la ayuda prestada, se justifica ideológicamente, a través de las concepciones humanitarias, caritativas, y/o cristianas. Es la idea de una pobreza arraigada y la posibilidad de su superación por una "distribución" de una riqueza, que al final, ha sido producto del intercambio desigual internacional entre los países de mayor desarrollo y aquellos que pretenden ayudar. La insurgencia de las ideas neoliberales, por ejemplo, apuntan precisamente a enfrentar ésta dirección de la ayuda para el desarrollo (Vergara, 1990).

En las próximas décadas, "...No parece probable obtener un cambio sustancial en la condición de países en desarrollo sin contar con cooperación internacional sostenida..." (Urquidi, 1989). Si ello es así, la cooperación levantada sobre las bases arriba indicadas no permitirá avanzar sustancialmente más allá de la que hasta ahora se ha materializado, llámese cooperación Norte-Sur o Sur-Sur, en buena parte, por la incomprensión y desconocimiento de el "otro sociológico", dada la diversidad sociocultural de las regiones y países a las cuales se ha pretendido ayudar en su desarrollo.

Si solamente tomamos el ejemplo del PNUD (1989) en términos de los aportes hechos a los programas para el desarrollo de las Naciones Unidas, puede observarse que estos han ascendido desde 1950 a 1989, de 20 millones a 1179 millones de dólares americanos, respectivamente, sin contar los gastos cubiertos por otros conceptos. En 1989, este organismo previó como ayuda para el campo de la agricultura un monto de 192,3 millones de dólares. Y del total de la ayuda global prestada a los países en desarrollo, América Latina y el Caribe recibieron 135,1 Millones en ese mismo año. Aquí es válida la pregunta como la que se hace Hummel (1989:88) ¿Por qué el sistema de organizaciones mundial no logra resolver los problemas del desarrollo a pesar de ésta ayuda? Y entre algunas de las respuestas que

se da, indica la "insuficiente voluntad política de los Estado miembros de dichas organizaciones, en especial, de los más ricos y poderosos". Cada país desarrollado, básicamente a partir de la post-guerra, ha venido fundando instituciones para la cooperación y ayuda a los países en desarrollo. La mayor parte de los analistas de la problemática mundial están de acuerdo en que la tal ayuda ha estado dirigida fundamentalmente a combatir la pobreza, el ambiente, el crecimiento de la población y la defensa de la paz, constituyendo estas las prioridades de la cooperación internacional. La ayuda para el desarrollo de una agricultura moderna, automatizada, etc., ha sido por mucho más tiempo, área prioritaria de las políticas institucionales de los países desarrollados y de los organismos internacionales (Cfr. González y Jaworski, 1990).

Sin embargo, la última década ha sido, por demás, para evidenciar cómo la "ayuda" prestada durante las décadas de los sesenta y setenta: Alianza para el Progreso, préstamos de los Organismos Multilaterales (BID, FMI), etc., que en América Latina, por lo menos, contribuyó a impulsar un crecimiento y desarrollo económico, a pesar de sus desigualdades y defectos, se ha convertido en una pesada carga para estos mismos países hoy en día, y que se expresa en la deuda externa (Silva Michelena). En otras palabras, lo que ayer se otorgó como ayuda, en estos momentos está siendo extraído con creces, y ha dado como resultado una situación de estancamiento, por no decir de regresión económica, paralelamente a las explosiones de inestabilidad sociales, como lo demuestran los casos elocuentes de Argentina, Brasil y Venezuela, más recientemente (Cuadernos del Cendes, 10, 1989).

A ello se agrega que las condiciones impuestas por los organismos financieros internacionales para el otorgamiento de nuevos plazos para el pago de la deuda, para la condonación de parte de ésta, la rebajas de los intereses, etc., han sido hasta ahora poco alentadoras. Así mismo, ha habido gran inflexibilidad por parte de los

organismos acreedores ante las propias condiciones socioeconómicas de los países endeudados, al mismo tiempo que las llamadas políticas de ajustes, han demostrado ser poco eficaces para modificar de manera decisiva las situaciones que pretenden superarse con tales políticas (Yachir, 1989).

El otro aspecto, estrechamente vinculado al anterior, es la "ilusión" del desarrollo basado en la transferencia de tecnología, las inversiones extranjeras, etc., principalmente de los países acreedores, cuya dirección está sometida a las mismas expectativas que generan las llamadas políticas de ajustes, acompañadas de procesos de reconversión industrial y privatización de la economía, que aplican los organismos financieros internacionales.

Otro tanto se puede decir de los intentos fallidos por establecer mecanismos idóneos de cooperación, ayuda e intercambio entre los países hasta hace poco denominados del "Tercer Mundo", conocida más comúnmente como Sur-Sur. Las relaciones entre nuestros países son más bien escasas y basadas en desconocimientos y desconfianzas aún peores que las que existen con los países del norte. (Bravo, 1989)

Objetivos de la Investigación:

En este contexto global, y como parte de la profundización de un proyecto de investigación sobre las relaciones de producción en la agricultura venezolana, recién culminado (Cfr. Hernández y Prato 1990), nos hemos planteado los siguientes objetivos específicos de investigaciones: a) clasificación de las instituciones internacionales privadas y gubernamentales de cooperación y ayuda para América Latina y el Caribe en el ámbito de la agricultura; b) establecer cómo el conocimiento que poseen sobre los problemas de la agricultura en la Región ha afectado y afecta dichos programas y su futuro; c) determinar las tendencias históricas del "estado de la conciencia institucional" existente en estas instituciones a

través de los diferentes programas de asistencia creados internacionalmente para colaborar en el enfrentamiento de los problemas del desarrollo agrícola de la Región; d) elaborar un directorio de los organismos de cooperación y ayuda en materia agrícola para la Región, clasificados por tipo de institución, antigüedad de sus programas, volúmenes de recursos utilizados y origen de los mismos, tópicos y áreas a las que dirigen primordialmente su ayuda para el desarrollo, publicaciones, etc., incluidos los centros que se ocupan de investigar sobre la realidad agrícola de América Latina y el Caribe.

Para alcanzar estos objetivos nos hemos propuesto realizar un estudio del desarrollo histórico de las instituciones; los diferentes propósitos y programas de ayuda y cooperación que tienen para América Latina y el Caribe. Igualmente, consultar la bibliografía publicada disponible de las instituciones que se ocupen del tema y la opinión que tienen sobre las instituciones y sus programas, sus principales directivos y expertos en el tema, etc.

Estamos conscientes de que un estudio de esta naturaleza, no implica que los problemas a los que se han hecho referencia van a ser solucionados. Pero estamos persuadidos de que este conocimiento nos permitirá avanzar en la formulación de un diagnóstico del estado de la conciencia social que existe en el mundo sobre América Latina y el Caribe de forma más realista, tomando en cuenta, la diversidad de las instituciones y de su élite dirigente, que facilitará avanzar en el establecimiento de programas de ayuda e intercambio internacionales hemisféricos e intercontinentales, más solidarios e igualitarios. Tampoco se pretende reconstruir una imagen acabada y completa de todas y cada una de ellas. Se trata, más bien de detectar cuáles son las tendencias generales del desarrollo institucional, cuáles son los aspectos que son comunes, los criterios asumidos, los problemas detectados, y los rasgos que las diferencian entre ellas, en sus políticas y programas de ayuda para el desarrollo

agrícola de la Región en sus distintas áreas geohistóricas: El Caribe, Centroamérica, Los Andes y el Cono Sur.

Un último aspecto que debemos destacar, es que el alcance y la amplitud definitiva del proyecto de investigaciones propuesto dependerá, en gran medida, de la ayuda y la colaboración que brinden otros centros de investigación y expertos que se ocupen de los problemas del desarrollo de la agricultura de los países de América Latina y el Caribe en otros Centros de Investigación. Tal colaboración, por supuesto, es bienvenida.

Bibliografía

ABOUHAMAD, Jeannette

1978 **El psicoanálisis: discurso fundamental en la teoría social y la epistemología del siglo.**, Caracas, Ed. FACES-UCV.

AREA SOCIOHISTORICA DEL CENDES

1982 **Formación Histórico-Social de América Latina**, Caracas, EBUC.

BOURDIEU, Pierre

1972 **Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique.**, Genève, Librairie Droz.

BRAVO DIAZ, Eveling

1989 **La cooperación América Latina-Africa.**, Caracas, USM. (Mimeo)

CASTILLA DEL PINO, Carlos

1970 **La incomunicación**, Barcelona, Ed. Península.

CHACON, Alfredo

1979 **Curiepe**, Caracas, Ed. FACES-UCV.

COLLIARD, Claude-Albert

1978 **Instituciones de Relaciones Internacionales**, México, FCE.

CUADERNOS DEL CENDES

1989 No. 10, Enero-Abril.

ESPINOZA, R.A.

1988 "Qué significa 1992 para América Latina" en Rev. Desarrollo y Cooperación, No. 6.

GONZALES N., A. Y JAWORSKI, H.

1990 **Cooperación internacional para el desarrollo: políticas, gestión y resultados**, Lima, Ed. Grade.

HERNANDEZ, J. y PRATO B., N.

1990 **Las transformaciones de la Agricultura en Venezuela**, Caracas, Ed.CENDES-TROPYKOS.

HUMMEL, Charles

s/f "La cooperación internacional y la problemática mundial desde la perspectiva de la UNESCO" en Revista Internacional de Ciencias Sociales, No. 91.

INFORME DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD

1975 "Sobre el Desarrollo y la Cooperación Internacional" en Rev. Development Dialogue, No. 1/2.

LACAN, Jaques

1966 **Écrits**, Paris, Seuil.

PNUD

1989 **Informe Anual**.

SILVA MICHELENA, José Agustín

1986 **Venezuela hacia el año 2000**, Caracas, ILDIS/CENDES.

STALLINGS, Barbara

1987 **Banker to the Third World: US Portfolio Investment in Latin America (1900-1986)**, Los Angeles and London, University of California Press.

UNESCO

1988 **Reunión de Consulta sobre Ciencias Sociales**, Gran Programa I. Reflexión sobre los problemas mundiales y estudios prospectivos. Serie Estudios y Documentos BEP/GPI/26, Paris. (Mimeo)

URQUIDI, Victor

1989 "Limitaciones al crecimiento en los países en vías de desarrollo: la experiencia actual de América Latina" en Rev. Internacional de Ciencias Sociales de la UNESCO, No. 120, Junio.

VARIOS

1986 **Repensar el futuro**, Caracas, Ed. Nueva Sociedad.

VARIOS

1986 **El futuro de América Latina**, Caracas, UNITAR/CENDES. (Mimeo).

VARIOS

1988 **America Latina, Desafíos y Esperanzas**, Caracas, Ed. CLAD.

VERGARA, Jorge

1990 "La critica latinoamericana al neoliberalismo",
Caracas, CENDES. (Mimeo).

WALERSTEIN, Immanuel

1990 "Development: Censorship or Illusion?" en
Development Studies Journal, Vol. 1.

YACHIR, Faïçal

1989 "Crisis y políticas de ajuste en los países árabes"
en *Rev. Internacional de Ciencias Sociales de la UNESCO*, No. 120, Junio.

ABSTRACT

Agriculture and Development Institutions of Cooperative and Aid to Latin América and The Caribbean: an Historical Evaluation

The main objective of this paper is expose a research project to analyze the historic variations of knowledge and information about Latin America and the Caribbean among public and private institutions, which offer aid and cooperation to that region in agriculture field. Our aim is to determine how the historic image of Latin America and the Caribbean has affected the criteria of those institutions in their perception of the Region's problems and their solutions, and related cooperation policies and international aid. Likewise, the project will make a diagnosis of the economic, financial, scientific and technological aid offered by the Developed Countries and Multinational Programs for Development (FAO, PNUD, etc.) to Latin America and the Caribbean agriculture. The research intends, a posteriori, to compare the present levels of institutional development for cooperation and aid to Latin America and the Caribbean in agriculture fields, among the countries and regions selected for the study. This will help in the plans for more solidary and egalitarian cooperation mechanisms, based on mutual knowledge and respect for the cultural, political and social ethos which historically determine their identities.

Nelson Prato Barbosa, Central University of Venezuela. He has been Chief of Sociohistorical Area and Publishing Director in this Center. He is author and co-authored of numerous book and articles published domestically and internationally on Venezuelan agriculture in a sociological and historical perspective: *Agricultura y desarrollo capitalista* (1988); *Las transformaciones de la agricultura venezolana. De la agroexportación a la agroindustria* (1990); *Las relaciones de producción en la agricultura venezolana. Aspectos teórico-metodológicos* (1991).